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Preface
The intention of this thesis is to show that there appear to be 
critical flaws in the assumptions and constructs used by school 
psychologists. Basic theoretical flaws have produced a profession whose 
resulting practices are also flawed. However, there are undeveloped 
opportunities and possibilities in the school psychology profession 
which stem from the personal commitments, moral leadership, and 
potential impact school psychologists can have on students and the 
educational system at large.
This paper will examine some very fundamental philosophical and 
theoretical questions about the discipline of school psychology, present 
a rationale for an alternative model of school psychology, and examine 
the implications of this model for the discipline. It will be argued 
that school psychologists very seldom discuss their most basic 
assumptions about the nature of reality, about what counts as knowledge, 
and about the values and virtues important to the practice of school 
psychology. Such inattention, however, should not be construed to mean 
that there are no shared, basic beliefs and assumptions. On the 
contrary, it will be argued that the literature of school psychology 
yields by inference a number of common assumptions about reality, 
knowledge, and values. It will be proposed that the common basic 
assumptions of the discipline exert very powerful influences on what 
takes place in the practice and training of and the explicit 
communications among school psychologists.
McGraw (1964) called for a re-examination of the philosophy 
underlying all educational issues. She believed that our leading
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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spokespersons for educational reform have avoided discussion of the 
first principles which determine our educational goals and values. She 
stated further that, "the mistake has been to view education primarily 
in terms of social science and then, further, to view it primarily in 
terms of what can be verified through quantitative measurement" (p. 41). 
She quoted Boyer (1984) who believed that "the social and moral 
imperative of education is to help all students see the connectedness of 
things, an insight that touches the very foundation of morality— social, 
personal and religious" (p. 41).
Heshusius (1989a; 1989b) and others (Adelman, 1989; Iano, 1989; 
Poplin, 1987) challenged the mechanistic view of the human being which 
has influenced traditional special education training and practice.
Their arguments clarified how the paradigm of mechanistic science has 
greatly limited and distorted our views about what occurs in special 
education classrooms. Smith (1988) and Smith and Blase (1989) have 
similarly criticized many of the basic assumptions underlying most 
educational research and pointed out the resulting flaws in educational 
practice.
Just as psychology does not make sense without teleology (Robinson 
1985), neither does education. The mechanistic view of the person has 
eliminated, or at least ignored, the teleos of humankind. Worse yet, 
historically recent philosophical and scientific views of humankind have 
stripped it of a soul (Barrett, 1986). Thus, it should not be too 
surprising that the goals and purposes of education have not been 
seriously considered in the recent very critical reports of American 
education. Perhaps the teleos of education should be the reunification
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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of Spirit with Mind as so aptly expressed in The Secret, a novel by
Adrian Malone (1984):
The founding of civilization! Abel was the first Grandfather. He 
was a nomad, a wanderer, a man like your friends the Sioux, who 
live in harmony with heaven and earth and are bound only by the 
seasonal rhythms of the herds, because they know that in Spirit 
they are related to all things. Abel knew this; and because he 
did, Cain murdered him. Cain murdered Abel to destroy the 
knowledge of Spirit, for no other who knows it can make war, as 
Cain did, against heaven and earth. And when Abel died the Fall 
was complete. The children of Cain saw only an alien planet of 
inert materials, of soils and minerals and metals, to be possessed 
and exploited. They knew only of distant, fearful gods, 
perpetually angry with them for their sins, placated endlessly by 
their priests. They knew no more of Spirit. When Cain murdered 
Abel he murdered one half of their minds— the loving, creative, 
mystical half, in which they knew themselves to be at one with all. 
Since the crime of Cain his children have known only the intellect, 
cold logic, which divides itself from the universe and then drives 
to conquer it. They have lived ever since estranged from Spirit, 
in terror of time and death. That is their inheritance from Cain; 
and they have not squandered it. They have gained dominion over 
the earth. But in every sad generation, a few of them hear someone 
calling in their dreams, and they yearn for the murdered Abel 
within them, and the secret that he knew. (pp. 80-81)
The above interpretation of the Cain and Abel myth provides a metaphor
of what some see as the problem of Western civilization (Barrett, 1986).
The recent criticisms of contemporary education in the United States
(e.g., National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) have
focused almost exclusively on the potential economic consequences of the
achievement problems of American students, with little or no debate
about what are the ultimate life goals of the students. These reports
appear to assume that the purpose of education is to prepare our
students for economic warfare with other nations over the material
resources of the world.
If the view presented so far of our current concerns in education
is reasonable, then it is pertinent to ask whether domination over the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
world's resources, or at least obtaining our fair share, should be the 
primary goal of education. Classical philosophies of education have 
taken a much broader view of the purposes and functions of education. 
Aristotle (1953; Frankena, 1965), for example, along with many of his 
contemporary Greek philosophers, was concerned about excellence, a word 
we hear in many debates about American education today. However, in 
defining excellence and the good Aristotle did not avoid talking about 
the student's soul. Aristotle was not inhibited about taking a 
teleological view of education. He saw the purpose of education as 
promoting the contemplation of God. We rarely hear any discussion about 
the souls of students in contemporary discussions about educational 
philosophy, nor is there any discussion of the soul or spirit in the 
criticisms of contemporary education.
Kant's summum bonum, or supreme good, is good will, which he 
sometimes spoke of as the whole end of man and creation (Frankena,
1965). The implication in Kant's thought was that mankind is to be the 
embodiment and recipient of good will because of some special destiny or 
capacity to achieve perfection. In other words, there is something 
special about humanity which requires our attention. Thus, it is not 
surprising that " . . .  he also holds that morality requires us to 
'postulate,' not only the freedom of the will, but also the immortality 
of the soul and the existence of God, the former because it is necessary 
for us to attain perfection, the latter because it is necessary for the 
existence of the summum bonum" (Frankena, 1965, p. 128). It is through 
education that mankind is to achieve perfection, which is, ultimately, 
good will. So here, again, we see a teleological philosophy of
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
X
education which emphasizes a non-materialistic aim for education, unlike 
the philosophies implied in the current educational debates.
Two hundred years after Kant, empirical science had a distinguished 
record of accomplishments and had yielded numerous technologies which 
contributed to the industrial revolution and made various aspects of 
human life more productive and efficient. Around this time the 
pragmatic, experimentalistic philosophy of John Dewey (1961) made a 
rather large impact upon the rapidly expanding public school system in 
the United States (Bergan, 1985).
Dewey's (1961) philosophy was a reflection of the time, place, and 
culture from which it emerged. The United States was engrossed in the 
industrial revolution and objective science was the intellectuals' 
religion (Feyerabend, 1987). Thus, in Dewey's philosophy we find 
concerns about controlling consummatory experiences, an unshakable 
belief in empirical science, and a denial of the immortal spirit of each 
person (Frankena, 1965). This materialistic bias continues in American 
education today.
Perhaps C. G. Jung (1933) came closest of the early twentieth 
century psychologists to recognizing humankind's core problem. He 
recognized the alienation of spirit from the living person and 
articulated an ideal of personal wholeness. Progoff (1973) told us, 
however, that even Jung was fearful of the scientific establishment and, 
therefore, very cautiously presented his ideas regarding certain 
concepts which hint at mysticism, such as synchronicity (Jung, 1960).
But in his private communications with others, according to Progoff, it 
was evident that Jung saw the limitations of the mechanistic determinism
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
of modern psychology and saw possibilities which could not be 
encompassed by modern science.
School psychologists tend to implicitly subscribe to the 
mechanistic view that reality is independent of the observer, that 
knowledge of reality can be discovered to reveal laws from which strong 
predictions can be made, and that facts and values are independent 
constructs. These and other basic positions and related beliefs in 
school psychology will be criticized in this thesis and a different set 
of basic assumptions, and their implications, will be proposed.
It will be shown that the profession of school psychology is 
undergoing change which is related to educational reform in general and 
to a number of critical failures of school psychology in particular. 
School psychologists were originally invited into the schools to 
administer IQ tests and, later, to assist in remediating the 
educationally relevant problems of students. In recent years, however, 
the use of IQ tests has been criticized legally and conceptually. 
Placement of children into special remedial programs has not fulfilled 
the promises of special education. The concepts of learning styles, 
educational diagnosis, and educational remediation have been questioned 
and found wanting. Thus, the most basic conceptual tools of the school 
psychologist have been severely challenged and are leading to reform in 
some parts of the United States. The outstanding feature of this and 
past reforms in school psychology is that there are no signs that the 
basic notions about reality, knowledge, and values are being examined. 
Without a re-examination of the philosophical assumptions which underpin
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the constructs and practices of school psychology the current cycle of 
reform is likely to be futile.
Because the contemporary problems of school psychology make only 
limited sense taken out of the historical context in which education and 
psychology have become associated, a brief view of the philosophical and 
social past of each discipline will be provided. This backdrop will 
help to give meaning to some of the recurrent problems in both education 
and psychology as they impinge upon the current practice of school 
psychology.
If it can be documented that scientific knowledge of human 
psychology has advanced only modestly beyond folk psychology, and it 
will be argued that this is the case, then school psychologists are in 
the embarrassing position of having little special knowledge to offer. 
Some would argue that the neurosciences have enriched our understanding 
of human psychology, others would argue that human psychology is not 
reducible to brain events. If the latter point of view is accepted, 
then we can argue that scientific psychology has little to offer beyond 
folk psychology. If the former is accepted then the proponents of the 
thesis that the mind just is brain states are obliged to demonstrate how 
knowledge of brain events can further our understanding of human 
motives, intentions, behavior, and social relations. The difficult 
question for school psychologists is, how can we explain the phenomena 
of human psychology in terms of nervous system (physical) events in a 
way which can be useful to our clients?
The answer to the above question turns out to be crucial in 
deciding whether or not psychology will be judged to be a science, in
L _ _______
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the same sense that physics is a science, and will be unified with the 
other physical sciences. Either psychology will not be judged to be a 
science or the notion of a science must be expanded to include the human 
sciences which function, it will be argued, without a solution to the 
mind/body problem and which, therefore, may have to utilize some 
assumptions and methods different from the physical sciences.
Briefly, the following basic positions will be put forward: 
reality is an undivided whole; knowledge is constructed; social 
knowledge is a function of social consensus; personal knowledge exerts a 
major influence on one’s behavior; humans are intentional beings; things 
matter to persons; the purpose of education is to facilitate the 
student's search for a personal meaning for life. These assumptions are 
not new in the history of human thinking, but they are alien to 
mainstream school psychology, a modern invention of psychologists and 
educators. A model for the practice of school psychology, based upon 
these fundamental concepts, will be presented. Since change in a human 
institution or practice develops out of a history and tradition, if 
school psychology is to change it will change as an outgrowth of current 
traditions and practices. Thus, some of the ways in which current 
school psychology practices might change as a result of an acceptance of 
these reformulated basic assumptions and the related model will be 
presented in a series of case studies. It will be asserted that one of 
the more important virtues of school psychology in the future will be 
that of humility.
Concerning the title of this thesis, the reader should not think of 
the term "foundational" in the metaphorical sense of a structural
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
foundation, as in the foundation of a building. Rather, consider the 
assumptions presented at the beginning of Chapter 4 as the inauguration 
of a new way of viewing the practice of school psychology, as in the 
foundation of an intentional social group or movement. Also, the reader 
is discouraged from taking the term "model" literally or in its use in 
science as a preliminary construction of how something works. On the 
contrary, the reader is advised to think of this model in the sense of a 
standard of excellence to be imitated. It is a challenge to other 
school psychologists to rationally debate the values stressed in Chapter 
4, and to join in the author's efforts to live and practice the 
standards which evolve from this dialogue.
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ABSTRACT
A major crisis in the profession of school psychology has emerged 
from the body of recent empirical studies in psychology and education. 
Research on school psychology assessments has suggested that little, if 
any, data are produced in these evaluations which is useful for the 
remediation of students' educational problems. Likewise, psycho- 
educational treatments of the behavior and learning problems of school 
children have empirically shown only weak, if any, efficacy.
An examination of some of the fundamental philosophical, 
theoretical, and practical foundations of school psychology yielded 
reasons for the crisis in the profession. The underlying assumptions of 
externalism and resulting faulty notions about objectivity and value 
neutrality were shown to be major contributors to the problems of school 
psychology. The failure to find any relatively exceptionless laws of 
behavior from which psychological practice can be based was presented as 
another of the reasons for the crisis. Mechanistic theories of the 
person, which are prevalent in experimental psychology, have invaded the 
thinking of school psychologists and other educators with unfortunate 
results. Semantic, diagnostic, research, and measurement problems in 
school psychology have evolved from these underlying philosophical and 
theoretical errors.
The following alternative foundational concepts were offered for 
the practice of school psychology: (a) reality is an undivided whole;
(b) reality is constructed through the dialectical process by the 
community of observers; (c) shared knowledge is developed out of social 
consensus; (d) personal knowledge exerts a major influence on the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
person's behavior; (e) human beings possess purposes and intentions; (£) 
human beings have moral status; and (g) the overriding purpose of 
education should be to facilitate the student's search for personal 
meaning for her/his life.
From this set of basic concepts a model for the practice of school 
psychology was developed. The model designated (a) the purpose of 
school psychology, (b) the ways in which the school psychologist 
enriches her/his clients, (c) a democratic approach to decision making, 
(d) the expansion of what counts as knowledge in the profession, and (e) 
the virtuous school psychologist as less of an expert and more of a 
moral leader. A series of case histories was presented to demonstrate 
the model in action.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ORIGINS OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY 
A Brief History
Mass Education
If one of the purposes of this thesis is to examine some of the 
fundamental problems in the practice of school psychology, then it will 
be helpful for the reader to have a brief exposure to the history of the 
profession and some of the basic movements in psychology and education 
which have shaped its practices. While reviews of the history of school 
psychology may be found in various introductory texts (which will be 
cited throughout this chapter), these are largely traditional, 
uncritical backward looks at the profession. In this chapter a more 
critical review of the history and influences will be offered than can 
be found in most school psychology textbooks. Such a critical review is 
needed in order to facilitate the dialogues which are currently shaping 
the profession, especially in light of the current school psychology 
"revolution” (Reschly, 1988) and the crises of the discipline of 
psychology (Westland, 1978). These criticisms will be more fully 
developed in a subsequent chapter.
Most persons who have grown up in an educational system in the 
United States take compulsory and mass education for granted. However, 
the attempt to educate all children in this country began only about 140 
years ago. It started earlier and developed faster in the United States 
than in other countries (Carrier, 1986). A number of problems and 
philosophical developments within the compulsory and mass education
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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movement converged to result in the conception of school psychology as a
profession (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1985).
One of the most significant of these problems was the influx into
the schools of students with a very wide range of abilities, some of
whom were thought to be incapable of learning. From the 
reinterpretation of social Darwinism by Lester Ward (1893/1954) and his 
colleagues (as cited in Kaplan & Kaplan, 1985) emerged a philosophy in 
which mind was believed capable of mastering nature and ameliorating 
social ills. This philosophy of improving humankind fostered the 
development of various specialists in the schools to assist in solving 
social and educational problems. Thus, the birth of school psychology 
was necessarily preceded by the move, in the United States, to mass 
education.
The Development of Intelligence Tests
School psychology is also indelibly linked to the history of 
special education and the development of intelligence testing (Gray, 
1963). Although most contemporary textbooks on psychological testing 
give a brief history of the testing movement, ijt is rare to find 
reference to the philosophical and political beliefs of the test 
developers and the historical context within which intelligence testing 
was born. Anastasi (1976) and Sattler (1982), for example, briefly 
examined the history of mental testing without mentioning the eugenics 
movement with which many of the early psychological test advocates were 
involved (Blum, 1978; Gould, 1981). Both Anastasi and Sattler presented 
the rise of testing as though it evolved from an apolitical interest in 
the psychology of individual differences (Anatasi, p. 8; Sattler,
jr.h
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p. 30) or in the problems of identifying and helping mentally retarded 
school children (Anastasi, p. 6; Sattler, p. 29). While Cronback (1984) 
devoted approximately two pages (pp. 197-198) to the tendency of many of 
the early test developers to confuse IQ scores with an individual's 
innate worth, he failed to elaborate on the social climate of the times 
and the social consequences of the movement.
It would appear that writers outside the field of psychology have 
been needed to illuminate the origins of intelligence testing. Gould 
(1981), a paleontologist and a science historian, provided an extensive 
socio-historical examination of the developments of mental measurement 
in psychology as did Blum (1978), whose major field was sociology.
Gould found Alfred Binet, the creator of the first practical scale of 
intelligence, to be a rather sympathetic character who refused to 
believe that his scale truly measured intelligence, who thought that it 
should be used for identifying children who needed help in school and 
not for ranking children, and who believed that the scores on his scale 
were for practical uses and did not represent anything innate. Gould, 
however, was not as sympathetic with those who followed Binet, the 
American hereditarians such as H. H. Goddard, L. M. Terman, R. M.
Yerkes, C. C. Brigham, and Arthur Jensen, and the British general 
factorists, Charles Spearman and Cyril Burt.
Gould (1981) found in his research an incredible amount of 
falsifying of data, sloppy research methods, and acceptance of clearly 
unreliable data in the early development of the IQ testing movement in 
the United States and England. Une example is that of Goddard's work 
with the infamous Kallikak family, often cited in introductory
*>.
[,
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psychology textbooks as an instance of familial retardation (Boring, 
Langfeld, & Weld, 1948; Cruze, 1951; Goddard, 1914; Harlow, McGough, & 
Thompson, 1971; Taylor & Manning, 1975). Gould suspected that the 
photographs of this family had been altered. Therefore, he submitted 
the originals to experts who verified that the photographs had been 
retouched in order to make the facial characteristics more depraved and 
simian in appearance.
Another example of sloppy research was reported by Gould (1981) 
regarding the work of Yerkes in his supervision of the mass intelligence 
testing of millions of army recruits during World War 1. Gould found 
documented evidence that Yerkes' attempts to standardize the 
administration of the test were frequently violated. The Beta, or 
nonverbal, form of the test was supposed to be administered to 
immigrants and illiterates, but this directive was often ignored in the 
testing stations across the United States. The frequency of zero scores 
was high on both forms of the test, but they were especially high on the 
Alpha test which was the verbal form. The quantity of zero scores on 
this test indicated (or should have) that a large number of recruits 
could not read or write well enough, or that they did not understand the 
instructions adequately, to answer any of the questions correctly.
Among those examined it was found that more recent immigrants, largely 
from southern and eastern Europe, scored lower on these tests. Of 
course these lower scores were primarily the result of the cultural, 
language, and educational differences among these groups. In spite of 
the obvious (from our perspective today) bias and invalidity of these 
tests, they provided the scientific basis for immigration policies which
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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restricted southern and eastern Europeans from emigrating to the United 
States.
Gould (1981) intimated that the unscientific development of the 
Army Alpha and Beta tests and the resulting test data on immigrants to 
the United States after World War I supported the eugenicists1 views. 
This unscientific, biased data, in turn, was used to fashion immigration 
laws which provided quotas for each country based upon the performance 
of those immigrants tested during World War I. The quotas favored 
northern and western Europeans over southern and eastern Europeans.
Thus, Gould suggested, these test data may have contributed to the 
Holocaust of World War II by denying the emigration of millions of Jews 
from southern and eastern Europe who were attempting to escape the 
Nazis.
A more recent example of the falsifying of data regarding the 
heritability of IQ is the case of Sir Cyril Burt. Burt (1971, 1972) was 
a world renowned British psychologist who argued strongly for the 
position that IQ is mostly determined by genetic factors. However, it 
was later discovered by Kamin (1974) that some of Burt's data were 
faked. Indeed, much of the argument for heritability of IQ was based 
upon Burt's data (Gould, 1981), but nowhere in Jensen's (1980) 
voluminous work, in which Burt is cited frequently, was the fakery 
acknowledged.
Blum's (1978) analysis of the history of intelligence testing began 
with early nineteenth century imperialism and slavery. He emphasized 
the historical importance of attempts by many thinkers during the era of 
rampant imperialism and slavery to justify these practices on biological
L
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and racial supremacy grounds. Galton searched— in vain— for many years 
for physical and sensory measures which would verify the hereditarian 
position. Thus, it should come as no surprise that both the British and 
American hereditarians began their research on mental testing with the 
assumption that there were (are) biological, inherited differences 
between the dominant classes (white, protestant, Northern European) and 
the dominated classes (white, non-white, non-protestant, Southern and 
Eastern European, African, Asian, etc.). Blum viewed the invention of 
IQ tests by Binet and Simon as a moderate advance for the field of 
educational psychology, and as a " . . . tremendous, revolutionary 
advance for the development of Galtonian pseudoscience” (p. 55).
Binet tried and rejected many of the physical and sensory measures 
previously used by Galton in trying to construct a test of mental 
abilities, but Binet's conception of intelligence was different from 
Galton's (Blum, 1978). Whereas Galton and other hereditarians were 
looking for objective measures of inherited mental capacities, Binet was 
searching for a predictor of school success. Binet eventually 
constructed his tests of items which were refleptive of the knowledge 
which was taught in school and, thus, was able to find reasonably good 
predictors of school success. However, he viewed his test not as a 
measure of innate capacity but as one which described behavior at a 
particular time and in a particular place. Because Binet, and others, 
found his measure useful for practical, educational purposes (because it 
had criterion validity) it rapidly became the accepted measure of 
intelligence against which other measures were compared (and, thus,
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became one of the criteria against which other IQ tests were, and 
continue to be, compared, as pointed out by Gould, 1981),
An interesting and revolutionary approach to studying the matrix of 
correlations among mental tests, factor analysis, was first used by 
Charles Spearman (Gould, 1981). He was searching for a causal factor 
underlying performance on these tests and found a substantial principal 
factor, referred to as j*, which could account for much of the variance 
among the tests (Gould; Jensen, 1980). He and his successors emphasized 
the importance of g as a unilinear form of intelligence; such a view is 
justified primarily by the process from which it was derived, factor 
analysis. It should be noted that Gould argued that the principal 
components method of factor analysis is only one way of extracting 
factors from multiple correlations and that L. L. Thurstone had pointed 
out the kind of rotation one employs has no theoretical, mathematical, 
or psychological necessity. Gould (1987) summed up his argument this 
way:
Where you place the axes depends upon what you want to learn.
Given our deep and subtle prejudices for unilinear ranking and 
notions of progress, and our not so subtle preferences for ordering 
people by inferred "value" (with one's own'group invariably most 
worthy), it is not surprising that principal components seemed the 
most "natural," indeed the only proper way to perform factor 
analysis, (p. 136)
Moreover, Spearman and his successor, Burt, strongly believed that 
g was innate and they inferred a physical substrate for it (Gould,
1981). Jensen (1980) is the most recent of general factor theorists who 
reified g when he stated that " . . .  it is as much a biological 
reality, fashioned by evolution, as the morphological features of the 
organism" (p. 182). Thus, Jensen joined the ranks of many earlier
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theorists in converting the hypothetical construct of intelligence into 
a thing, a view which was predominant in psychology during the 
inauguration and early development of school psychology. Jensen's 
position was similar to those who subscribed to the identity hypothesis 
wherein "brain state" is equivalent to "mind state" (Bungs & Ardilla, 
1987).
School Psychology and Special Education
The development of special education and mental testing paralleled 
one another for many years (Gray, 1963). Likewise, the growth of school 
psychology in the twentieth century has closely followed the growth and 
funding of special education programs (Reschly, 1983). Classes for the 
mentally retarded may have begun in Europe as early as 1859, but did not 
commence in the United States until 1896 (Frampton & Rowell, 1938, as 
cited in Gray). In this same year Lightner Witmer began his 
psychological clinic at the University of Pennsylvania. Much of the 
focus of this new clinical psychology, until World War II, was on 
children (Gray).
Carrier (1986) presented a sociologist's view of the history of 
special education in England and the United States. While this view is 
certainly not the only version and not the most flattering one, it does 
make an attempt to locate the events in the history of special education 
within the social context, including the prevailing educational 
philosophy of the time. He defined the purpose of education as that of 
reproducing, justifying, and reflecting the social order. Thus, one of 
the main functions of the school in advanced societies was, and 
continues to be, " . . .  to sort students, to differentiate them, and to
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allocate them to different educational treatments" (p. 290). The school 
psychologist has been instrumental in this sorting process.
Carrier's (1986) version of U.S. educational history presented the 
majority of educators in the early nineteenth century as ideologically 
egalitarian. They also subscribed to substantialism, the belief that 
there are different types or sorts of students whose differences are 
substantive, real, and internal to the individual. However, near the 
end of the nineteenth century American educational ideology changed, 
under the influence of John Dewey and his followers, as it became more 
child-centered and recognized that all children did not learn the common 
curriculum at the same pace. "This encouraged the development of 
educational psychology to help determine just what those individual 
attributes were . . . "  (p. 300). According to Carrier, this 
represented a change from the egalitarian and substantialist position to 
that of the egalitarian and contractualist ideology. The contractualist 
agreed that students may indeed be different, but these differences are 
. . . superficial and artifactual, generated by unjust, inegalitarian 
social forces that educators ought to counter and correct" (p. 291).
This ideological shift furthered the sorting process in the schools in 
order to provide the education appropriate to the individual child. As 
a part of this sorting process special education in the United States 
grew more rapidly than in Great Britain, where the egalitarian, 
contractualist movement developed several decades later.
The egalitarian, substantialist doctrine was reflected in the 
"separate but equal" doctrine which applied to American blacks until the 
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. It was shortly after this Supreme
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Court ruling that special education programs for the mildly retarded
were begun in various places in the United States, for example,
Washington, D. C. and California. Carrier (1986) saw a parallel between
the emerging contractualist philosophy in education at the turn of the
century and the changes evident in special education after racial
segregation was outlawed; "thus, the relationship between mass
education, contractualist ideology, and special education is repeated in
miniature in the ending of racial segregation in the schools" (pp. 302-
303). Special education has continued to grow in the United States,
especially with the impetus of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975. However, the effects of special education,
especially for the mildly handicapped, have been criticized (Blatt &
Garfunkel, 1973; Carlberg & Kavale, 1980; Cegelka & Tyler, 1970; Glass,
1983; Milofsky, 1974). The utility of diagnostic and prescriptive
testing has also been found lacking (Arter & Jenkins, 1979; Ysseldyke &
Mirkin, 1982). Carrier's comments about these failures of special
education are pertinent:
This focus on differentiation and allocation situates special 
education in a broader framework of educational practices and 
relates it systematically to the focus of interactionist concerns: 
classroom life, pupil careers, deviance, and handicap. And it does 
so without losing sight of the institutional nature of special 
education and the role it and other forms of sorting play in the 
school and the society at large, for it links sorting directly to 
reproduction. Just as reproduction can take place without the 
conscious intent of educators, so special education solidifies and 
perpetuates poor educational performance in spite of the desire of 
special educators to help the child, (pp. 290-291)
Educational Roots 
Textbooks and articles from the field of school psychology which 
deal with the history of the profession tend to take a narrow,
w:
L_______
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psychological view while ignoring the social and philosophical context 
of school psychology. While Kaplan and Kaplan (1985) also noted the 
tendency of school psychologists to ignore the social context of the 
student, and briefly acknowledged the importance of ideology and the 
social environment, their exploration of the impact these variables have 
had on the development of school psychology was very limited. Thus, in 
this section an attempt will be made to contrast the typical history of 
education presented in school psychology literature with that of 
educational historians and sociologists who tend to take a broader view. 
The intention here is to demonstrate that school psychology as a 
discipline has emerged from a rich, complex socio-historical background 
and based its practices on some assumptions which are rarely explicated 
or discussed.
Psychological Assumptions of Educators
Kaplan and Kaplan (1985) traced the development of school
psychology and found that the psychological beliefs of educators in the
late nineteenth century, and an available technology of psychological
testing, were the precursors to bringing psychologists into the schools.
Thus, educators were already thinking with psychological constructs when
school psychology was invented. School psychology "became a means of
translating educational theory into practice and, beyond that, a means
of implementing societal values" (p. 319). The Kaplans also emphasized
the importance of individualism in education and psychology in the turn
of the century schools:
Thus, to the extent that school psychologists assumed traditional 
psychological views, they ignored social history, social order, and 
the social context, and they underscored the focus on the
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individual organism, placing success and failure within the 
individual, relatively independent of context. . . . School 
psychology provided a rationale for schools already oriented to 
finding problems in children. In part for this reason, school 
psychologists adjusted comfortably to the structure of a 
conservative social organization— if problems were in the child, 
there was little reason for the system to be altered. . . . 
Individualism in the United States is understood to mean that 
advancement, achievement, and success should rest primarily on 
merit and talent and not on heredity, (p. 323)
In their review of the historical ties between psychology and
education Goldstein and Krasner (1987) mentioned the traditionally
recognized early psychologists (e.g., Munsterberg, Scully, Witmer,
Gesell, Hall, Thorndike, etc.) who took an interest in educational
issues. However, they devoted only two paragraphs to the controversial
philosophical issues which influenced the early intentional application
of psychology to education. One of the issues which will be discussed
at length later was Thorndike's belief that the psychologist's task was
to discover laws of behavior which could be applied in any situation
involving human beings. The other controversial issue mentioned was
that of the predominance of nature or nurture in the determination of
human behavior.
The decline of Social Darwinism and a national reform movement were 
mentioned in a more contemporary text (Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, &
Witt, 1984), as parts of the historical context in which school 
psychology developed. However, these authors did not define "Social 
Darwinism" or "national reform", nor did they elaborate upon just how 
these movements affected education and the origins of school psychology. 
The list of publications which briefly mention historical events without 
exploring the social and philosophical contexts and their impact on
F----L
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current practice can go on and on (e.g., Bergan, 1985; Curtis & Zins, 
1981; Gray, 1963; Hynd, 1983; White & Harris, 1961).
A task in which school psychologists have demonstrated little 
interest, then, is the analysis of the historical and philosophical 
roots of their profession. Furthermore, without such an analysis any 
debate regarding the underlying assumptions of the practice of school 
psychology is liable to make no sense. It will be argued later that 
such a debate is critical to the understanding and shaping of the 
effects which school psychologists have on their clients. Now, however, 
a brief review of the history and philosophy of education will be 
conducted in order to further understand the context in which school 
psychology developed.
History and Philosophy of Education
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century the basic structures 
and systems which make up modern American education were formed (Meyer, 
1965). Of course, the system of education in the United States was 
locally controlled and highly varied, but there were a number of common 
elements to this variability. Two elements relevant to the origins of 
school psychology were (a) compulsory, mass education, and (b) a 
philosophical movement known as progressivism.
Compulsory education laws were passed in each of the states between 
1852 and 1918 out of a perceived need to "Americanize" the enormous 
influx of immigrants to the United States (Cremin, 1961). Before 1880 
most immigrants to the U. S. were from northwestern Europe and settled 
in the middle Atlantic, raidwestern, and northwestern parts of the 
country (Meyer, 1965). After 1880, however, the number of immigrants
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from southern and eastern Europe began to increase and their patterns of
settlement were largely urban. They tended to stay in segregated slums
and cling to the "old ways" of life. Education became the instrument
for Americanizing the children of these immigrants (Cremin).
In Spring's (1986) analysis of the history of American education,
it was in the last two decades of the nineteenth century that
educational systems adopted broad social and economic roles:
Of profound importance to the future of American education was the 
decision to organize the school system to improve human capital as 
a means of economic growth. In fact, the development of human 
capital as a means of solving problems in the labor market became a 
major educational goal of the twentieth century.
Complementing the goal of developing human capital was the 
evolution of the science of education, an important part of which 
was the measurement of intelligence, interests, and abilities.
Also, the political structure of schooling changed as 
corporate models of organization became popular. The modern school 
bureaucracy emerged as educators emulated factories and businesses, 
(pp. 149-150)
The promise of economic development as a reward for educational 
development can be traced back to Horace Mann's arguments for the common 
school. This expectation may have contributed to the development of 
segregated education, vocational education, vocational guidance, and the 
modern high school. "In fact, one could argue that schooling as a means 
of developing human capital has become the most important goal of the 
educational system in the twentieth century" (Spring, p. 185).
In the belief that economic efficiency would be served, equality of 
opportunity (to allow the most productive a chance to rise to the top) 
became an important part of the thinking among educators in the last 
century (Spring, 1986). Even today evidence can be seen of this strong 
conviction and its economic connections in the reform document A Nation
jr.
['
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at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform (National Commission on
Excellence in Education, 1983).
Early in the twentieth century, schooling was seen as providing the 
opportunity which would prepare all students equally for the economic 
race in adult life. However, as the century continued the attitude 
about equality of opportunity began to shift. The school soon became 
the track, on which the race would be run (Spring, 1986). In order to 
make the competition more fair, the determination of merit was to take 
place in the schools using the science of educational measurement. 
"Scientific measurement of intelligence, abilities, and interests was to 
serve as an objective means of providing equality of opportunity" (p. 
217).
Needless to say, the tremendous influx of children into the 
available public schools strained the educational resources, primarily 
in creating a shortage of available teachers (Meyer, 1965). The result 
of teacher shortages was a kind of regimented pedagogical approach in 
which " . . .  teaching in the public school was reduced to drumming 
knowledge into pupils . . . "  (p. 468). In reaction to these 
ineffective methods, F. W. Parker combined his background of New England 
individualism, his faith in democracy, and the thinking of Pestalozzi, 
Herbart, and Froebel to produce a pedagogical approach which became 
known as progressivism. While Parker's efforts were fruitful in Quincy, 
Massachusetts, he met with much resistance in Chicago. He retreated to 
the University of Chicago a year before he died (in 1902), but his 
friend and colleague, John Dewey, took up the torch of progressivism
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which influenced American education until the middle of the twentieth 
century.
Cremin (1961) aptly described Dewey's role in the early progressive
education movement:
All about him, a cacophony of voices was demanding educational 
reforms of every sort and variety. Businessmen and labor unions 
were insisting that the school assume the classical functions of 
apprenticeship. Settlement workers and municipal reformers were 
vigorously urging instruction in hygiene, domestic science, manual 
arts, and child care. Patriots of every stripe were calling for 
Americanization programs. And agrarian publicists were pressing 
for a new sort of training for country life that would give 
youngsters a sense of the joys and possibilities of farming— and 
incidentally, keep them from moving to the city. Now note the 
common implication running through these proposals: educational
functions traditionally carried on by family, neighborhood, or shop 
are no longer being performed; somehow they must get done; like it 
or not, the school must take them on. (pp. 116-117)
Cremin understood Dewey's form of progressivism as an attempt to have
the school reflect the changes that had taken place in the nation,
rather than isolating itself from the newly evolving industrialism.
"The school, as an institution, should simplify existing social life;
should reduce it, as it were, to an embryonic form" (Dewey, 1954, p.
631). Further, the school should attempt to improve the larger society.
Dewey believed that the student should be actively involved in
discovering the social and material worlds and how they worked. The
student's psychological aspects, the natural and individual impulses,
should be directed toward the desirable social aims.
Dewey's followers and proselytizers, who had to translate Dewey's
writings and teachings to make them generally comprehensible, made many
converts and developed progressivism as a dissent from what they
perceived to be stagnating educational approaches (Meyer, 1965). In
f.
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reaction to some of the extremes of progressivism, however, the 
Essentialists of the 1940s criticized most of the elements of 
progressivism and argued for a return to the basics in education. This 
conservative spark was fanned into flame after the Russians successfully 
beat the United States in the race to launch a satellite into space. 
Conant's (1959) book, The American High School Today, roundly criticized 
high schools for their inferior programs and lack of scholarship.
Cremin (1961) analyzed a number of reasons why the progressive movement 
collapsed in the 1950s, but asserted that many of the changes wrought in 
American education as a result of the progressive movement were 
irreversible and continue to be felt in the schools.
American Progressivism was a response to industrialization and was 
applied in the schools to improve the lives of individuals. Much of its 
program was pertinent to the introduction of psychologists (and other 
specialists) into the schools:
First, it meant broadening the program and function of the 
school to include direct concern for health, vocation, and the 
quality of family and community life.
Second, it meant applying in the classroom the pedagogical 
principles derived from new scientific research in psychology and 
the social sciences.
Third, it meant tailoring instruction more and more to the 
different kinds and classes of children who were being brought 
within the purview of the school.
Finally, Progressivism implied the radical faith that culture 
could be democratized without being vulgarized, the faith that 
everyone could share not only in the benefits of the new sciences 
but in the pursuit of the arts as well. (Cremin, 1961, pp. viii- 
ix)
Thus, school psychology owes much to the progressive movement. The 
progressives' focus upon the individual, with a view to the individual's 
ability to contribute to the social good, and their faith in the
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psychological and social sciences helped to prepare the way for a 
psychological specialty in the schools.
Schools of Philosophy
Marler (1975) undertook the difficult task of defining and 
characterizing the schools of philosophy which have been predominant in 
American education. He admitted to the difficulty of analyzing 
educational theories and practices by the schools of philosophy 
approach:
Assumptions are grouped under "schools" or "systems" of philosophy. 
So many assumptions— sometimes not all that consistent one with 
another— are included under a label such as "Idealism" that even 
the basic generalizations to which the label was designed to refer 
become blurred. Furthermore, given the pluralistic nature of 
culture, it is difficult to identify two philosophers whose belief
systems are identical, (p. 20)
Nevertheless, there are enough commonalities to group some metaphysical,
epistemological, and axiological beliefs into schools of philosophy, and
briefly to examine the basics of each school, and to examine the
influences of each school on the development of American education.
Idealism. According to Power (1979) the founders of the American
colonies based their lives on theological rather than formal
philosophical grounds. Their lives were ruled more by belief than by
reason. Though reason was certainly not rejected, it was, however,
secondary to theological guidance. Doubts and fragmentation began to
creep into theological belief by the end of the colonial period sparked,
possibly, by the rise in scientific interests. It took until the early
years of the nineteenth century for the first philosophical interests to
blossom into Transcendentalism.
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This first, widely recognized school of philosophy in the United
States borrowed heavily from German Idealism (Power, 1979). Marler's
analysis of this movement was as follows:
Its theological overtones softened by the Enlightenment, Idealism 
absolutely dominated American thought in the nineteenth century—  
first with the Transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, William 
Channing and Bronson Alcott, and then with the New-Hegelianism of 
Wm. Torrey Harris, Bordon P. Browne and Josiah Royce. (1975, p. 
370)
As summarized by Marler, the metaphysical beliefs of the Idealists were 
based upon a creative, purposeful, spiritual view of reality. They 
believed that human nature contains both good and evil and that some 
persons are, by virtue of their natural gifts, inherently superior to 
others. The Idealists aligned themselves with the notion of free will 
rather than determinism in reference to human action. Regarding God and 
faith, the Idealists generally expressed belief in an orthodox, Judeo- 
Christian God, which can be contrasted with the humanistic conception of 
God, and with atheism.
The epistemology of the Idealists was founded upon their belief in 
mind or soul as an immaterial entity. Ideas were seen as archetypes of 
existence grasped intuitively by the mind. Experience was seen as 
contact with, and objectivity as alignment with, a given, antecedent 
reality. The Idealist frame of reference (frame of reference is defined 
here as the sum total of one's assumptions) was that our conditioned 
perceptions are but limitations to be overcome by various methods. This 
position is in contrast to those philosophies which view the frame of 
reference as the self-in-becoming, that is, the view that the self is 
the frame of reference (Marler, 1975, pp. 123-124). For the Idealist,
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knowledge and truth were consistent with the immaterial, archetypal
ideas. Knowledge could be gained either through contemplation or
through more complex cognitive activities of a conscious nature,
including experiment and theory building.
Taking axiology to be the theory of value, the axiology of the
Idealists can be summarized from Marler (1975) in the following way.
Value is a property which resides in the objects of reality. While
values can not be validated directly through experimentation, they can
be known through more traditional modes, such as emotional intuition,
revelation, and authority. It is through emotional intuition that one
is able to discover the nature of values and classify and arrange them
in hierarchies of relative importance. In the Idealist's view, morality
was the process of seeking the objective good and striving to conform
one's behavior to it. Conscience was believed to be the guide which
aids one in discerning the correct moral choice and it was conscience
which obligated one to follow the correct choice. Finally, the Idealist
believed that life entails growth toward an ultimate goal, usually
expressed as self realization.
The influence of Idealism on education in the nineteenth century
was quite extensive, yet its influence waned at the end of the century
for several reasons according to Power (1979):
The main reason for Idealism's loss of influence was the temper of 
America and a decline in devotion to religion, for Idealism, even 
without denominational allegiance, was intensely spiritual and 
regarded man, on whom any educational theory would have to 
concentrate, as an extension of an absolute or divine spirit. 
Idealism, moreover, departed from a common-sense explanation of 
metaphysics when it described reality as being spiritual rather 
than material. In twentieth century America, when materialism came 
close to being a way of life, it was hard to be convincing about
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spiritual reality. But the metaphysics of Idealism, while an 
important obstacle to its acceptance among teachers and educational 
theorists, was not the only deterrent: Idealists doubted the
possibility of securing valid knowledge through the usual channels 
of sensory experience, for knowledge had an intuitive and cultural 
component immunizing it from the ordinary processes of discursive 
learning, (p. 326)
Another problem with Idealism which contributed to its loss of 
influence in American education was its relative lack of concern for the 
human body in the so-called mind/body problem (Power, 1979). Americans 
were becoming more aware of their bodies by the end of the nineteenth 
century and concerns about disease, nutrition, and physical development 
were emerging. The Idealist's focus on mind ran counter to these 
developments. Interestingly, as will be shown, Behaviorism later 
carried the mind/body problem to the other extreme by virtually ignoring 
the mind. The revival of Pragmatism in America at this time fulfilled 
the need for a philosophy which more adequately addressed new social 
concerns.
Pragmatism. Pragmatism was introduced to American thought by 
Charles Sanders Pierce, popularized by William James, and thoroughly 
developed by John Dewey (Power, 1979). Although Pragmatism and 
Progressivism were not synonymous, the latter was heavily influenced in 
its early development by the former. Again, taking Marler's (1975) 
interpretation, the basic metaphysical assumption of Pragmatism was that 
a human being can know things only through experience which is 
influenced by that person's assumptions. Experience is defined as " . . 
. those accidental and planned encounters between all objects in the 
environment through which each is defined, ordered and given meaning"
(p. 34). Human nature was taken as a given, and was constructed through
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
22
transactions between the organism and the objects of its experience. 
Evaluations of human nature were seen to be the result of social or 
cultural interactions. The Pragmatists believed in basic determinism 
and that if there is free will, it is a kind of freedom of choice within 
a limited set of conditions, not apart from them. The Pragmatists 
admitted to a God which represents mankind's highest ideals and 
strivings for perfected knowledge.
In the Pragmatic philosophy, mind was taken to be that complex set 
of purposeful, problem solving behaviors stimulated by some 
disequilibrium or discomfort. Thus, mind was not identified as an 
immaterial entity nor was it seen strictly as a physical manifestation 
of the brain. In Pragmatic epistomology, ideas were human created plans 
for action. Ideas and thoughts were the links between what is and what 
could be. Experience was seen as the transactions between the person 
and the objects of reality as the person thought and did and reacted to 
the effects of the thinking and doing. It was a dynamic construction of 
the self-concept and the other-concepts. Marler (1975) described the 
nature of objectivity from the Pragmatist’s view as follows:
"Objectivity is the product of sharing and, when possible, reconciling 
subjective perceptions of a given phenomenon in a specified context" (p. 
119). The frame of reference of the Pragmatist was described as the 
self-in-becoming. The basic assumptions of the person, and the self, 
were seen to be equivalent, both of which were dynamically evolving out 
of experience. Since the person is dynamic, in flux, always becoming, 
then it followed that, for the Pragmatist, truth and knowledge were
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constructed and were situation specific. Knowledge claims were seen to 
be public, testable, and awaiting confirmation by others.
The axiology of the Pragmatist, according to Marler (1975), began 
with the view that value is a product of contextual inquiry. Value 
existed in the relationships between the person and the object in the 
context of other, often competing, values and other variables. 
Pragmatists did not make a strong fact-value distinction; thus, 
hypotheses about values were as subject to experimentation as are those 
of facts. Any rank ordering or hierarchical arrangement of values, 
then, would depend upon a particular context or situation. Morality in 
the Pragmatic account was the result of a critical inquiry regarding the 
context and relationships involved in the choice of action. Regarding 
obligation and conscience, the Pragmatists were committed to application 
of intelligence to all contextual factors which are relevant in a 
situation calling for moral choice. Quoting Dewey (1922), Marler 
explained the Pragmatist's views of means, ends, and progress, "Means 
and ends are two names for the same reality. The terms denote not a 
division in reality but a distinction in judgment" (p. 218). Thus, the 
distinction between means and ends was a judgment, not an absolute.
Ends and means to those ends influence one another as one progresses 
toward the temporary end-in-view. The ends change as one progresses and 
they become the means to new ends.
Realism. Although the philosophy of Realism has a long history, 
its influence in American education developed out of a dissatisfaction 
with the propositions of Pragmatism (Power, 1979). The metaphysics of 
the Realists were close to the common sense version of reality and,
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thus, had historically received wide support. Marler (1975) described 
the axiology of the Realists as widely divergent, ranging from the 
objective to the subjective to the contextualist positions. Because no 
general consensus regarding axiology can be found among the Realists no 
summary of their positions will be presented in this paper.
The basic metaphysical position of the Realists was that reality 
consists of an orderly, knowable, and sensible world. The world exists 
independently of the knower, it is discovered not constructed. Realists 
were divided over the issue of whether or not human nature is basically 
good or basically evil. Most Realists held that humans are inherently 
either superior or inferior depending upon their innate qualities. 
Although they believed that much of human behavior is determined, many 
Realists generally believed that the self is free to choose among 
alternatives at critical junctures in life. Other Realists believed 
that human nature was determined by heredity and/or environment. 
According to Marler (1975), Realists have taken all three of the 
possible positions regarding belief in God. Some have held a 
traditional view of an orthodox God, others have believed God to be a 
representation of mankind's highest ideals (the Humanistic God), while 
other Realists have denied the existence of God.
The Realist's epistemology began with an assumption that the mind 
is a function of bodily transactions which process data from an 
external, independently existing reality. Ideas, then, were seen to be 
the reflections of a natural, external reality. Experience was seen to 
be that contact with the objects of reality, which exist independently 
of the one having the experience, and which can result in a knowledge of
K.
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that reality. Objectivity consisted of aligning oneself with the 
independently existing reality. While admitting to the pervasive errors 
in perception and reasoning, the Realist's frame of reference viewed 
these as limitations to be transcended by meticulous methodology. For 
the Realist, truth was knowledge which corresponded to the objective, 
independently existing reality. It was mankind's role to discover and 
conform to the truth.
In summary, current notions of free will and remnants of the 
spiritual beliefs of the Idealists can be seen, if one looks closely 
enough, in the schools today. Emphasis upon the importance of 
experience in education and the constructed nature of truth and 
knowledge are associated with the Pragmatists. Materialism, 
determinism, the God's Eye View of an independently existing reality, 
and predominant notions of objectivity are influences in education which 
are aligned with the Realist philosophy. These fundamental 
philosophies, Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism, have, according to 
Marler (1975), had the most profound effects on American education since 
the late nineteenth century. It is this time frame which is of most 
interest in understanding the influences upon school psychology and the 
assumptions with which most school psychologists have practiced their 
profession in American schools.
Psychological Roots
As important as IQ testing and special education were in the 
development of school psychology, the parent discipline for this 
relatively new profession was psychology. Early twentieth century
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psychological theory was developed out of, or a direct descendent of,
nineteenth century psychology. According to Robinson (1986):
The record of the century [nineteeth] is particularly commendable 
in regard to psychology. When we examine the topics now filling 
the literature in professional psychology, we are hard pressed to 
find one that was not put forth— often in a form still to be 
improved upon— by those whose efforts we have examined in this 
chapter [which deals with the last half of the nineteenth century]. 
. . . Our sense of what an experimental science is and ought to be 
is taken over, with only the slightest modifications, from J. S. 
Mill, and the general attitude toward the status of science remains 
largely the one advocated by Auguste Comte and his positivist 
disciples. . . . Contemporary psychology then is largely a footnote 
to the nineteenth century, (pp. 390-391)
This section will address the philosophies dominant in psychology,
school psychology's parent discipline, at the time of the creation of
school psychology. As Robinson's (1986) above quote tells us, very few
significant changes have occurred in the major questions to which
psychologists address themselves or in their views of the scientific
approach to psychological questions since the nineteenth century. Thus,
an examination of the philosophies and approaches of psychologists from
the late nineteenth century on may be very revealing about some of the
inherited and current practices of school psychologists.
Perhaps the most profound philosophical influence on nineteenth
century psychology was the development of positivism in the twentieth
century (Robinson, 1986). Supporters of positivism held science to be
the savior of mankind, the only way in which humanity's physical,
social, and personal problems could be solved. Robinson summarized this
severe attack on rationalism as follows:
According to the logical positivists— and they might just as well 
be called radical empiricists— the facts of the world are 
sensations, and all the laws of science are ultimately reducible to 
empirical propositions. Once we have exhausted the data of sense,
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there is nothing else that can be said either of the world or 
ourselves, (p. 333)
In examining the influence of the psychologist E. L. Thorndike on
education, Goldstein and Krasner (1987) declared that it was his efforts
which established that research in psychology would become the basis of
classroom application. It was through Thorndike that positivism made a
major assault on education. Thorndike believed that every aspect of
education would be touched by psychology. Goldstein and Krasner quoted
from Cremin (1961) regarding Thorndike's widespread influence on early
twentieth century education.
. . .  no aspect of public-school teaching during the first quarter 
of the twentieth century remained unaffected by his influence. . .
. Ultimately, Thorndike's goal was a comprehensive science of 
pedagogy in which all education could be based. His faith in 
quantified methods was unbounded, and he was quoted ad nauseum to 
the effect that everything that exists exists in quantity and can 
be measured. Beginning with the notion that the methods of 
education could be vastly improved by science, he came slowly to 
the conviction that the aims, too, might be scientifically 
determined. (p. 114)
Robinson (1986), too, saw Thorndike as highly influential in his 
effect on the development of scientific psychology. Thorndike's law of 
effect stated, basically, that we tend to do those things which we find 
satisfying, while his law of exercise can be paraphrased as our tendency 
to get better at those things which we practice. As Robinson pointed 
out, however, we do not see laws of this sort in psychology any more. 
Actually, the notions expressed by Thorndike's laws were not new, but 
the experimental evidence he offered in their support was new and 
reflected the contemporary faith in the ability of science to solve 
human personal and social problems.
■r.L
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There is little in either of these "laws" that could not be gleaned 
from Locke and Hume or Bentham or, for that matter, Aristotle.
They are the classical laws of association with the addition of 
Darwinian and Benthamist principles. The difference, of course, is 
that the laws in Thorndike's case are supported by experimental 
findings, (p. 409)
Thorndike influenced several thousand students in his more than 
forty years at Columbia's Teachers College (Meyer, 1965). He 
contributed greatly to what came to be called the Measurement Movement 
in education; his philosophy that "everything that exists, exists in 
quantity, and is measurable" (Meyer, p. 482) continues to influence 
research in education.
While agreeing with the methods, J. B. Watson disagreed with the 
mentalistic terminology in Thorndike's formulations (Robinson, 1986). 
Following the positivist path, Watson wanted to purge psychology of all 
terms referring to inferred, mental phenomena. He borrowed the 
physiological terms used by I. Pavlov and zealously promoted 
behaviorism, the prototypical science of objective psychology. The 
behaviorists exorcised mental phenomena from scientific psychology, 
claiming that only observable behavior could count as data. "Indeed, 
radical behaviorists such as John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner generally 
denied the scientific validity of conscious experience altogether" 
(Baars, 1986, p. 7). While for several thousand years philosophers have 
been attempting to come to grips with the mind/body problem, the 
behaviorists simply ignored the problem or declared it a nonproblera 
(Baars; Robinson).
Behaviorism has certainly left its mark on school psychology in 
concepts of learning (Gagne, 1970), behavior modification programs
 --------L
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(Bandura, 1969), behavioral objectives (Bloom, 1956; Gagnd-, 1970; 
Gronlund, 1978), and many of the canons of scientific methodology.
These contributions have given school psychologists some scientific 
credibility, but at the expense of creating a barrier between everyday 
psychology understood by their clients and the "scientific" psychology 
professed by the school psychologists. Behaviorism will be examined in 
more detail in a later section.
Scientism
Science and technology, according to Bernier and Williams (1973),
have developed in a mutually reinforcing way and have provided us with
new social classes of technocrats, managers, and technicians who 
implement the technological products of science. Some may conceptualize 
school psychologists as essentially technicians who apply the knowledge 
and techniques of psychological science in education. Indeed the 
ideology of scientism (explained below) is all pervasive in modern 
education as evidence by the current dependence upon specialists 
(guidance counselors, nurses, administrators, curriculum specialists, 
consultants of various kinds, etc.) who possess scientific knowledge 
which they apply to the problems of education.
Bernier and Williams (1973, p. 61) used the term scientism to
denote an ideological framework which shapes the perceptions of the 
social group sharing this framework and which espouses the formal goal 
of controlling the forces of nature, including the forces which control 
human behavior. Bernier and Williams' commentary about the extensive 
influence science now has upon western culture followed the development 
of this ideology from the early attacks by religious groups to the
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widespread support science now enjoys throughout Western culture, even
to the support of most religious thinkers.
In spite of David Hume's (1739, 1748) doubts about the certainty of
knowledge and the twentieth century development of the indeterminacy
principle in physics, Bernier and Williams (1973) credit the scientians,
adherents of scientism, with the belief that any limitations in
mankind's knowledge of an ordered universe are the result of human
limitations and not of the lack of an orderly, external universe (p.
66). If the universe were not orderly then the scientians' hopes for
prediction and control would be dashed. But optimism has prevailed
because ” . . .  Scientism is rooted in the belief that events can be
isolated, analyzed, and recorded, and that reliable inferences can be
derived from such observations" (p. 67). With the proper methodology,
empirical testing, and objectivity the scientians are certain that
knowledge, prediction, and control of the external world are achievable.
In his analysis of the lives of some eminent scientists, Gardner
(1983) came to the following conclusion:
Even though the scientist's self-image nowadays highlights rigor, 
systematicity, and objectivity, it seems that, in the final 
analysis, science itself is virtually a religion, a set of beliefs 
that scientists embrace with a zealot's conviction. Scientists not 
only believe in their methods and themes from the depth of their 
being, but many are also convinced it is their mission to use these 
tools to explain as much of reality as falls within their power. 
This conviction is perhaps one of the reasons that the great 
scientists have typically been concerned with the most cosmic 
questions, and that, particularly in the latter years of life, they 
are often given to making pronouncements about philosophical 
issues, such as the nature of reality or the meaning of life. (p. 
150)
While not all scientists are scientians and most scientists are 
committed to the tenuousness of scientific studies, those who apply
hi _ ~ _L
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technology in education often uncritically accept the findings of
science (Bernier & Williams, 1973). For example, because IQ tests are
purportedly developed from the science of measurement they have been
accepted almost without criticism by educators and applied
psychologists. A brief background in the scientific evolution of IQ
tests was presented above and suggested that the uncritical acceptance
of IQ as the best measure of intelligence is quite premature. However,
Bernier and Williams pointed out that it is the claim to objectivity and
the incredible success of the physical sciences which appears to have
made credible the scientific research of social scientists. Those
researchers who do not adhere to the objective methods of science are
likely to have their research branded as "subjective", implying that it
cannot achieve the status of objective (acceptable) knowledge. An
example of an attempt to intimidate disbelievers is evident in this
passage from Bunge and Ardila (1987):
The world exists by itself, whereas the maps of the world are 
processes in brains. Whoever denies this realist thesis has no use 
for the experimental checking of our conceptual models of things, 
and cannot explain the history of science. Worse: He or she risks
being referred to a psychiatrist, (p. 175)
Behaviorism
Behaviorism played a ve/y important role in shaping the science of 
psychology. The assumptions, methods, and the epistemology of 
behaviorism influenced experimental psychology in America in a lasting 
way (Baars, 1986). Experimental psychology in turn has had a tremendous 
influence upon the practice of psychology, even though the relatively 
few theories which have emerged from the behavioristic paradigm have 
been quite weak. However, as Baars pointed out, with the development of
i-
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behavior therapy from the principles of behavioristic psychology, 
clinical psychologists, in their battle with psychiatrists over the 
market place, were able to claim greater scientific validity for their 
methods than could psychiatrists who were unable to scientifically 
defend psychoanalysis.
The role of J. B. Watson (1913) has already been mentioned and it 
was pointed out that he made the claim that psychology should be 
concerned with behavior and not with consciousness. Early in its 
development the new science of psychology had taken human consciousness 
to be its subject matter (Stevenson, 1974). Introspection was the 
source of information about consciousness but was soon found to be 
unverifiable and, therefore, inadequate for the description and 
classification of sensations, imagery, and emotions. Watson's proposal, 
thus, met a need in the development of the science of psychology by 
insisting that the data of psychology be the publicly observable 
behavior of organisms. Watson theorized that only the reflexes were 
innate, that all other behavior was learned, and that learning was 
mediated primarily by classical (or Pavlovian, or respondent) 
conditioning. He believed that environmental conditioning could account 
for almost all human behavior.
Following Watson, B. F. Skinner (1953) carried on the behavioristic 
thesis, expanded the constructs, and applied the principles of operant 
and respondent conditioning to explain most behavior. Skinner has been 
recognized by his peers as "perhaps the most influential contemporary 
psychologist" (Evans, 196b), certainly the most famous living 
behaviorist (Baars, 1986). Robinson (1986) believed that Skinner's The
i:
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Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (1938) influenced
American experimental psychology as much as any other single source in 
the history of the discipline. Because of Skinner's influence on modern 
scientific psychology, his statements will be examined as representative 
of the basic assumptions and beliefs of the behaviorists' movement in 
psychology.
Skinner (1953) viewed science as the salvation of mankind, and the 
science of human nature as the only sensible solution to the problems of 
modern man, including the problems associated with the misuse of 
science. He predicted resistance to the deterministic view of human 
nature offered by a science of human behavior, a resistance which would 
result from the common belief in personal freedom and autonomy. The 
mission of the behavioral scientist was, according to Skinner, to 
discover the lawful relationships among events, to predict behavior from 
laws, and, eventually to provide methods of controlling behavior based 
upon lawful relationships. Theories, he believed, are larger systematic 
arrangements of laws and rules which come later in the development of a 
science. Technology, however, does not wait for theories. In 
psychology, postulates of unobservable events as determiners of behavior 
were unacceptable to Skinner. "Ily interest is in a science of behavior 
which is part of biology; it deals with observable events, not with the 
fictitious or metaphorical apparatus which Freudians feel they observe 
in the organism" (Skinner as quoted in Evans, 1968, p. 7). Skinner 
(1953) adopted the assumption that human behavior is determined by that 
which is outside the person.
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As Stevenson (1974) pointed out, there are two assumptions basic to
Skinner's views: (a) there are scientific laws which govern human
behavior, and (b) these laws report causal connections between behavior
and environment. These assumptions appear to be a part of Skinner's
generalized faith in science and in the enormous success of the methods
of science where they have been applied (Skinner, 1953). He described
science as a set of attitudes, a search for order and lawful
relationships, and, eventually, a system of rules and laws.
The influence of the behavioristic paradigm on the way modern
experimental psychologists think is frequently taken for granted (Baars,
1986). Furthermore, most modern psychologists have accepted the
behaviorists' methodological and epistemological views. These include
the restriction of evidence to that which is observable, the requirement
of precision in specifying stimuli and responses, the general skepticism
of empirically untestable theories, and the practice of refusing for
consideration unsupported subjective reports. The implications for
school psychologists are tremendous, as Phillips (1982) pointed out.
We must realize, for example that the meaning of scientific 
concepts is given to us, and their validity is defined by others. 
This represents a powerful source of control over the school 
psychologist, since others determine what is valid information. . . 
. To some degree, science, scientific methods, and research-in- 
action "programs" school psychologists and reduces their choices in 
problem solving and decision-making. . . . And there is the 
additional danger that the reality created by science and research, 
which defines what is, may become the sole basis for defining what 
ought to be. (p. 25)
Behavior modification became a major technology which emerged from 
the behavioristic paradigm and has had a profound impact on American 
psychology and society in general ’Goldstein & Krasner, 1987). Behavior
F
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modification has been widely and extensively applied in school systems 
and can be traced back to the operant conditioning research of B. F. 
Skinner (Kazdin, 1982). The focus in behavior modification is, of 
course, observable behavior. The antecedents and consequences of the 
behavior of concern are manipulated in order to achieve the desired 
outcomes. Three assumptions are made by those who apply behavior 
modification outside the laboratory setting: (a) human behavior is at
least partially learned, (b) laboratory experiments have relevance to 
real life problems, and (c) findings from experiments with animals can 
be generalized to humans (Goldstein & Krasner, 1987). The value neutral 
position of the psychologist as experimenter, however, clearly could not 
be true of the behavior modifier, who, among other things, must decide 
which behaviors of value must be modified. Thus, in one of the most 
influential books on behavior modification, Bandura (1969) included an 
entire chapter on the values and ethics of applying behavioral 
technology to persons.
Behaviorism has had a tremendous influence on school psychology in 
the recent past (Ysseldyke & Schakel, 1983). Behavioral assessments and 
behavioral interventions have become quite common in the arsenal of 
school psychologists. A survey of random samples of members of the 
American Psychological Association’s Division 16 (Division of School 
Psychology) and the National Association of School Psychologists found 
that the highest percentage of respondents indicated that their primary 
theoretical orientation was toward behavioral psychology (Anderson, 
Cancelli, & Krathochwill, 1984). Specifically, they found the following 
percentages: behavioral— 20%, other— 19%, cognitive-behavioral— 17%,
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reality-oriented— 11%, client-centered— 8%, neo-Freudian— 7%, Freudian—  
3%, Gestalt— 3%, transactional analysis— 2%, multiple responses— 9%, and 
no response— 2%.
There is a long tradition advocating for the scientist-practitioner 
in clinical psychology (Raimy, 1950) and in school psychology (Bergan,
1985). Martens and Keller (1987) have recently renewed the call for 
school psychologists to be trained in objective empiricism so as to 
facilitate knowledge development in the profession.
In summary, the behavioristic paradigm has profoundly influenced 
the way psychologists think about what counts as knowledge in the 
experimental setting. Likewise, many psychologists have been influenced 
by behaviorism regarding the kinds of clinical information which are 
important. Basically, the behaviorists, and most subsequent 
experimental psychologists, have excluded private, introspective data 
and count only that data which is publicly observable. This position 
represents the position of physicalistic monism in the long enduring 
mind/body debate in philosophy and takes the view that all psychology is 
reduced to the physical movements an organism makes in space (Baars,
1986). Behaviorism represents the pinnacle of scientism in psychology. 
Underlying the scientistic thesis is the belief that there is an 
orderly, external reality which exists independently of the observer.
School Psychology Practice
School psychologists have been suffering from a prolonged identity 
crisis (Brown, 1982; Grimley, 1981). A number of "summit" conferences 
(e.g., Bardon, 1964; Cutts, 1955; Ysseldyke & Weinberg, 1981) have dealt 
with the roles, functions, and training of school psychologists, but to
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date there is little consensus among leaders in the discipline about 
what a school psychologist is supposed to do. Bardon (1982) observed 
three levels of functioning among school psychologists which have 
evolved over the last five decades. The first level of functioning 
involves the provision of psychometric assessments. At the second 
level, representing much current practice, is found the application of 
more sophisticated assessments than level one and the emergence of 
intervention services by school psychologists. At the third level the 
school psychologist has become influential in school policy and 
practices via consultation with teachers, administrators, school board 
members, and through involvement in program development and evaluation. 
Services at level three are more talked about than actually realized in 
current practice.
In this section the practice of school psychology will be examined 
by organizing it into two loose categories labeled Psychological 
Assessments and Psycho-Educational Treatments. These categories are 
intended to reflect the primary responsibilities and practices of the 
school psychologist, diagnosis and intervention, yet they also suggest a 
broader role for the practitioner than just testing and making 
recommendations. As will be seen, assessment in current school 
psychology utilizes interviews, observations, and other techniques to 
gather information about a child. Likewise, remediation may include 
consultation, individual counseling, group counseling, inservice 
training, and other approaches in providing help for students.
L_____
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Psychological Assessments
A number of studies have assessed the kinds of services school 
psychologists actually provide to schools by examining the individual 
school psychologist (Fairchild, 1974), a local group of school 
psychologists (Eitel, Lamberth, & Hyman, 1984), a statewide survey of 
school psychologists (Winikur & Daniels, 1982), and national surveys of 
school psychologists (Farling & Hoedt, 1971; Ramage, 1979; Lacayo, 
Morris, & Sherwood, 1981). Invariably, these studies found 
psychological assessments of children to be the single most time 
consuming category of professional activity.
These findings are not surprising when viewed in historical 
perspective. Cutts (1955) reviewed the history of school psychology and 
described the initial function of the earliest school psychologists as 
child study, primarily through the use of the newly developed tests of 
mental ability. The clinics which were founded beginning in the 1890s 
at a number of universities had as their purpose the examination of 
children whose educational development was retarded. The first of these 
clinics appears to have been at the University of Pennsylvania under the 
direction of Lightner Witmer. The Chicago Board of Education 
established a district wide Department of Child Study under the 
direction of Fred W. Smedley shortly after Witmer began his clinic. 
Arnold Gesell may have been the first to receive the title of school 
psychologist when the Connecticut State Board of Education appointed him 
to make mental examinations of "backward and defective" children 
throughout the state and to plan programs and methods for their improved
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care. Interests in child study were also developing in several European 
nations at this time (White & Harris, 1961).
A number of historical accounts of school psychology have 
acknowledged the development of the individual intelligence test by 
Binet and Simon as the launching of the individual testing movement 
which has been so important to the development and current practice of 
child evaluations (Bardon, 1982; Bergan, 1985; Cutts, 1955; Gray, 1963; 
Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, & Witt, 1984; White & Harris, 1961). As 
special programs for students have increased over the years, the demand 
for school psychologists has also increased. In turn, the demand for 
more and better diagnostic tools has increased since the early versions 
of Binet's test were introduced. By 1940 school psychologists had 
available to them one or more tests of perceptual-motor development, 
educational achievement, and personality functioning (Cutts, 1955).
These tests formed the basis of the psychological profile for child 
study. While the number and sophistication of tests has greatly 
increased since 1940, the data gathering procedures in school psychology 
have remained largely the same (Page, 1982). In recent years there has 
been an increased emphasis upon behavioral observations and evaluations, 
environmental-cultural influences, and vocational assessments (National 
Association of School Psychologists [MSP], 1984), although 
administering and interpreting psychological tests for the purpose of 
identifying handicapped students continues to be the single most 
prevalent function of the school psychologist (Goldwasser, Meyers, 
Christenson, & Graden, 1981, cited in Reynolds, 1983). Likewise, the 
school psychology research literature continues to be dominated by
F ..
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research on testing and assessment (Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, & Witt, 
1964).
Assessment continues to be the most stable and consistent day-to- 
day activity of most school psychologists (Gerken, 1985) and can be 
defined as the systematic gathering of information to be used in 
decision making (Cancelli & Duley, 1985). The theoretical orientation 
of the school psychologist determines the factors to be assessed and the 
approaches to assessment. However, most school psychologists have 
developed a battery of tests the data from which are used in making 
classification and placement decisions (Gerken, 1985). This battery 
usually includes an individual intelligence test, an achievement 
battery, a perceptual-motor test,' and, often, a standardized measure of 
behavioral/emotional functioning (Cancelli & Duley, 1985; Gray, 1963). 
Data from standardized tests along with data from interviews, 
observations, work samples, and diagnostic teaching may be integrated to 
aid in diagnosing, classifying, and making recommendations for the 
referred student. Descriptive studies of how school psychologists 
actually conduct assessments have yet to be reported.
Psycho-Educational Treatments
Following the identification and diagnosis of educational and 
psychological problems one might expect some kind of remediation. In 
simplifying the clinical model prevalent in the practice of school 
psychology, Lauer (1969) characterized the diagnostic process as an 
attempt to describe and explain the problems, illnesses or 
maladjustments of a child, and remediation as the efforts to attack or 
treat the deficiencies of the individual child. Failure to remediate
ST"....... .....
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the problems often result in a recommendation that the child be removed 
from the regular classroom and sent to a different setting for more 
intensive treatment. This oversimplified model of school psychology 
practice, however, does not give a clear picture of just what kind of 
remediation is provided by school psychologists.
As late as the Thayer conference of 1954 the consensus of the 
participants regarding the functions of the school psychologist 
generally described remediation as planning educational programs for 
exceptional students (Cutts, 1955). One of the recurring questions at 
this conference, however, was "should the school psychologist carry on 
therapy?" (p. 46) and Cutts reported much insecurity among the school 
psychologists addressing this question. The participants of this 
conference were divided over whether or not the psychologist should 
provide psychotherapy as a direct intervention. Contrast this 
indecision with the unhesitating statement from the Standards for the 
Provision of School Psychological Services (National Association of 
School Psychologists, 1984), section 4.3.3.1, "School psychologists 
provide direct and indirect interventions to facilitate the functioning 
of individuals, groups and/or organizations." Thus, in a span of 30 
years professionals in school psychology have decided to offer a broad 
array of remedial services in the schools.
Recent surveys (Hughs, 1979; Lacayo, Morris, & Sherwood, 1981; 
Ramage, 1979) have suggested that contemporary school psychologists 
spend between 20% and 58% of their time in providing some kind of 
intervention service. These services included consultation for planning 
educational interventions, behavior management, individual counseling,
L
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and group counseling. Grimes (1981) described the characteristics of 
school psychology interventions as follows: (a) they are based upon
sound psychological theory and research, (b) they do not include placing 
students into special education programs, (c) they focus on the 
systematic change of describable behaviors, and (d) they may focus upon 
a wide range and numerous types of behaviors. While his second 
characteristic of school psychological interventions contradicts 
traditional practice, it represents a goal toward which Grimes obviously 
thinks the profession should move.
Meacham and Peckham (1978) found in their survey that consultation 
was emerging as a central function in the provision of intervention 
services. Moreover, practicing school psychologists preferred 
consultation over other, more time consuming direct interventions. The 
role of "change agent" was also seen as a developing function for school 
psychologists, a role for which they had received little training.
Fuchs and Fuchs (1986) pointed out four ways in which recent laws 
have pushed school psychologists into providing more intervention 
services. First, PL 94-142 requires that a diagnostician serve on the 
committee which plans the individual educational plan for students 
identified as needing special education services. Second, the need for 
consultation regarding regular classroom interventions has been 
increased by the requirement for placement of handicapped students in 
the least restrictive environment. Third, prereferral intervention 
strategies are being called for in response to the ever increasing 
number of children who are being identified as handicapped and requiring 
special education programming. And fourth, litigation and legislation
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have called for unbiased assessments which can provide effective 
educational remediation for students.
Summary
School psychology was born in the midst of the compulsory and mass 
education movement. Large variations in student learning aptitudes 
quickly emerged as a pressing problem for educators who tried to teach 
all children. Attempts to quantify aptitudes or, some would say, 
intelligence, and the provision of "special" education for mentally 
slower students emerged as the prevailing solution to the problem of 
heterogeneity of learning abilities in classrooms. Intelligence testing 
and identification of students in need of special education became a 
process in which the school psychologist specialized. This process of 
student testing and placement was as much a product of ideology as it 
was of a disinterested, impartial science.
Firmly embedded in the educational system, school psychology was 
affected by movements in educational philosophy. While remnants of 
Idealism and Pragmatism can be found in the assumptions of today's 
educators, Realism has strengthened the materialistic and deterministic 
views which currently predominate in education and provides the 
foundation for the testing and placement activities of most school 
psychologists.
Developments in the science of psychology, especially the 
experimental branch, also shaped the profession of school psychology. 
School psychologists endorsed not only the methods but also the ideology 
of scientific psychology. Behavioristic psychology was, and continues 
to be, a major influence on practicing school psychologists and what
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they acknowledge as evidence. Publicly observable behavior counts as 
data, subjective reports do not. Only recently have school 
psychologists begun, as a group, to offer substantially more remedial 
services such as counseling and consultation. However, in spite of a 
continuing sense of crisis among school psychologists, the prevailing 
activity continues to be assessment with standardized tests.
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CHAPTER 2
PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate a number of major 
problems faced by the school psychology profession. For convenience and 
consistency these problems will be grouped under the two main categories 
of school psychology practice, diagnosis and remediation. The intent is 
to review enough of the pertinent literature to show that there is not a 
consensus of satisfaction with current assessment and intervention 
practices in school psychology. While the intent of this chapter is to 
point out flaws in the professional practice of school psychology, space 
limitations do not allow for the exposition of the successes and more 
positive aspects of the practice of school psychology, of which there 
are many. An attempt will be made in the final chapter of this paper to 
identify some of the positive aspects of school psychology practice and 
to demonstrate how these positive aspects support the adoption of the 
model proposed herein.
Psychological Assessments 
Not only did the growth and development of school psychology follow 
the expansion and funding of special education, but the creation of 
mental tests made the profession possible. Arnold Gesell may have been 
the first to bear the label school psychologist and his primary function 
was to test for mental retardation (Cutts, 1955). It was previously 
established that the administration and interpretation of tests 
continues to be a major function of the school psychologist. Prior to 
that, however, a brief history of the development of intelligence tests 
revealed some of the biases of the early test developers in their
e........................   •L_ _ _ _
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efforts to find some scale along which people could be ordered according 
to merit* Recall Gould's (1981, 1987) beliefs that the eugenicist 
values of the early test developers influenced the development of the 
empirical scales of intelligence and, to some extent, our notions of 
what is Intelligence.
Intelligence tests are likely to be the most ubiquitous measures 
used by school psychologists (Reynolds et al., 1984, p.. 137). While 
intelligence is a hypothetical construct, most intelligence tests in use 
today were developed primarily from an empirical basis, without a sound, 
underlying theory of intelligence. The earliest tests of intelligence 
were developed empirically to predict school success (Wallin & Ferguson, 
1967), and as Blum (1978) pointed out, quickly became a boon to the 
eugenicists in their search for a scale on which human value could be 
measured.
Besides the historical problems and atheoretical development of IQ 
tests, other problems concerning the validity of intelligence tests have 
surfaced periodically. While IQ tests are generally viewed as more 
objective than teacher judgments, the objectivity of these and similar 
tests, which purport to reliably and validly measure human 
characteristics, has been found by some to be illusory (Arter & Jenkins, 
1979; Heshusius, 1982; Ysseldyke & Salvia, 1974). When it is recalled 
that the validity of Binet's original scale was established by teacher 
judgments (Wolf, 1969a, 1969b), and that the IQ test has become the 
criterion against which other measures have been validated (Gresham, 
Reschly, & Carey, 1987), the importance of the culture of the classroom 
must be appreciated. Since the criterion against which the IQ test is
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
compared, teacher judgments, is almost always available in a school one 
must wonder whether the IQ test is serving its function of providing a 
more efficient way of measuring student aptitude (Anastasi, 1976). In 
fact, Gresham et al. (1987) found teachers' judgments regarding 
students' classroom performances were at least as accurate in predicting 
the students' classification as non-handicapped or learning disabled as 
were a combination of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children- 
Revised (WISC-R) and the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT). Of 
course this is not the first research to find that teacher ratings or 
judgments were equal or superior to psychological tests (e.g., Ullman, 
1957; Hoge, 1983). Gerber and Semmel (1984) have advocated the return 
to using regular classroom teachers as "tests" of the academic 
achievement of their students. Now, it appears we have come full 
circle!
At this point, rather than deal with the issues concerning whether 
or not tests are fair or whether or not they are used fairly (see Lutey 
& Copeland, 1982, for a review), issues about which the empirical 
research data are generally inconclusive, the foundational concept of 
test validity will be examined. The primary kind of validity which will 
be scrutinized will be construct validity, which is an attempt to 
persuade others of a certain interpretation of what a test measures; 
this kind of validity is coming to be viewed by measurement experts as 
the most basic kind of psychometric validity (Cronbach, 1984).
Gould (1981) examined the history and development of intelligence 
testing and found that although Binet denied that his scale was a 
measure of intelligence, he led the way in applying a variety of complex
L_
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tasks as indices of mental performance. Because Binet, and others, 
found his measure useful for practical, educational purposes (because it 
had criterion validity) it rapidly became the accepted measure of 
intelligence against which other measures were compared.
Charles Spearman was the first to use factor analysis for the 
express purpose of studying the matrix of correlations among mental 
tests (Gould, 1981). He was searching for a causal factor underlying 
performance on these tests and found a substantial principal factor 
which could account for much of the test variance. This general factor 
was labeled g by Spearman who, along with his successor, Cyril Burt, 
strongly believed that g was innate and they inferred a physical 
substrate for it. Jensen (1980) is the most recent of general factor 
theorists who reified g when he stated that " . . .  it is as much a 
biological reality, fashioned by evolution, as the morphological 
features of the organism" (p. 182).
A major problem with using the first principal component of a 
factor analysis, as is usually done in factoring out g, is that 
nonsensical systems of positive correlations also have principal 
components, as illustrated by Gould (1981). Theoretically, any score 
which correlates positively with another set of scores will also load on 
the first principal component factor. Thus, the reification of 
intelligence (or any other "mental" construct for that matter) from a 
principal component factor analysis cannot come from the mathematics or 
the label given to the factor but must be supported by additional 
biological data, which have not been forthcoming in the case of 
intelligence.
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By using the same data gathered by Spearman and his followers, 
Thurstone invented a new form of factor analysis which found no general 
factor but a number of primary factors of intelligence (Gould, 1981). 
Thus, a new abstraction of the data suggested an interpretation of 
intelligence quite different from the g theory. Perhaps Thurstone's 
most important contribution was to demonstrate that the mathematics of 
factor analysis can be legitimately interpreted from more than one point 
of view.
Grover (1981) challenged a number of conclusions reached by g 
theorists, Jensen (1980) in particular. She cited a number of studies 
that strongly suggest that temperament or personality factors affect 
measures of IQ as much as any innate cognitive capacity. Drawing from 
neuropsychological literature she argued that the performance of an 
individual on a test is largely a function of the structural features of 
the assessment device rather than a measure of mental capacity. Grover 
(1981) explained " . . .  that instruments or measuring devices 
presuppose the validity of the principles which they embody, and are in 
fact an extension of theory” (p. 38). Thus, a thermometer presupposes 
the principle of uniform expansion of bodies as a result of the action 
of heat, and a thermometer, then, is used to measure the uniformity of 
thermic action. Likewise, if an IQ test presupposes a unilinear general 
factor or a normal distribution of scores it will then exhibit these 
properties as a function of its design (Kohlberg, 1987).
In the early construction of intelligence tests the assumption that 
intelligence is equally distributed between the sexes led to substantial 
adjustments so that males could compete equally with females
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(McGuinness, 1985). In the early pilot studies on the Binet and Simon 
scales, boys were more likely to fail than girls (Varon, 1935). This 
led Binet and Simon to alter the scales until the performances of the 
sexes were equal. Wechsler encountered a female superiority on almost 
all of his initial scales forcing him to search for scales and items 
which would show a balanced performance between the sexes (Kipnis,
1976). McGuinness (1985, p. 19) believed that since many of the items 
were added to balance the sex effects, some of the subtests seemed 
unrelated to intelligence (e.g., Coding) and have not shown much 
correlation with other tasks of intelligence. This, then, is a 
pertinent example of how a preconception, that males and females develop 
intellectually at the same rate, has affected the construction of a 
measuring instrument. Interestingly, McGuinness added that had boys 
tended to score higher on the initial test tasks no changes would likely 
have been made, for such a finding would have supported the attitudes 
about females prevalent at that time.
Grover (1981) also asserted that IQ tests measure a restricted set 
of learned skills and a number of information processing strategies. 
These learned skills seem to be one particular set of logical thinking 
aptitudes which are taught in and valued by traditional schools.
Gardner (1983) agreed with this view, stating that paper-and-pencil 
tests and brief interviews almost guarantee that an examiner will tap 
only the linguistic and logico-mathematical intelligences which are, of 
course, prized by schools. The implications are (a) that there are 
other cognitive skills which are not tapped by IQ tests and (b) that the 
skills measured by IQ tests are teachable. Grover cited a number of
[.
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investigations which have demonstrated the modifiability of basic
cognitive skills. She has rejected IQ as a measure of g because,
. . .  intercorrelations among a set of tests do not at all 
necessarily point to the existence of a general intelligence factor 
. . .  rather, this general factor may, as has been alluded to 
previously, reflect general skills for dealing with 
decontextualized material which for problem-solution requires a 
particular "schooled" logic, (p. 123)
The basic question to ask seems to be: Is g real in the sense that
it exists as some entity outside the mathematical procedures from which 
it is induced, or is it a metaphor, or artifact, invented by human 
consciousness? If g exists as some real, physical thing then the, 
supposedly, value-free methods of physical science may be the most 
appropriate way to proceed in its investigation. If, however, one 
assumes that g, like other socially mediated concepts, is mind-dependent 
then the methods of the physical sciences can best be viewed as only one 
way, among many, of developing the arguments concerning this construct. 
Value laden political discourse may, for example, be another way of 
trying to settle differences about the nature of g.
Jensen (1980) spoke of g as both a hypothetical construct (p. 224) 
and as a biological reality (pp. 182 & 251), whi'ch typifies the 
scientific realist position regarding the validity of IQ tests. He 
carefully pointed out, however, that g is not to be equated with the 
means used for measuring it (p. 247), to do so would violate the notion 
of objectivity which is one of the basic premises of the scientific 
realist's approach (Smith, 1985). Gould (1981) demonstrated that 
Spearman, Burt, and Jensen have all made the same fundamental mistake of 
concluding that the mathematical abstraction of g is a thing, yet to be
L_
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discovered, which has some fundamental existence in the same sense as 
nerves and biochemicals. Although a scientific realist himself, Gould 
argued that absolute scientific objectivity is a myth, and that cultural 
prejudices often predetermine the outcome of scientific research. An 
internal realist (Putnam, 1988) would carry this argument a step further 
and propose that all social scientific objectivity is limited because 
there is no conceivable way to separate the social scientist from that 
which is observed (Smith, 1983).
The historical analyses of the development of the IQ movement made 
by both Gould (1981) and Blum (1973) illustrated the strong motive to 
find scientific justification for the existing social order.
Speculation about ways in which the concept of IQ could have developed 
from other social motives is fueled by recent developments in thinking 
about intelligence. Gazzaniga (1985, 1988), coming from a 
neuropsychological tradition, conceived of a number of independently 
functioning mental abilities which influence our behavior, but which are 
unified by reliance upon our verbal expressive ability to justify the 
behaviors we emit. Another similar approach is offered by Gardner 
(1983) who presented a theory of multiple intelligences. These are only 
two of, possibly, an unlimited number of ways the construct of 
intelligence can be, or could have been, developed. Guilford (1967; 
Guilford & lloepfner, 1971) preceded these multiple intelligences 
approaches with his version of 120 vectors of the mind.
Iverson (1986) examined the ways in which the views of IQ test 
construct validity have affected the practice of school psychology. He 
attacked Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) concept of the nomological network
■r.
t-
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as it applies to psychological laws by showing that psychological laws 
do not account well for intentions; argued that disconfirming 
observations do not necessarily refute the construct being validated, 
thus allowing a kind of circular reasoning; and, pointed out the 
weaknesses in making generalizations about human actions apart from 
human intentions. Thus, the problem of treating human behavior as, 
simply, movements in space determined by prior movements in space 
ignores human intentions which often can make behavior unpredictable.
The problem with many of the tests used by school psychologists, then, 
is that they are based upon deterministic thinking which ignores the 
qualitative differences between human behavior and the behavior of other 
physical events such as the movement of electrons, atoms, molecules, and 
biochemicals.
Iverson (1986) went on to describe how school psychologists appear 
to work from two incompatible models when conducting assessments. The 
first model is that of deterministic science (also referred to as 
scientific realism) which has provided the basis from which "objective" 
tests have been derived. The second model is labeled the value-oriented 
model, the assumptions of which are in conflict with those of 
determinism, and underlie the more qualitative aspects of a 
psychological evaluation including in-depth interviews, participant 
observations, and diagnostic teaching. Iverson believed that school 
psychological evaluations were relatively ineffectual (a point to be 
addressed below) primarily because of this conflict in basic 
assumptions. The conflicting assumptions which are concealed in the 
deterministic and value-oriented models will be examined in Chapter 3
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(see p. 70). The reasons why these models cannot be complementary 
should become clear to the reader at that point.
One of the basic reasons school psychologists conduct psychological 
and educational assessments is to gather information which will be 
useful in planning educational programs for students who are not 
succeeding. However, a review which appeared in a major textbook on 
school psychology, The School Psychology Handbook, by Ysseldyke and 
Mirkin (1982), found that " . . .  there has been essentially no 
empirical support for the beliefs that process dysfunctions cause 
academic difficulties, can be reliably assessed, or can be remediated" 
;p. 409). They found no support for the practice of basing 
prescriptions upon aptitude measures. They quoted Mann, Proger, and 
Cross (1973) who stated that methodological problems in the measurement 
of aptitude are to blame for the lack of positive findings. They also 
quoted Arter and Jenkins (1977) who found a widespread belief among 
educators in modality-instructional interactions in spite of the absence
V
of empirical support for such practices. Ysseldyke and Mirkin summed up
their review with the following statement:
Assessment and decision-making practices are too often incongruent 
with empirical findings, technically inadequate tests are used far 
too often, decisions are significantly affected by nonobjective 
data, and the process of using assessment data to make decisions is 
both considerably varied and little understood, (p. 400)
Another major function of assessment in school psychology is to
diagnose handicapping conditions in students. White and Harris (1961),
while they acknowledged that many psychologists felt that diagnoses were
unreliable, advocated for the diagnostic process and diagnostic
categories "because they require a summation of the pupil's
5T-----------
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difficulties” (p. 239). However, in an introduction to an issue of 
Exceptional Children exploring curriculum-based assessment, Tucker 
(1985) concluded that there is no evidence that traditional, norm- 
referenced testing, which most school psychologists provide, produces 
data which is relevant to the remediation of a student's educational 
problems. School curricula are usually determined by local school 
boards, and local traditions are what determine whether or not a student 
is making satisfactory progress. Thus, Tucker argued that assessment of 
a student's functioning within the school curricula is essential in 
determining just what are the student's educational needs.
Gittelman (1980) reviewed the literature on the validity of 
projective tests in diagnosing emotional and behavioral disturbances in 
children. Projective tests usually consist of ambiguous stimuli 
presented to a child who is asked to respond in some way. The 
responses, it is hypothesized, provide some information about the 
child's intrapsychic dynamics. Gittelman found very poorly done 
research, but concluded that children with severe problems tend to 
differ on some projective tests from normal children, but these tests 
lack diagnostic specificity. Also, there was no research support for 
the belief that a certain kind of test response characteristic of a 
group of abnormal children could be interpreted as having the same 
meaning for normal children.
Gerken (1985) concluded in her review of academic assessment by 
school psychologists that the reliance on objective tests of achievement 
is no longer an acceptable approach. Flaws in the instruments are only 
part of the problem; another important part is the tendency of school
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psychologists to gather insufficient, inadequate, and/or irrelevant 
information. She presented a model for improving academic assessments 
and recommended that interventions be based upon sound psychological and 
educational theory, but she failed to provide examples of well 
supported, sound theories which can guide the process of deriving 
remediation from assessment.
Cancelli and Duley (1985) reviewed the data on psychological 
assessments and advocated an approach that focused on the uses to which 
assessment data were put. While they rejected the traditional reliance 
on objective, norm-referenced testing, neither did they fully embrace 
the opposite position of doing away with traditional tests in favor of 
behavioral assessments (a position favored by Trachtman, 1981). "Both 
intrapersonal functioning and behavioral assessment data are important 
for aiding educational decisions in the schools" (Cancelli St Duley, 
1985). While presenting a rationale for greater reliance on behavioral 
assessments they failed to provide evidence that meets the criteria of 
the behavioral approach which they advocate, that behavioral assessments 
result in more effective remediation. This advocacy of new approaches 
before gathering supporting empirical evidence is not unusual in school 
psychology literature.
In his review of the sources of errors in the professional 
judgments of school psychologists, Barnett (1988) reported that 
standardized instruments with reliabilities and validities considered 
acceptable lead to magnitudes of error that are difficult to defend. 
Also, a study reported by Ilacmann and Barnett (1985) in which a computer 
simulation designed to minimize classification errors by selecting tests
I *
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with high reliabilities, found that when reliability coefficients were 
as high as .94 retest misclassifications reached 30%. The error rates 
were much higher when retesting was done with different, but highly 
correlated, tests. Barnett (1988) concluded this portion of his review 
as follows: "In summary, many problems associated with the technical
adequacy of tests and other assessment procedures actually have been 
underestimated" (p. 663).
Summary of Assessments
To summarize the problems concerning assessment, it was found that 
intelligence tests have developed empirically rather than from theory. 
Their empirical development, however, reflects a preconception about the 
unilinearity of human intelligence which has been subsequently verified 
by the principal components approach to factor analysis. Because there 
are other approaches to factor analysis which support a multi-factor 
view of intelligence and new theories of multiple intelligences, the 
general factor theory of intelligence is being challenged (see Gardner, 
1983, for a historical review of the single versus multiple factor 
theories of intelligence). School psychologists may have prematurely 
adopted an approach to intelligence which does not tap all the 
potentialities of students. The construct validity of tests was also 
criticized because of ontological assumptions which ignore 
intentionality. The practical problems of tests as they are currently 
used by school psychologists were pointed out. These problems included 
the fact that aptitude measures have not resulted in useful treatments, 
that the notion of modality preferences has no bearing on interventions, 
that achievement measures are often invalid, and that achievement
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measures usually do not measure what the child is being taught. While 
alternatives to objective, psychometric assessments were illustrated, 
what seems to be missing in school psychology is a theory explaining how 
assessment information is linked theoretically to specific remedial 
activities. For example, knowing that a student with average abilities 
and a "normal" intelligence test profile is unable to sound out medial 
vowels does not point to any specific remedial strategy. Even if a much 
greater amount of assessment information about the student were 
available either from traditional or curriculum-based assessments, there 
are no empirical reasons to believe that a successful strategy for 
teaching this youngster to sound out medial vowels could be derived from 
such data. This is reminiscent of the philosophical problem of 
formalizing inductive logic. The best we can do is, as Popper (1968) 
suggested, conjecture and refute. If this is the case, why conduct 
expensive, time-consuming assessments? Why not simply do practice 
teaching with a student, experimenting with hypotheses, while gathering 
many kinds of information?
Psychological Diagnoses 
If it is assumed that diagnosis is based upon assessment 
information, and the assessment information is suspect for the reasons 
examined above, then one would expect, logically, that diagnostic 
practices must also be suspect, which is what Barnett (1988) reported. 
Reynolds et al. (1984) have made a number of interesting observations 
about the diagnoses used by school psychologists. First, the diagnostic 
categories utilized have been generated by psychiatrists, special 
educators, or government legislators or bureaucrats, with little or no
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input from school psychologists. Second, the philosophical basis for 
most diagnoses in school psychology has been the medical model with its 
focus on intra-individual pathology. And third, the diagnostic process 
has been severely criticized as unreliable and invalid.
The criticisms of school psychological diagnoses are similar to 
those of other child specialists. McDermott (1980) found that school 
psychologist diagnoses were lacking in congruence, but they were no 
worse than those of clinical psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
mental health agencies, public mental health workers, or special 
education teams. Frame, Clarizio, Porter, and Vinsonhaler (1982) 
examined the congruence of school psychologists1 diagnoses and found phi 
coefficients ranging from .30 to .53. Epps, McGue, and Ysseldyke (1982) 
reported that a group of school psychologists were unable to 
differentiate between learning disabled and non-learning disabled when 
presented with diagnostic data on each student. In a study by Adelman 
(1978) it was found that diagnostic labels were confusing, redundant, 
and not differentiating. In a similar vein, Barnett (1988) concluded 
from his more recent review that the reliability of diagnoses in school 
psychology is very poor. Wang, Reynolds, and Walberg (1988) reviewed 
the literature on evaluating and diagnosing special students and 
concluded that at best the system is unscientific, inefficient, and 
unhelpful, and at worst may actually harm some students. Reynolds and 
his colleagues (1984) concluded from their review of the literature 
that, "taken as a whole, this body of research indicates inadequate, 
reliability for most, if not ail, current systems of diagnosis in 
frequent use" (p. 318). This statement is a good summary of the state
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of the art of diagnosis in school psychology. Thus, extensive reviews 
of the literature suggest that a consensus is growing that the 
diagnostic practices of school psychologists are quite deficient.
Summary of Diagnoses
Diagnostic procedures used by school psychologists have been 
adopted from other professions and generally focus upon intra-individual 
pathology. These diagnoses, like those in other child specialty fields, 
have been severely criticized as confusing, redundant, unreliable, 
unscientific, and inefficient. They are accused, in some cases, of 
harming children.
Psycho-Educational Treatments 
As previously stated, the intervention services offered by school 
psychologists include consultation for educational remediation and 
behavior management, individual counseling, and group counseling. In 
this section these categories will be grouped for convenience into two 
parts, consultation and counseling, so as to examine the literature of 
the effectiveness of each. As Reynolds et al. (1984) pointed out, 
however, there are an infinite number of possible problems a school 
psychologist may encounter and very likely an equal number of possible 
interventions which could be brought to bear on these problems. Thus, 
grouping of the typical kinds of interventions used by school 
psychologists is necessary. Likewise, the research on various 
intervention techniques is voluminous (Reynolds et al., 1984); 
therefore, an examination of research reviews should help to indicate 
whether or not school psychologist interventions are considered to be 
effective.
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Consultation
The first review of outcome studies of consultation was conducted 
by Mannino and Shore (1975) who examined 35 research reports published 
between 1958 and 1972. They counted as positive effects any changes in 
attitudes or behavior of consultees or improvements in behavior of 
clients. Twenty-nine, or 69%, of the studies reported at least one 
positive outcome. Of those studies which assessed the effectiveness of 
consultation within school settings, 20, or 78%, reported at least 
partial success.
Medway (1979) conducted a follow-up review and focused on school 
consultation outcome studies from 1972 through 1977. He defined 
consultation as "collaborative problem solving between a mental health 
specialist (the consultant) and one or more persons (the consultees) who 
are responsible for providing some form of psychological assistance to 
another (the client)" (p. 276). Twenty-nine studies were found and of 
these eight, or 28%, reported consistently positive results. Another 14 
studies obtained positive results on at least one of several dependent 
measures. Thus, the overall percentage of studies in which at least 
some positive result was found turned out to be 76, a figure remarkably 
close to that found for the school consultation studies by Mannino and 
Shore (1975).
Medway (1979) cautioned, however, that many of the studies he 
reviewed were flawed because of their failure to use control groups, or, 
in some cases where comparison groups were used, to use comparable 
subjects in the experimental and control groups. Eleven studies, 10 of 
which reported positive results, failed to include a control group. The
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number and background characteristics of the consultants was also a
problem in several of the studies. These characteristics have been
shown to be important in other outcome studies (Bergan & Tombari, 1976;
Rider, 1974; Schowengerdt, Fine, & Poggia, 1976). Little or no attempt
was made in these studies to ensure that the consultees were a
homogeneous group. The type of outcome data, the intervals between
treatments and gathering of outcome data, and the persons reporting the
outcome data were inconsistent from one study to another. Also, Medway
had reason to believe that journal editorial policies may have limited
the number of outcome studies published which reported either negative
or no positive results. For example, only three of the eight doctoral
dissertations included in his review reported any positive results. In
chapter seven of his book, Westland (1978) discussed the "publication
crisis” in psychology. He emphasized that the meaning of a positive
result in psychological research is not the same as a positive result in
the physical sciences. Causing a substance to crystallize, for example,
once it happens, cancels out previous negative results in a chemical
experiment. The significance of a positive result in psychology,
however, must be judged in light of previous negative results. Westland
(1978) concluded that:
It is for this reason that if only the 'positive' result is 
published, and nobody knows about the others (real or potential), 
it can be said that publication practices can lead to totally 
misleading conclusions, whereas the absence of knowledge about the 
chemist's abortive trials makes no difference at all to the logical 
status of the result he does publish. If a conclusion in physical 
science is wrong, it is wrong for different, and usually internal, 
reasons (internal to the experiment, that is), (p. 101)
r.
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Investigation of the effects of journal editorial policies on the 
publication of all kinds of knowledge in school psychology might be an 
important avenue of inquiry.
Counseling
The next aspect of school psychology practice to be examined in the 
remediation category is counseling. This term normally is used to 
represent relatively short-term direct interventions with one or more 
clients (Bardon & Bennett, 1974), and will be so understood in this 
paper. While the terms "counseling" and "psychotherapy" are often used 
to denote differences in the client, the approach, the seriousness of 
the problem, or the context of therapy, these differences are artificial 
and provide no clear distinctions (Patterson, 1966). Therefore, 
following Patterson, no distinction will be made between counseling and 
psychotherapy, both of which will be defined as "processes involving a 
special kind of relationship between a person who asks for help with a 
psychological problem (the client or patient) and a person who is 
trained to provide that help (the counselor or the therapist)" (p. 1).
Counseling is one of the school psychology interventions most 
preferred by teachers (Ford & Migles, 1979: Algozzine, Ysseldyke,
Christenson, & Thurlow, 1982). Teachers may prefer counseling for the 
imnature or misbehaving child because they do not understand the 
limitations of counseling (Bardon & Bennett, 1974), because teachers 
have unrealistic ideas about the training of school psychologists 
(Styles, 1965), and/or because teachers prefer interventions which do 
not intrude on their prerogatives (Ford & Migles).
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One of the earliest, and most controversial, assessments of the
effects of psychotherapy was reported by Eysenck (1952). He reviewed
the literature of outcome studies and found that there was little reason
to think that psychotherapy was effective. Eysenck reviewed the
literature again in 1966 and reached the following similar conclusion:
With the single exception of the psychotherapeutic methods based on 
learning theory, results of published research with military and 
civilian neurotics, and with both adults and children, suggest that 
the therapeutic effects of psychotherapy are small or non-existent, 
and do not in any demonstrable way add to the non-specific effects 
of routine medical treatment, or to such events as occur in the 
patients' everyday experience, (pp. 39-40)
Furthermore, a similar review of psychotherapy studies with children as
the clients was conducted by Levitt (1963) with results which were very
similar to those found by Eysenck.
Meehl (1966), and others, were invited to respond to Eysenck's
(1966) findings of generally nonpositive effects of psychotherapy.
Meehl estimated that in his experience perhaps only one-fourth of the
people seeking psychotherapy can profit from the experience, the
remainder either would not benefit or would improve without help. He
also believed that only one-fourth of the therapists in practice are
effective in helping clients. Given these estimates, Meehl then
calculated the probability that the appropriate client receiving therapy
from an effective therapist at only about .06. He concluded that until
psychotherapists could identify appropriate clients, and the
effectiveness of individual therapists could be identified, further
outcome studies would be futile. This argument appears to beg the
question, as did most of the replies to Eysenck's analysis.
5............. *
I’
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Strupp and Hadley (1979) conducted an interesting experiment
comparing the effectiveness of experienced psychotherapists with
university professors who had no formal training or experience in
counseling, but who were known to form caring relationships with their
students. Each group was randomly assigned a rather homogeneous group
of students with indications of anxiety or depression based upon the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory scores. A minimal treatment
control group was also formed. Outcome measures found that the clients
in both treated groups achieved the same amount of gain on the multiple
outcome measures. While the control group also improved, their gains
were not as large as those of the treated groups. All groups maintained
their improvements at a one year follow-up assessment.
Smith and Glass (1977) reported a meta-analysis of psychotherapy
outcome studies. They conducted a large number of analyses of client,
therapist, method, and temporal variables. In general, they found that
the average treated client is better off than about 75/. of untreated
clients. Their major conclusions were as follows:
The results of research demonstrated the beneficial effects of 
counseling and psychotherapy. Despite volumes devoted to the 
theoretical differences among different schools of psychotherapy, 
the results of research demonstrate negligible differences in the 
effects produced by different therapy types. Unconditional 
judgments of superiority of one type or another of psychotherapy, 
and all that these claims imply about treatment and training 
policy, are unjustified. Scholars and clinicians are in the 
embarrassing position of knowing less than has been proven, because 
knowledge, atomized and sprayed across a vast landscape of 
journals, books, and reports, has not been accessible, (p. 760)
Subsequent meta-analytic studies by Shapiro and Shapiro (1982) and
Landman and Dawes (1982) found very similar effect sizes and reached the
conclusion that psychotherapy is at least moderately effective.
F.
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However, the Shapiro and Shapiro study found behavioral and cognitive 
therapies to be slightly more effective than other types of therapy.
Prout and DeMartino (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of school- 
based studies of psychotherapy outcomes. They found only 33 studies 
which met their criteria for inclusion in the analysis, but reported 
that the overall effect size across all treatments was large enough 
(0.58) to tentatively conclude that school-based psychotherapy is at 
least moderately effective. The authors of this study found that 
cognitive and behavioral and group counseling or psychotherapy were 
relatively more effective than other forms of therapy.
The issues of training and experience for psychotherapists have 
been raised. Smith and Glass (1977), for example, found virtually no 
correlation between therapist experience and outcome (r «* -.01). Hynan 
(1981) interpreted the findings by Smith and Glass of a modest effect 
for psychotherapy as a demonstration of the effects of relationships, 
not techniques. He pointed out that, with very minor exceptions, the 
specific techniques of psychotherapy are not effective and the training 
of the therapist appears to be inconsequential to the outcome of 
therapy. Following these assumptions Hynan argued for a number of 
advantages in graduate training of counselors or therapists when one 
assumes that the techniques of psychotherapy are ineffective. These 
benefits are (a) alleviation of anxiety in beginning therapists, and (b) 
making patients responsible (and giving them the credit) for any 
improvements they might make.
It should also be pointed out that meta-analysis as a technique for 
reviewing research is not without its critics (e.g., Eysenck, 1978). An
r.
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entire journal issue has been devoted to an examination of the pros and 
cons of the meta-analysis procedure (Garfield, 1983).
Special Education
While school psychologists are not directly responsible for special 
education programs, they are a part of the system which identifies and 
recommends these programs for certain children. The literature in a 
wide array of educational publications has in the last few years 
publicized the apparent fact that special education programs for most 
handicapped children are no more effective than regular education 
programs. Cegelka and Tyler (1970) found in their review of 40 studies 
that measures of student academic achievement Indicated that mildly 
handicapped students in regular classes performed just as well as, or 
better, than similar students placed in special education classes.
Blatt and Garfunkel (1973) reached the same conclusion in their review. 
Using meta-analytic methods, Carlberg and Kavale (1980) concluded that 
special education placement was inferior to regular class placement for 
students with below average intelligence. Glass (1983) also reviewed 
special education efficacy studies and concluded that there is little 
evidence substantiating the benefits of special education programs for 
students with mild handicaps. Reschly (1988) reviewed the literature 
regarding special education programs for learning disabled students and 
concluded that, "If It could be shown that the eligibility determination 
is reliable and valid or related to differential instructional 
effectiveness, then t.hose services could be justified. However, there 
is no convincing evidence to support those assertions" (p. 463).
F
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Some (Hallahan, Keller, McKinney, Loyd, & Bryan, 1988) have 
criticized the technical adequacy of the dependent measures and/or the 
experimental designs of many of the special education efficacy studies, 
and Marston (1987) found preliminary evidence that some special 
education programs may work if they are analyzed using curriculum-based 
assessments. Nevertheless, the bulk of the evidence raises serious 
questions about special education effectiveness. This view seems to be 
dominating the media and is stimulating the dismantling of special 
education programs for the mildly handicapped (e.g., Reynolds, Wang, & 
Walberg, 1987; Will, 1986). Once again, action is being recommended 
before a consensus has been formed among the researchers and those who 
are involved in special education about the issues being examined and 
debated.
Summary of ?gycho-Educational Treatments
It has not been convincingly shown that interventions normally 
employed by school psychologists, consultation, counseling, and program 
recommendations, have been effective in helping educationally 
handicapped children to improve their functioning in school. While the 
research on consultation is promising, a number of problems with these 
studies prohibit any conclusions regarding overall effectiveness. 
Likewise, the latest review of counseling outcome research shows only a 
very modest positive effect which is probably a measure of the effects 
of relationships rather than specific techniques. Special education 
programming for most handicapped students has not been shown to be 
effective. While it is premature to conclude that school psychology
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
I —
69
intervention services are ineffective, it is safe to say that school 
psychologists have yet to demonstrate the value of these services.
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CHAPTER 3
REASONS FOR THE FAILURES OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY 
So far, a particular point of view of the influences on, and the 
history, practices, and failures of school psychology has been 
presented. The intent of this presentation was to examine the current 
crisis in the profession while hinting at some of the reasons for the 
crisis. In Chapter 3 the reader will be presented with criticisms of 
metaphysical realism (or extemalism), notions of objectivity, the 
typical distinction between facts and values, laws of behavior, and 
theories of the person, as these ideas are found in the behavioral and 
social sciences. Following this, the more practical problems of 
semantics, diagnostic categories, application of research, and 
measurement in school psychology are addressed.
Also in this chapter an attempt is made to explicate a number of 
reasons for the current state of crisis in school psychology. Reasons 
rather than causes are dealt with in this paper because, following 
Phillips' (1980) analysis, behavioral science cannot yet establish 
causes for complex phenomena. Furthermore, Robinson (1985) pointed out 
that causes are purely natural phenomena and can be contrasted with 
reasons which entail agency and usually speak of the agent's motives, 
desires, expectations, and purposes. To speak of causes is appropriate 
when the topic is some aspect of one of the natural sciences. Referenc 
to reasons is more appropriate when we speak of the psychological and 
social sciences.
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Philosophical Reasons 
The first set of reasons for the failures of school psychology are 
those which relate to the dominant world view of scientific psychology. 
This world view is founded upon basic assumptions about the relationship 
of the observer to the observed, the nature of objectivity, the 
antagonism between facts and values, the laws of behavior, and theories 
of the person.
Externalism
The first reason for the failures of school psychology is that like
much of scientific psychology in general, school psychology has
subscribed with little or no question to the assumptions of the
philosophical externalists as defined by Putnam (1981).
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of 
mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete 
description of "the way the world is." Truth involves some sort of 
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external 
things and sets of things. I shall call this perspective the 
externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a 
God’s Eye point of view. (p. 49)
Putnam associated the externalist view with metaphysical realism, a view
which is explicated and defended by, for example, Bunge and Ardila
(1987).
Putnam (1981) presented a number of arguments against externalism. 
One of his arguments was that the externalist adopts a correspondence 
theory of truth, that is, the notion that our perceptions are true if 
they correspond with what really exists externally to our perceptions. 
The problem with this position is that no one knows what really exists 
outside her/his mental representations. Such knowledge requires that 
the knower have access to both the mental representation and the real
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object. Putnam refers to this as the God's Eye point of view, which of 
course is impossible to attain.
Borrowing from Hume and Kant, Putnam (1981) pointed out that we do 
not have access to objects, only to our sensations and perceptions of 
objects. Thus, to assume that our sensations/perceptions of objects are 
the "things in themselves" is mistaken. Our sensations/perceptions and 
our mental representations are internal to us. In order to decide 
whether or not one's map or idea is the "true" representation of reality 
would require one to have the God's Eye view, which is an impossibility.
In the history of any discipline there are a multitude of examples 
wherein we can demonstrate numerous plausible representations or maps of 
an object or phenomenon (Kuhn, 1970). Intelligent human behavior is an 
example from the school psychology discipline for which there are many 
differing views (discussed in earlier chapters). However, there is no 
way that we can demonstrate or prove that one particular representation 
is the correct one for all time. In science one can offer hypotheses 
and subject them to tests of verification. However, the results of the 
tests are also objects which, like other objects, are represented in 
human thought. These representations are subject to the same 
limitations as all representations. To assert that a particular 
representation is the correct one is to also assert that one has a kind 
of prior knowledge in which one can recognize a true representation when 
one comes across it. That is, one is asserting an isomorphism between 
the representation and the object. This implies the God's Eye point of 
view in which one can separate from one's mental processes and from the
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external object and see the correct correspondence. Such a view is 
unsupportable.
All one can do is choose a similarity or map which is rationally
acceptable for the time being. Rational acceptability is, according to
Putnam (1981), a function of the values of the community and what
members of the community are willing to accept as rational. The
characteristics of a desirable system of rational procedure (which he
also listed as the desiderata for a moral system) are as follows:
• • • (1) the desire that one's basic assumptions, at least, should 
have wide appeal; (2) the desire that one's system should be able 
to withstand rational criticism; (3) the desire that the morality 
recommended should be livable, (p. 105)
The wonderful products of the physical sciences— in contrast to the
behavioral and social sciences— cannot be denied. Some thinkers,
though, have seriously questioned the connections between the "pure"
sciences and their products. Feyerabend (1987), for example, argued
that the products of science are as much, and in many cases more, the
result of social processes which are outside the realm of the scientific
research endeavor. Furthermore, the sociology of scientists appears to
be such that many of the products of the physical sciences are unrelated
to the metaphysical view of externalism (Feyerabend, 1987, pp. 25-39).
The metaphysical realism of Newtonian physics has also been
challenged by what is described as the most successful theory ever
produced in science (Davies & Brown, 1986), quantum theory. Wheeler
(1981) described the theory and some of its implications as follows:
We used to think of the universe as "out there," to be observed as
it were from behind the screen of a foot-thick slab plate of glass,
safely, without personal involvement. The truth, quantum theory 
tells us, is quite different. Even when we want to observe, not a
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galaxy, not a star, but something so miniscule as an electron, we 
have, irt effect, to smash the glass, to reach in, and install 
measuring equipment. Bohr's principle of complementarity, 
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminism, and the lesson of 
"phenomenon" tell us more. We can install a device to measure the 
position, x, of the electron, or one to measure its momentum, p, 
but we can't fit both registering devices into the same place at 
the same time. Moreover, the act of registration has an 
inescapable consequence for what we have the right to say about the 
electron then and in the future. The observer is inescapably 
promoted to participator. . . .  In some strange sense, this is a 
participatory universe, (pp. 17-18)
Oppenheimer (1956) criticized psychological science for continuing to
use the Newtonian analogy of science when physics had moved on beyond
the mechanistic paradigm. Thus, the God's Eye view of metaphysical
realism was, and still is, a useful metaphor for classical physics. As
the range of matter to be explained has increased, however, it has
become necessary to include information about the observer. The
inclusion of such information has eroded the validity of the God's Eye
point of view. As will be discussed below, the application of the God's
Eye view metaphor to psychology faces another major obstacle not usually
found in the science of physics, that of intentionality.
It has not been established directly how, as a group, school
psychologists view metaphysics, epistemology, and the nature of
objectivity. Actually, very little mention of philosophical assumptions
can be found in the school psychology literature, with a few important
exceptions (Bass, 1987; Lauer, 1969; Phillips, 1987a, 1987b; Shinn,
1987) which will be discussed in more detail later. However, the
position of most school psychologists can be inferred from statements
made in the school psychology literature about science (e.g., that the
purpose of science is to "describe reality" [Phillips, 1982, p. 25]).
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Skinner (1953) clearly believed that the "basic characteristics of
science are not restricted to any particular subject matter" (p. 11) and
that the consummate function of a science is to control that which it
studies. In spite of changes in the paradigms of physical science,
control and prediction remain the standards for scientific knowledge for
physics and for other sciences which would emulate physics (Rychlak,
1981). Rychlak very pointedly exposed the science of psychology as
being out of touch with the historical developments in physics:
This now leaves us with two rather interesting developments:
First, other considerations besides predictive efficiency may 
determine the choice of one theoretical view over another at any 
given time. Second, it is within the realm of possibility that 
more than one view of the cosmos may function jointly and 
efficiently at any point in time, or even for all time. Empirical 
data may be amenable to diverse points of view. . . . Despite the 
reasonableness of this conclusion, based upon the experiences of 
our brother scientists, whom we were once only too pleased to 
emulate, psychologists have disregarded the lessons of history and 
persisted in patterning themselves after a nineteenth-century brand 
of physics. The science of modern psychology is essentially 
Newtonian, (p. 118)
Summary of Externalism
To summarize, the God's Eye view of reality, also known as
externalism, is unsupported because it requires the observer to become
free of her/his mental representations so as to compare them with the
"real" objects which are external to her/him. The most basic of the
sciences, physics, now entertains the highly successful quantum theory
which acknowledges that the observer participates in bringing about the
effects which are perceived in an experiment. Very basic notions of
experimental control in psychology reflect an outdated, mechanistic view
that the experimenter can be isolated from die world she/he studies.
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Accepting the criticisms of externalism, however, forces a criticism of 
our views of objectivity, which is taken up next.
Objectivity
The evidence that school psychologists generally adhere to 
scientism was presented earlier. The basic tenets of scientism are 
essentially the same as those of externalism in the sense that both 
subscribe to the belief that external reality can be known through more 
or less objective methods and that behavior can be described and 
explained causally. Objectivity, of course is understood to mean that 
any influences of the observer on the phenomenon of interest can be 
overcome, to varying degrees, by employing increasingly rigorous 
experimental controls (Bunge & Ardila, 1987, pp. 77-78). At least one 
dictionary definition of objectivity described it as follows: "Of or
having to do with a known or perceived object as distinguished from 
something existing only in the mind of the subject, or person thinking" 
(Webster's New World Dictionary, 1960). Bunge and Ardila spoke of, for 
example, "good experimental designs [that] keep the observer at arm's 
length, precisely in order to maximize objectivity" (p. 74). They 
defined a description as objective if it is an approximately true 
statement of fact rather than of fiction (p. 34). Such a statement, of 
course, implies a prior knowledge of that which is true, or the God's 
Eye view.
Feyerabend (1987) asserted that objectivity is older than science 
and originated when different cultures came into contact, each of which 
held its own views as lawful and correct. He distinguished between 
material objectivity, which is tradition-independent truths, and formal
[-
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objectivity, meaning tradition-independent ways of finding truths.
However, Feyerabend pointed out, both notions of objectivity are
problematic because each is defined differently in various cultures. In
the rise of science in the western world the scientific, or formal,
notion of objectivity has not been sustained.
As science advanced and produced a steadily increasing store of 
information, formal notions of objectivity were used not only to 
create knowledge, but also to legitimize, i.e. to show the 
objective validity of, already existing bodies of information.
This led to further problems: there exists no finite set of
general rules that has substance (i.e. recommends or forbids some 
well defined procedures) and is compatible with all the events 
leading to the rise and progress of modern science. Formal 
requirements defended by scientists and philosophers were found to 
be in conflict with developments set in motion and supported by the 
same group. To resolve the conflict the requirements were 
gradually weakened until they disappeared into thin air. (p. 9)
Feyerabend went on to give examples of scientists who undermined the
boundary between subject and object yet advanced their science (e.g.,
Einstein's relativity theories). He concluded " . . .  that the idea of
a science that proceeds by logically rigorous argumentation is nothing
but a dream" (p. 10).
What Feyerabend (1987) did was to show that conceptions of reality,
truth, objectivity, and science have changed and evolved and cannot be
understood outside their historical and cultural contexts. These
concepts have served various purposes at different times, one of which
has been to defend the status quo and to defeat competing views. Kuhn's
(1970) analysis of the history of science similarly proposed that
scientific thinking is governed by paradigms which serve a local (in
time and culture) purpose. A paradigm influences what is of importance,
what is likely to be perceived, and what is evaluated as positive or
negative. When the paradigm no longer meets the needs of the science, a
j_—  ----------- ....
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crisis occurs and a revolutionary change in the paradigm is likely to be 
imminent.
The notion of objectivity is an integral part of the attempts to 
make psychology a science of the causal mechanics of behavior. The 
desire to make psychology more objective was what led J. B. Watson to 
develop and advocate behaviorism (Baars, 1986, p. 45). Two major 
problems with the attempts in psychology to achieve objectivity have 
been in (a) the quite restricted range of phenomena investigated, and 
(b) the unimportance of variables to which experimental psychology has 
been interested (Krathwohl, 1985, pp. 23-24). Indeed, Michael Wapner 
(1986), in an interview, interpreted Koch's (1959) volumes on the 
accomplishments of the science of psychology as having shown the 
enterprise is bankrupt and has trivialized the whole human experience. 
More recently, Koch (1981) made similar pronouncements after further 
study of the discipline of psychology. He indicated his belief that 
psychology was never successfully severed from philosophy and " . . .  
that psychology is not a single or coherent discipline but rather a 
collectivity of studies of varied cast, some few of which may qualify as 
science, while most do not" (Koch, 1981, p. 268). Koch also spolce of 
the moral bankruptcy in psychology when a particular paradigm is 
presented as the final preemption of human nature. He also criticized 
psychological research as being too narrowly fixated on methodology. In 
contrast, anthropologists and sociologists often use less objective 
methods of inquiry and seek more holistic views at the risk of 
subjective biases.
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Summary of Objectivity
Notions of objectivity in psychology are based upon the 
insupportable God's Eye view of reality and have produced a large body 
of research which has been judged by some to be trivial and bankrupt.
By admitting only observable behavior as data, experimental 
psychologists have missed a significant aspect of what it is to be 
human, that is, to interpret sentences, to build constructs, to have 
purposes. Ironically, this internal nature of the person has shown 
through in rigorously controlled experiments (Bransford & Franks, 1971; 
Bransford, 1979).
Facts and Values
If the arguments criticizing the externalist's (God's Eye) view and 
those examining objectivity are coherent, then the assumed distinction 
between facts and values must also be questioned. Putnam (1981) 
defended the notion that since our conception of what i£ cannot be 
compared to an unconceptualized true reality, then our conception of 
what is true results from what the community of scholars within a 
discipline accept as rational at a particular time in the history of the 
discipline. The rational criteria accepted by the community, in turn, 
is a reflection of the values of the community. As the empirical world 
is constructed within a discipline, the standards of rationality (and 
the values underlying these standards) are altered.
From a long tradition of metaphysical realism and the God's Eye 
view has developed a tendency to conceptualize realistic and subjective 
as opposites. Putnam (1981) said the following about this common 
bipolar construct:
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But in fact, metaphysical realism and subjectivism are not simple 
'opposites'. Today we tend to be too realistic about physics and 
too subjectivistic about ethics, and these are connected 
tendencies. It is because we are too realistic about physics, 
because we see physics (or some hypothetical future physics) as the 
One True Theory, and not simply as a rationally acceptable 
description suited for certain problems and purposes, that we tend 
to be subjectivistic about descriptions we cannot 'reduce' to 
physics. Becoming less realistic about physics and becoming less 
subjectivistic about ethics are likewise connected, (p. 143)
If facts tend to be of those kinds of things which can be reduced to
physical descriptions and values tend to be those which can not be so
reduced, and the metaphysical realist's God's Eye view is indefensible
concerning either material or non-material things, then talk about
values is not all that different from talk about facts. Both can be
subjected to standards of rationality which have evolved in human
cultures.
MacIntyre (1984) traced the history of (and the breakdown of)
standards of rationality in ethics. He noted that it was in the
transition from a classical philosophy of mankind to a mechanistic one
that facts and values became separated:
The notion of 'fact' with respect to human beings is thus 
transformed in the transition from the Aristotelian to the 
mechanist view. On the former view human action, because it is to 
be explained teleologically, not only can, but must be, 
characterized with reference to the hierarchy of goods which 
provide the ends of human action. On the latter view human action 
not only can, but must be, characterized without any reference to 
such goods. On the former view the facts about human action 
include the facts about what is valuable to human beings (and not 
just the facts about what they think to be valuable); on the latter 
view there are no facts about what is valuable. 'Fact' becomes 
value-free, 'is' becomes a stranger to 'ought' and explanation, as 
well as evaluation, changes its character as a result of this 
divorce between 'is' and 'ought', (p. 84)
MacIntyre (1984) went on to argue that the application of a
mechanistic technology of humanity has been deceptive and self-deceptive
L______
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(on the part of social scientists) because such a program has not
resulted in real achievement. What it has produced is numerous
bureaucracies based upon the mechanistic program which claim value
neutrality and expertise. The expertise is derived from the mechanistic
sciences of humanity and made up of a body of value free 'facts'.
But in every case the rise of managerial expertise would have to be 
the same central theme, and such expertise, as we have already 
seen, has two sides to it: there is the aspiration to value
neutrality and the claim to manipulative power. Both of these, we 
can now perceive, derive from the history of the way in which the 
realm of fact and the realm of value were distinguished by the 
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. . . . And 
the legitimation of the characteristic institutional forms of 
twentieth-century social life depends upon a belief that some of 
the central claims of that earlier philosophy have been vindicated, 
(p. 87)
The central claims of which MacIntyre (1984) spoke, of course, were 
those which established the sciences of humankind in the image of 
Newtonian physics and which always hoped to be based upon law-like 
generalizations which govern social behavior. A very crucial question, 
then, is have we been able to produce the law-like generalizations about 
social behavior from which technical expertise can be claimed? Does the 
school psychologist have available to her/him laws of behavior from 
which accurate predictions can be made and effective control of behavior 
can be derived?
Summary of Facts and Values
If one accepts the argument thus far, that our conceptions of truth 
are based upon what we can rationally agree is true, rather than what we 
discover to be true, then truth is a function of our rational processes. 
These processes, in turn, have evolved out of the values inherent in our
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histories and cultures. Rationality, then, is equally applicable to 
what we have falsely dichotomized into facts and values.
Laws of Behavior
MacIntyre (1984) argued that there are four kinds of systematic 
unpredictability in human affairs which will always render 
generalizations about human behavior subject to numerous counter- 
factuals. The first kind of unpredictability stems from radical 
conceptual innovations. By their definition they cannot be predicted, 
yet these innovations occur frequently. The second kind of 
unpredictability has to do with the inability to predict one’s own 
future actions insofar as these depend upon future, unmade decisions. 
Only an omniscient being does not need to make decisions because all is 
known and decided ahead of time. Human beings are not omniscient; 
therefore, human beings must decide among alternatives and their future 
decisions, and their subsequent behavior, can not be known ahead of 
time.
MacIntyre's (1984) third source of unpredictability came from the 
game theoretic nature of social life. That is, people are often 
Involved in transactions with others in which one person is trying to 
maximize the predictability of the other while minimizing her/his own 
predictability. To further complicate matters, each person is engaged 
in more than one complex game at a time. As MacIntyre humorously put 
it, "Not one game is being played, but several, and, if the game 
metaphor may be stretched further, the problem about real life is that 
moving one's knight to QB3 may always be replied to with a lob across
[.
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the net” (p. 98). He concluded that the totality of determinate, 
enumerable factors in a situation can not be known prospectively.
Compare this game theoretic nature of social life to the 
observations of Kelly (1955) that psychologists frequently report that 
their scientific aim is to predict and control human behavior. What 
many psychologists omit from their formulations, Kelly reminded, is that 
their experimental subjects and their clients have similar aspirations. 
Psychological perspectives on humankind too often depict the person as 
some mindless entity endlessly seeking to gratify basic urges. They 
ignore the richness of human social interactions.
The fourth source of unpredictability in human social life 
explicated by MacIntyre (1984) is that of pure contingency. There are 
simply too many elements which could have an influence upon the outcome 
of some human endeavor. MacIntyre cited the action of bacteria which 
produced the cold which Napoleon had at the battle of Waterloo, which 
caused the decision to send in the Guardd Imperiale two hours too late.
MacIntyre (1984) also admitted four kinds of predictable elements 
in human life. The first element is our tendency to structure 
activities around regular schedules. The second element includes the 
numerous statistical regularities of human life, many of which are 
independent of causal knowledge. Third, there are the causal 
regularities of nature which affect human decisions and behavior.
Fourth, MacIntyre admitted to some generalisations about human affairs 
which do have more or less predictive power. His example was of the 
causal connection between social class and educational opportunities in 
Britain and Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
i-I_________
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Goodman (1983) examined the problem of defining a law as it is used 
in the sciences and concluded that a law is a statement which has 
reached a certain level of acceptance even though complete evidence of 
its accuracy can never be obtained. The problem with the inductive 
process is that we cannot foresee the future at which time a 
counterfactual may invalidate an induction. But the same problem holds 
for deduction.
I have said that deductive inferences are justified by their 
conformity to valid general rules, and that general rules are 
justified by their conformity to valid inferences. But this circle 
is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular 
inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with 
each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are 
unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule 
we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the 
delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and 
accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only 
justification needed for either. . . . All this applies equally 
well to induction. An inductive inference, too, is justified by 
conformity to accepted inductive inferences, (p. 64)
The processes by which we construct scientific (or other) knowledge are
not governed by axiomatic rules but by judgments and standards which
have evolved linguistically in our particular culture. In the natural
sciences of physics and chemistry these process.es have yielded
scientific knowledge from which emanates very powerful predictive and
manipulative capabilities. The behavioral and social sciences, in
contrast, have failed to produce the judgments, standards, or linguistic
practices which seem necessary for predictive and manipulative power.
After examining a number of the pros and cons of the covering law
model, Robinson (1985) concluded that it leaves something to be desired
as a source of explanations. However, other, more desirable models have
not been forthcoming. One of the unfortunate consequences of the
L
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covering law model is that the social sciences, including psychology, 
can not claim any reliable covering laws from which accurate predictions 
can be made. The best psychologists can offer are what Robinson refers 
to as explanation sketches, which are of a functional or teleological 
nature.
Iverson (1986) found the basic assumptions of the deterministic and 
value-oriented models incompatible. Determinism assumes an 
unsupportable God's Eye view of the person and ignores intentionality. 
While the value-oriented model acknowledges human intentionality, such a 
view conflicts with deterministic notions of objectivity. As Putnam 
(1981) hinted, until school psychologists become less realistic about 
psychometrics and less subjectivistic about values their practices will 
continue to be contradictory.
Summary of Laws of Behavior
In summary, the covering law model has not worked well in 
psychology because no relatively exceptionless laws of behavior have yet 
been formulated. Human behavior has not yielded to the predictability 
hoped for by those who have sought to pattern psychology in the image of 
the natural sciences. Without laws of behavior from which accurate 
predictions of human behavior can be made, the image of the school 
psychologist (and others) as expert is in error.
Theories of the Person
In addition to the philosophical problems which are at the 
foundation of psychological science there are also deficiencies in the 
theoretical views of the person which have dominated experimental 
psychology. While there are a number of very rich psychodynamic
F
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personality theories which are often adopted by school and other applied 
psychologists, the view of the person which has emerged from 
experimental psychology has been quite narrow and incomplete since the 
behaviorists revolted from the introspectionists. The three 
metatheories which have dominated experimental psychology have been 
introspectionism, behaviorism, and cognitivisim (Baars, 1986). The 
major figure in nineteenth century introspectionism was Wilhelm Wundt.
It was his version of introspectionism, and Titchener's systematic self­
observation, against which the behaviorists revolted (Baars, p. 6). The 
resultant image of humankind which dominated most of experimental 
psychology has been quite sterile.
As has been alluded to earlier, the behavioristic model of the 
person has influenced the thinking of school psychologists, who are 
usually trained as scientist-practitioners, a training model which 
continues to be recommended (Martens & Keller, 1987; Schover, 1980).
One major problem with the behavioristic view of the person is that it 
focuses only on one of the three traditional (Huxley, 1945) aspects of 
the person, the body, while excluding mind and spirit. Earlier, a quote 
from B. F. Skinner (from Evans, 1968, p. 7) revealed his program for 
making psychology a part of the science of biology. Skinner (1953) 
objected to inferred "inner states," such as mind and spirit, not 
because they do not exist, but because they are not relevant in a 
functional analysis. Keschly's (1988) call for reduced levels of 
inference and the use of behavioral assessments and interventions is an 
example of a similar attitude in school psychology.
F
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
87
Heshusius (1982, 1989a) found similar missing features of the
person in the models implicit in special education institutions. The
mechanistic view of humankind has guided not only science but has
provided a cultural worldview which influences our thinking, perceiving,
and acting. Special education, Heshusius argued, has been shaped by
this worldview. Evidence of such a worldview is easily seen in the
"rules, regulations, objectives, measurements, prediction, and control—
external, quantifiable child behaviors" (1982, p. 7) which are an
integral part of special education. This view was adopted from the
Newtonian, mechanistic view of the universe, which produced in the
social and behavioral sciences a view of the person as reactive/passive
and governed by stimulus control. In this view accountability is a
realistic goal and the diagnostic-prescriptive model of remedial
teaching is pervasive. The mechanistic view resulted in a closed-system
theory of the person, a conviction which is not supported in the face of
the inability of the social and behavioral sciences to formulate any
covering laws free from major counterfactuals.
Harre (1984) was more explicit in his criticism of both the
experimental (behavioristic) psychology conception of the person and
that of the more recent cognitive movement:
Two images of human psychology compete for our attention. Academic 
psychologists, particularly those who work in the 'experimental' 
tradition, make the implicit assumption that men, women and 
children are high-grade automata, the patterns of whose behavior 
are thought to obey something very like natural laws. Quite 
recently, thoughts and feelings have been reincorporated into the 
general ontology of psychology, but much of the subsequent work in 
cognitive psychology has preserved the automaton conception. It is 
assumed that there are programs which control action and the task 
of psychology is to discover the 'mechanisms' by which they are 
implemented. Lay folk, clinical [and school] psychologists,
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lawyers, historians and all of those who have to deal in a 
practical way with human beings tend to think of people as agents 
struggling to maintain some sort of reasoned order in their lives 
against a background flux of emotions, inadequate information and 
the ever-present tides of social pressures.
I shall try to show that the great differences that mark off 
these ways of thinking about human psychology are not ultimately 
grounded in a reasoned weighing of the evidence available to any 
student of human affairs. They turn in the end on unexamined 
political and moral assumptions that show up in the choice of 
rhetoric, in morally and politically loaded ways of speaking and, 
more particularly, of writing. Although these profoundly different 
ways of interpreting and explaining human thought and action have 
their origin in preferred linguistic forms rather than any 
compelling facts of the matter, they do have profoundly different 
practical consequences. They carry with them very distinctive 
stances as to the moral, political and clinical problems with which 
modern people are beset, (p. 4)
This quote sums up the problems faced by school psychologists who are
trained in the scientist-practitioner model, including its mechanistic
view of the person, and their subsequent experiences in the world of
persons who do not normally behave as automatons. The mechanistic
worldview which has prevailed in most of experimental psychology has, at
best, been of little practical use. At its worst, such a worldview has
impeded the school psychologist in understanding and helping clients.
School psychologists and other applied psychologists who come from a
tradition of the scientist-practitioner model frequently think about
their clients with mixed metaphors. Harrd provided an analysis of an
example of a research article entitled, "Self Focus, Felt
Responsibility, and Helping Behavior" (Duval, Duval, & Knealey, 1979),
in which the mechanistic view of the human is imposed upon the moral
agent view. Such unexamined metaphysical and moral/political
presuppositions are problematic throughout experimental psychology and,
it is hypothesized, are responsible for much of the confusion in and
i-
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inadequacies of school psychology. We simultaneously treat students as 
automatons and as moral agents, two incompatible approaches.
In the literature on experimental psychology much has been written 
about the operant technique of "shaping" behavior. Skinner (1953, 1971) 
has been the most outspoken advocate of the use of operant conditioning 
to improve the lot of mankind. By reinforcing successive approximations 
of a behavior the experimenter can usually "bring a rare response to a 
very high probability in a short time" (Skinner, 1953, p. 92). In such 
an experiment, however, the mechanistic view of the subject of the 
experiment must be contrasted with the purposive behavior of the 
experimenter or shaper of the behavior. Thus, even in the rather 
isolated conditions of the laboratory one may not be able to escape the 
contamination of the mechanistic metaphor with that of the teleological 
(Hallberg, 1975). Here we may note Skinner's (1971) remark that 
behavior modification (the technology of behavioristic theory) tends to 
be used mostly on the relatively powerless members of the community, and 
that when behaviorally oriented therapists have psychological problems 
they tend to seek out therapists who incorporate intentionality into 
their theoretical views (Lazarus, 1971; Norcross & Prochaska, 1984; 
Watkins, Campbell, Lopez, & llimmell, 1987; Wynne, 1988).
Summary of Theoretical Reasons
To summarize the reasons submitted to this point for the failures 
of school psychology and the science on which it is founded, the 
viewpoint of metaphysical realism, or the God's Eye view, which is so 
prevalent in psychology, is unsupportable. This viewpoint has, in turn, 
been the supporting assumption for a notion of objectivity which cannot
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be defended. Not surprising then is the continual discovery of new 
threats to the validity of psychological experiments (e.g., Borg & Gall, 
1983; Krathwohl, 1987; Orne, 1969; Westland, 1978). Another reason for 
the failure of school psychologists, and other applied psychologists, to 
live up to their claim of expertise is the failure of the science of 
psychology to discover any covering laws from which accurate predictions 
of human behavior can be made. If psychologists are better than non­
psychologists at predicting and controlling behavior, and there is 
little or no evidence that they are, then this accuracy must be the 
result of factors which are not explained by the science of psychology. 
It has also been shown that the model of the person implicit in 
twentieth century experimental psychology has been that of a passive, 
reactive, automata. This mechanistic model of mankind has been 
competing with less influential psychological models and common-sense or 
folk models of the human being as goal oriented and purposeful. .School 
psychologists, with little or no discussion of the issue of an 
appropriate model of the person, have vacillated between these views.
The results have been a neglect of the purposive nature of human 
behavior in much psychological research and in many of the applied 
practices of school psychologists. It is unlikely that school 
psychologists will ever succeed in serving their clients by thinking of 
them as automata. But the tremendous desire to be scientific has led 
many in the discipline of psychology to make the error of pervasively 
applying the mechanistic model to humankind.
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Practical Reasons
The next set of reasons for the failures of school psychology are
those which appear to be the result of wrong turns made in the
development of the profession. These paths have led to dead ends in the
psychologist's attempts to help children think, feel, and act better in
school. These unproductive aspects of practice include semantic
problems, failed diagnostic categories, research application problems,
and measurement problems.
Semantic Problems
School psychologists typically use and proliferate various
psychological and educational concepts which may be responsible for
practice failures. Twenty years ago Lauer (1969) wrote about the
tremendous expansion of school psychology services and the concomitant
problem of an appropriate model of practice. At that time she
recognized several approaches to school psychology which were aligned
with the various divisions within the parent discipline of psychology,
experimental, behavioristic, social, and developmental. She pointed out
the need for school psychologists to make choices in line with modern
science while reflecting the values inherent in the liberal social
tradition. She discussed the problem in the school psychology
profession of the tendency to reify constructs:
Concepts such as problem, neurosis, disability, and retardation 
probably were created so that we could talk about certain 
observable behavioral processes. But like many category words they 
have come to be accepted as if they referred to some "thing" which 
a person could "have." (p. 244)
Advocating for a general semantics (Go) orientation she urged school
psychologists to look not for an entity or "thing" for which a child is
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referred, rather they should examine relations among entities and look
for distress among these relations.
Lauer (1969) further urged school psychologists to consider that it
is not just the child's behavior which prompts a teacher to make a
referral. Rather, the teacher's decision to refer is also affected by a
number of complex factors including " . . .  her [sic] coping power, the
circumstances under which she is trying to teach, her own value system,
or her prediction about what kind of a problem would gain the attention
and service of the psychologist" (p. 246). By focusing upon the
disharmonies among relationships, the psychologist, Lauer argued, is
more likely to generate plans and interventions for that which is most
amenable. She implied that our current system of trying to remediate
highly abstract, reified "things" is unlikely to be successful, a
prediction which (in Chapter 2 it was argued) was accurate.
Lauer (1969) pointed out that school psychologists have come to use
nouns to describe arbitrary degrees of deviance, a practice which has
led us to talk about these deviations as though they were naturally
occurring phenomena. That which we label abnormal is not inherent in
nature but the product of a social process which varies greatly from
place-to-place and group-to-group. Lauer proposed the following general
semantics solution to this problem:
As an alternative, the GS-trained psychologist might consider 
helping the school to concentrate upon those judgments which .limit 
the range of what is considered normal. By helping the in-groups 
gain greater capacity for including and caring for an ever-widening 
range of human variability, we can cease supporting a social system 
which solves its problems by segregating its own casualties and 
begin to create a society which solves its problems by preventing 
them or coping with them. (p. 249)
L
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Our thinking about problems needs to be examined from the GS point 
of view, Lauer (1969) argued. Problems can be solved only 
metaphorically because (a) problems do not exist as "things,” (b) 
solutions do not exist as "things,” and (c) that which is perceived as a 
solution by one person may be seen as an injustice by another. The GS 
point of view is that problems are disharmonies in ongoing 
relationships.
If the psychologist hopes to instigate changes which others will 
evaluate as "solutions," it behooves him [sic] to become well- 
acquainted with what those others would regard as salutary changes. 
If he writes recommendations on a psychological report without 
first involving his clients in the solution-making process, he may 
find his best clinical judgment to be unappreciated, (p. 251)
Lauer (1969) also saw the removal of a "problem" child for
counseling or special education services as an approach which denies the
teacher and the class their share of the responsibility for coping with
the problem. This tradition of segregation promotes and sustains the
belief that " . . .  behavior can be viewed as independent of a system of
human interrelatedness and that it can be dealt with independently” (pp.
252-253). Such a practice in the public schools prevents self-
examination and change, while promoting defensiveness, denial, coercion,
and/or segregation. When school psychologists "take on" the problems of
the school they may be missing an opportunity to educate school
personnel about participant observation and self-evaluation.
Diagnostic Categories
Reschly, Genshaft, and Binder (1987) found that school
psychologists typically spend about two-thirds of their time providing
services for classifying and segregating handicapped students.
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Dissatisfaction with segregated special education programs, has brought 
forth a revolution in the provision of services for special education 
students which Reschly (1988) believed will necessitate either a change 
in or a “substantial reduction in school psychological services” (p. 
460). He pointed out that it is the system of classification and 
services for mildly handicapped students which has failed, a system with 
which most school psychologists are intimately involved.
Reschly (1988) noted, as did Lauer (1969), that the classifications 
made by school psychologists are restricted to matters of degree along a 
continuum.
. . . classification criteria will always and inevitably involve 
arbitrary, artificial distinctions at the margins. There will 
never be, and indeed cannot be, clear distinctions of kind (e.g., 
handicapped vs. non-handicapped, SLD vs. low achiever, EMR vs. slow 
learner) when the critical dimensions are broad continua with fine 
graduations of competence, (p. 462)
Reschly addressed many of the issues raised in Chapter 2 of this paper.
He concluded that the training received by school psychologists and the
instruments used in school psychology have little relation to effective
intervention strategies. Reschly argued for an approach which evaluates
the effectiveness of school psychology assessments according to the
success of the interventions produced therefrom. He failed to specify,
however, just how success is to be defined and who will decide when
success has been achieved. Success is defined differently by
psychologists of different theoretical orientations (Rychlak, 1981, pp.
189-191).
Reschly (1988) clearly believed that a behavioristic model of the 
person will prove to be the most successful (again, without defining
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success). In the future, he predicted, assessments with reduced levels 
of inference will have the best chance of yielding effective 
interventions. He advocated for precise behavioral counts which can be 
used as a baseline for estimating the effectiveness of the 
interventions. Furthermore, he strongly recommended the use of " . . . 
the powerful behavioral technology and the increasingly rich knowledge 
base of interventions for learning and behavioral problems . . . "  (p. 
470). He failed, however, to reference these remarks about the power of 
behavior technology, thus, implying that this technological power is a 
well accepted fact about which there is little or no debate.
Behavior modification programs have demonstrated considerable 
success while the programs are in effect; however, there has been very 
little documentation of the comparative effectiveness of these programs 
once they are terminated (Reynolds, Gutkin, Elliott, & Witt, 1984). The 
latest research agenda in behavior modification, then, concerns the 
maintenance and generalization of effects, and the acceptability of the 
intervention by those who must implement it (ilartens & Meller, 1990). 
Until the research supports the maintenance and generalization of 
behavioral changes once the program has been terminated, school 
psychologists are not ethically bound to select behavioral techniques 
over other competing techniques in helping a client change a behavior. 
Application of Research
The next practical problem in school psychology has to do with the 
application of scientific finding in school psychology. Having made the 
claim that they are scientist-practitioners raises the expectation that 
one will witness technology in action, the application of the laws of
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psychology to persons in the school. Before the technology can be 
applied, however, long-lasting generalizations in basic psychological 
and educational research must be found, a state of affairs which has not 
been realized (Phillips, 1980).
Even if one believes that the behavioristic project has produced 
useful generalizations, the complexities of application are apparent.
The difficulties of implementing behavior modification programs in the 
schools was discussed by Rosenfield (1981) who concluded that "there is 
no question that implementing a behavioral program involves changing not 
only the child's behavior but that of the teacher as well" (p. 425). 
Nowhere in Rosenfield's chapter did she discuss the ethical question of 
whether or not the psychologist should secure permission before changing 
the teacher's behavior. Reschly's (1988) apparent assumptions about the 
richness and power of behavioral technology, therefore, assert (among 
behaviorists) a conmon-sense fact, not necessarily a scientific one, and 
he assumes both a scientific and an ethical consensus among 
psychologists which in all likelihood does not exist.
Phillips (1987a, 1987b) recently began a long overdue discussion of 
the relationship of the philosophy of science to the practice of school 
psychology. He conjectured that very little research in school 
psychology is conducted by practitioners. Shinn (1987) verified 
Phillips' hypothesis, having found that practitioners seldom publish 
research in the school psychology journals and they spend relatively 
little time on research activities. Phillips (1987a) further surmised 
that the practical application of research results in school psychology 
is "indeterminate" and "unpredictable" (p. 226), and not well understood
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
97
(1987b). Phillips (1987b) elaborated on the practitioner's dilemma as 
follows:
The predicament of the practitioner also needs to be taken into 
account. In the day-to-day variations of practice, the problem for 
the practitioner is to make good use of science in the swampy
lowland where practice is perplexing and messy, and where many of
the most challenging practice issues are, as well as on the high, 
hard ground where science can be more readily applied, (p. 245)
Unfortunately, Phillips (1987b) and Shinn (1987) failed to explicate in
their discussion just where this "high, hard ground" is in the practice
of school psychology "where science can be more readily applied"
(Phillips, 1987b, p. 245). Their failure to recognize or acknowledge
the weaknesses in the scientific foundations of the practice of school
psychology is unfortunate. Their opening of a dialogue about
philosophical issues, however, is a refreshing and welcome advent.
Measurement Problems
It has been frequently pointed out in this paper that school
psychologists devote much of their time to the administration and
interpretation of tests. The purpose of these assessment devices is to
provide some relevant information about the child of interest. Sy
definition, standardized, norm-referenced tests are those which have
standardized procedures and which have been administered to
representative samples of the population relevant to the purposes of the
test (Anastasi, 1976). What a particular test score tells us is where
in the array of the reference groups' scores it falls. Thus, this time-
honored, nomothetic approach of administering tests is based upon the
notion that we can learn something important about the individual by
comparing her/his score with that of a similar group of persons. An
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underlying assumption is that reliability and validity coefficients
based upon group, aggregate data provide an appropriate way of inferring
the degree of consistency with which an individual will demonstrate the
trait measured by the test (Lamiell, 1982).
Lamiell (1982, 1987) challenged the assumption that the stability
of an individual’s scores can be based upon group data. He argued (as
did Mischel, 1969, before him) that the foundation of personality
psychology, the perception of the relatively stable and continuous
behavior of individuals, has not been supported by the vast empirical
literature. The argument Lamiell made which is relevant to school
psychologists is that the basic framework, the nomothetic or individual
differences approach, has restrained our understanding of the individual
person within the ecological context. The nomothetic approach to
personality study only tells us something about the individual's
relative standing. Changes in the standing over time are not
necessarily due to changes in the individual, rather the individual's
score may change over time because of variations in the array of scores.
We are not measuring the person, instead we are_ measuring the gaps
between persons. Thus, Lamiell (1982) made the following remarks about
the dominant empirical strategies in the field of personality research:
All of those strategies result in attempts to treat as a 
statistical problem what is actually a problem of measurement.
Given the aggregate statistical indices generated within those 
strategies, it is for all intents and purposes, never possible to 
infer how consistent or inconsistent any one individual has been in 
her/his manifestation of any one attribute over time or across 
situations, (p. 52)
If the problem of assessing personality is viewed as one of measurement
rather than statistics, then it should be possible to describe
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personality at the level of the individual and also address issues of 
personality development.
An attempt has been made here to point out that weaknesses in 
personality measurement approaches have made it quite difficult for the 
school psychologist to make strong hypotheses about a child's
personality based upon test scores. The stability of the child's traits
across time and situations is not amenable to assessment with 
standardized instruments because these measuring devices indicate trait 
stability relative only to scores of other children. Thus, the 
variability actually observed in the classroom or home may not be the
same as the variability found on the child's relative standing on a
test. The study of a child's personality is not well served by 
comparing her/his score to those of others. Rather, as Lamiell (1982) 
stated "personality is a phenomenon based ultimately in accumulated 
information about an individual's actions, interpreted or rendered 
meaningful within a context provided by the perception and construal of
t
that individual's alternative possibilities for action" (p. 53).
Summary of Practical Reasons
To summarize, some of the practical problems which may account for 
the relative lack of success in the explicit goals of school psychology 
practice, first was noted the semantic problems which reflect a tendency 
to reify our constructs. By making our constructs into "things" we have 
briefly enjoyed the delusion that we were practicing deterministic 
science. Second, it was found that dissatisfaction in the educational 
community with special programming has exposed the rather arbitrary 
selection of diagnostic categories used by school psychologists. The
L_ . . . . . .
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reason for creating school psychology, the diagnosis and placement of 
special students, is now threatened with elimination. Again, our 
tendency to create "things" and subject them to scientific analysis 
modeled after the physical sciences has failed us.
A third problem examined was the discovery that much of school 
psychology practice has not been touched by the science of psychology. 
In spite of the advocacy for scientific training in school psychology 
programs, little is known about how scientific is the day-to-day 
practice. The complexities of practice have rendered it an unexplored, 
"swampy lowland.” The conceptual problem is that we have imagined the 
practice of school psychology to be founded upon firm principles of 
deterministic science. There is little support for this imagined 
scenario. It does not seem to have occurred to school psychologists 
that the difficulties in translating scientific findings into practice 
may be related to the mechanistic model of human beings which emanates 
from most branches of our science. The science of psychology lures us 
into the mechanistic model, but the applications of this science are 
thoroughly resisted by the purposive, moral agents we find outside the 
laboratory.
The final practical problem in school psychology examined was the 
problem of nomothetic, individual differences research upon which many 
of our measuring instruments are founded. The basic problem here is 
that we are not measuring aspects of the individual, rather we are 
measuring the gaps between individuals.
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CHAPTER 4
A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY
A review of the basic arguments regarding the practice of school 
psychology may help to provide a rationale for a revised set of concepts 
by which the profession may be guided. The essential arguments include 
the following:
1. In Chapter 1 a review of the history of school psychology found 
that it was invented to identify students who, it was believed, could 
not profit from the regular education program. A more or less implicit 
goal in the segregation of deviant students was to remediate their 
problems so that they could be returned to the regular education fold, 
or, if their problems were irremediable, to provide an alternative 
educational program.
2. It was argued in Chapter 2 that the school psychology 
discipline has been unable to justify the use of most of its diagnostic 
categories and the profession has not shown that the primary remedial 
programs, those of special education, have accomplished their intended 
purposes.
3. Chapter 3 attempted to explain that school psychologists, like 
most psychologists, have made a commitment to the science of psychology, 
yet this science has been unable to produce any covering laws from which 
accurate predictions of human behavior can be made.
If, as it has been argued above, school psychology has not achieved 
its goals, then perhaps there is something wrong with the goals of the 
profession, or the strong commitment to scientific psychology has not 
been fruitful, or both problems have contributed to the school
K
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psychology crisis. This author believes that both the goals of school 
psychology and the conception of science which predominates in 
experimental psychology are at fault, and both are due for revision.
What follows in this section is a collection of concepts which can 
serve to guide the practice of school psychology. The first seven 
concepts provide a philosophical foundation upon which school psychology 
practice may be based. The remaining five concepts are more specific to 
an alternative practice of school psychology when the preceding 
foundational concepts have been adopted.
Basic Assumptions in the Practice of School Psychology
That school psychologists seem relatively unconcerned about the
assumptions which undergird their practice has already been addressed in
this paper. It was proposed that many of the failures in the practices
of school psychologists can be traced to unexamined philosophical
beliefs. In an effort to correct this conceptual deficit, very basic
ideas which support a renewed approach to school psychology practice are
offered in this section.
1. A foundational concept in the renewed practice of school
psychology is that existence is an undivided whole. Bohm (1980)
elaborated on the notion that Western culture has a deeply imbued
reductionistic bias which produces a fragmentary world view. He saw in
modern physical theory a new focus upon wholeness:
So, in approaching the question in different ways, relativity and 
quantum theory agree, in that they both imply the need to loolc on 
the world as an undivided whole, in which all parts of the 
universe, including the observer and his [sic] instruments, merge 
and unite in one totality. In this totality, the atomistic form of 
insight is a simplification and an abstraction, valid, only in some 
limited context, (p. 11)
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
103
The science of psychology, while trying to emulate physics, lags 
far behind as it continues to segregate subject from object (Riegel, 
1979). The consequence of this segregation is that psychology looks at 
the static rather than the dynamic qualities of the person. In school 
psychology we need to emphasize the complex, ever-changing connections 
among the things in which we are interested. Analysis serves, at best, 
only a temporary, local purpose but can never tell us precisely how 
things are related. When we focus upon the particular parts we are 
unable to gain insight into the whole (Bohm, 1980, p. 25). All 
meaningful integrations, including those of science, require that the 
subsidiaries (the particulars) be organized into the focal (the whole) 
by a person (a mind) who performs the integration (Polanyi & Prosch,
1975, pp. 63-64). However, it is the perceptual act of organizing and 
not the focusing on particulars which results in what Polanyi and Prosch 
(1975) have termed tacit knowledge. Such knowledge requires an active 
mind which focuses upon the gestalt, not the individual parts; attending 
only to the parts causes the whole, or the meaning, to be lost. It is 
by immersing ourselves in a local setting, by organizing the parts to 
form a meaningful whole that we can hope to offer a point of view which 
will be useful to our clients. We need, as Lauer (1969) suggested, to 
view the child as part of dynamic systems and we cannot adequately 
understand the child apart from those systems.
2. This model of school psychology practice accepts that knowledge 
is constructed through the dialectical process. Constructionism, a term 
denoting an active mind which builds more than discovers knowledge, may 
be thought of as a way in which the person organizes her/his world
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
104
(Glasersfeld, 1984). In this paper, the definition of the act of
construing follows that of Kelly (1955):
By construing we mean "placing an interpretation": a person places
an interpretation upon what is construed. He [sic] erects a 
structure, within the framework of which the substance takes shape 
or assumes meaning. The substance which he construes does not 
produce the structure; the person does. (p. 50)
Experience is organized by the person, and, if this organization
serves its purpose it is maintained. If a construct does not hold up or
serve its purpose it might eventually be altered. Glasersfeld (1984)
pointed out that in the metaphor of evolution the "real" world does not
directly enhance the survival of the fittest, it eliminates those
organisms which are unfit. He believed that the so called "real" world
also sets the limits of our mental constructions by eliminating those
which do not fit (Glasersfeld, 1984). In Kelly's (1955) theory, the
limits or boundaries of a construct represents its range of convenience.
The usefulness of a construction, however, does not logically tell one
how the world is in terms of a correspondence between the construct and
the "real" world. Putnam (1981) reminded us of the futility of the
correspondence view of knowledge and emphasized constructionism in
science:
If the notion of comparing our system of beliefs with 
unconceptualized reality to see if they match makes no sense, then 
the claim that science seeks to discover the truth can mean no more 
than that science seeks to construct a world picture which, in the 
ideal limit, satisfies certain criteria of rational acceptability, 
(p. 130)
Piaget (1962) offered a constructivist theory of intellectual 
development. Intelligence develops, he believed, through a process in 
which the child interacts with the environment to construct internal
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operational structures. Riegel (1979) presented a developmental theory 
which is also constructivist in nature, but which, in contrast to Piaget
(1962), placed more emphasis on the disequilibrium experienced by the 
person as a result of crises in a number of possible dimensions. The 
most significant changes come about, Riegel thought, as the result of 
asynchronies in individual-psychological and cultural-sociological 
developments. The person continuously changes as part of a dialectical 
process of interaction with the environment. Harr£ (1984) noted the 
language games typically played between mothers and infants, a 
dialectical process which may be important in the child's development of 
a theory of the self. Mead (1934) believed that the process of dialogue 
makes thought a social possibility (Kohlberg & Wertsch, 1987). He 
viewed the presentation of conflicting points of view and their 
synthesis through dialogue as the underlying process from which 
knowledge is constructed. Mead also saw the internalization of the 
dialogue, in the form of inner speech, as an important aspect of 
cognitive development in children, especially in the construction of a 
sense of self.
Another psychological theory which explicitly subscribed to the 
constructivist assumption was that of Kelly (1955). He used the 
philosophy of constructive alternativism as the basis for his theory of 
personal constructs. Kelly's philosophy took the long range view of 
humankind, the view across the centuries rather than the decades. His 
philosophy was based on the assumption that the person is already in 
pursuit of goals or purposes and that no explanation of this movement 
was necessary. He believed that people view the world through
i .
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transparent patterns or templates in their attempt to anticipate events. 
Kelly defined constructs as the patterns or templates with which people 
try to make sense of the world. Constructive alternativism emphasized 
that there are always different ways of construing an event and that, in 
the absence of a unifying system of constructs, events can be profitably 
and simultaneously construed from multiple construct systems.
Although absolutely objective knowledge appears to be out of reach, 
a quasi-objectivity may be attainable as a result of the dialectical 
process of constructing knowledge. A long history of criticism and 
response to criticism imbues most forms of organized bodies of knowledge 
and leads to a reduction in uncertainty (Cronbach, 1982; Krathwohl,
1987). Although the truth which is sought after must ever remain 
elusive, the social dialectical process of knowledge construction 
provides us with a scaffolding upon which we can raise ourselves. In 
school psychology, then, knowledge of the child ought to emanate from 
the social dialectic among those who have experienced and developed a 
personal knowledge of her/him, namely, parents, teachers, and others.
Each one of us, then, constructs our own personal knowledge of the 
universe. Polanyi (1962) argued convincingly that all knowledge is 
based upon mental operations (assumptions, intuitions, insights, etc.) 
which are not and cannot be formalized. "The relation of a subsidiary 
to a focus is formed by the act of a person who integrates one to 
another" (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 38). All knowledge carries with 
it, he argued, an element of conviction on the part of the knower. This 
conviction emerges as an assertion about the knowledge or the 
assumptions upon which the knowledge is founded. All knowledge is, from
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this perspective, personal and cannot successfully be separated from the 
knower. Except where specified in this paper, personal knowledge refers 
to any of the constructions created by a person. Personal knowledge may 
occasionally be analyzed into constructs, thoughts, beliefs, myths, or 
theories, depending upon the purpose of the analysis. Ultimately, 
however, such analyses are best thought of as parts of a larger whole—  
the person— which is, in turn, a dynamic part of a larger whole.
3. An additional concept important in the practice of school 
psychology is the recognition that social knowledge is a function of 
social consensus. "Knowledge reaches out beyond the individual case, 
beyond the subjective meaning of some limited fact pattern, and 
interlaces with the meanings of an ever-broadening community" (Rychlak, 
1981, p. 92). Just as a construction of the natural or the social world 
is subject to the limitations imposed by what we regard as "reality," 
there are also constraints in knowledge construction implied by the 
"criteria of rational acceptability" spoken of by Putnam (1981, p. 130). 
This idea was further developed by Krathwohl (1987) who declared that 
all knowledge is the product of social consensus. He distinguished 
scientific knowledge from other kinds of knowledge in three important 
ways:
1. The consensus in these instances is formed around the 
interpretation of evidence. (You no doubt recall from your 
history books that one of the characteristics of the 
Renaissance— as well as a foundation of science— was dependence 
on carefully gathered evidence, in contrast to the prevalent 
prior practice of sitting around thinking about a subject.)
2. The consensus is developed within rules or norms intended to 
prevent an arbitrary and unwarranted consensus from developing.
3. The evidence around which the consensus is developed must meet 
certain criteria, (p. 14)
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That which is judged to be arbitrary or unwarranted is the result of 
social forces as well as the limitations imposed by reality.
Sometimes a consensus must be formed among a group of people who 
have a broad range of constructs, as for example in the school staffing. 
Typically such a meeting involves teachers, parents, an administrator, a 
special education consultant (former teacher), a school psychologist, 
and sometimes other support personnel. The parents often do not share 
the educators' concepts and vocabulary, while the psychologist, or other 
support persons, may use several theoretical systems quite different 
from the teachers. The principal may have goals for the child which 
differ from those of the parents and teachers. To further complicate 
matters, each staffing participant may view the student of concern very 
differently. At least one description of the staffing process (Law, 
1981) has presented it as an authoritarian imposition of preconceived 
decisions, rather than a consensual process. The complexities of 
finding commonalities among the various construct systems in the 
staffing makes authoritarian procedures understandable, but not 
excusable. Actually, the staffing process has the potential to provide 
those who are involved a way to find a common ground and to participate 
in constructing a consensus about the student, her/his problems, and 
some potential solutions. The school psychologist has an excellent 
opportunity to serve as the leader in the formation of such a consensus. 
By viewing psychological data as forming the basis for a number of 
hypotheses, the psychologist can ask those who know the child best, the 
parents and teachers, to verify (or nullify) each of these hypotheses. 
This process of validation can function to create a consensually
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validated theory of the student. It can be argued that the emergent 
theory of the student provides a more objective view than any of the 
individual, pre-staffing theories taken alone. The staffing process can 
provide the opportunity to reduce some uncertainties about the student.
In keeping with the idea that what counts as knowledge is a 
function of social consensus, the school psychologist's views about 
students, their abilities and disabilities, appropriate programs and 
remedial procedures, is best seen as one particular point of view which 
must compete with other points of view. In Chapter 3 it was argued that 
psychology has not achieved the status of the physical sciences in that 
it has no accepted covering laws from which accurate predictions of 
behavior can be made. The psychological knowledge which we possess has, 
at best, been able to rule out certain kinds of knowledge as false; 
however, positive, relatively exceptionless, laws of behavior have not 
been forthcoming. Therefore, school psychologists and others in the 
staffing process can claim, at best, to have knowledge which has only 
weak authority. For example, when a school psychologist offers an 
explanation of a child's behavior there are no grounds for claiming that 
this interpretation is the absolute truth. Only when this explanation 
meets the formal and informal criteria of legitimacy held by the social 
group (e.g., staffing or conference participants) can one declare it to 
be knowledge. It is possible, of course, that the group consensus may 
be such that explanations provided by the psychologist are taken to be 
infallible. Such naivete, however, is best discouraged from the outset 
by the school psychologist who is aware of the .limitations of 
psychological knowledge.
f .
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Some might argue that the part of school psychology which is based 
upon mathematical models deserves the status and authority of scientific 
knowledge. However, it had better be remembered that a mathematical 
prediction does not predict behavior, rather it predicts other numbers 
which are, of course, based upon a measurement operation. An IQ score, 
for example, is used to predict an achievement score. But the 
correlations between these two measurements are never perfect, and the 
errors associated with the measurement operations can be predicted by no 
rule (see Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 30, for a similar discussion of the 
limits of mathematical predictions based upon Newtonian mechanics).
Thus, psychometric theory does not tell us the meaning of any deviations 
from the expected correlation. In a staffing, then, psychometric theory 
does not provide the psychologist with knowledge from which an 
authoritative explanation of a student's underachievement can be made. 
The prudent psychologist would also do well to remember that 
intelligence and achievement tests were originally validated by 
teachers' judgments (Gresham, Reschly, & Carey, 1987).
4. Personal knowledge, that is a person's thoughts, beliefs, 
constructs, theories, myths, or other internal cognitive and evaluative 
operations, exerts a major influence on that person's behavior. This 
concept has been defended by a number of writers (e.g., Baars, 1986;
Beck & Emery, 1985; Ellis, 1962; Kelly, 1955; Mahoney, 1974; Maultsby, 
1984; Meichenbaum, 1977). While common sense psychology accepts the 
notion that what a person thinks affects the person's behavior, during 
the behaviorist's domination of twentieth century experimental 
psychology this concept was largely ignored.
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Harr£ (1988) dealt with the objection some would have to the fact 
that a person's constructs are largely unobservable and, therefore, not 
an appropriate project for psychological investigation. He described 
the positivists' attempt to reduce explanation to prediction and made 
the following observations about the essential uses of theory in 
explanation:
For prediction we need to know only facts of the same kind as those 
we wish to predict, in this case observable symptoms. But to 
explain we need to know the causal mechanism that produces the 
symptoms. In general the entities that make up the causal 
mechanism are of a different kind from those we can ordinarily 
observe, and are known in some other way than that by which we know 
the kinds of things we can observe as regular antecedents of the 
disease states. We can see now why positivists prefer to reduce 
the notion of explanation to prediction. Taking explanation 
seriously calls for the use of the theoretical imagination to 
create ideas of beings which are often yet to be observed, (p.
139)
The causal mechanisms of interest to school psychologists and their 
clients had better include personal constructs which influence the 
observable elements of human behavior.
Since human behavior appears to be a function of environmental 
contingencies and personal constructs, the prediction of human behavior 
is going to be at least partially dependent upon variables internal to 
the person which are not directly observable. While environmental 
contingencies are theoretically observable, the internal personal 
knowledge of the person of interest is not. The best evidence for a 
person's construct system comes from the person's expressions, verbal 
and nonverbal. Such information is vulnerable to any number of errors 
and distortions, intentional or otherwise, by the person. The 
behaviorists have typically dismissed self-report data because of this
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unreliability. However, to ignore this data results in a very 
incomplete understanding of the person.
When the ever-changing flow and often non-public nature of personal 
knowledge is considered, the improbability of accurately predicting 
human behavior is revealed. Even in the process of sharing about 
ourselves we are changing, possibly as a result of the act of sharing 
(Rogers, 1961) and possibly because of the ways in which our memories 
change (Riegel, 1979). Intentionality, personal knowledge, and 
rationality consort to liberate the person from at least some of the 
natural-causal conditions that would otherwise severely limit behavioral 
possibilities. None of the dominant theories in psychology adequately 
accounts for personal knowing or the various forms of human agency and 
"thus, none of these schemes describes, let alone explains, human 
action" (Robinson, 1985, p. 68).
The wholistic school psychologist attempts to understand the client 
by asking the client directly or indirectly to share personal knowledge. 
Interviewing and storytelling are, in addition to more traditional 
techniques, ways of gathering information from which inferences can be 
made about the client's personal knowledge. One of the most productive 
things a school psychologist can do is to ask a client to verify these 
inferences. If, for example, a school psychologist infers that a school 
phobic child is thinking how horrible it is to be separated from one's 
parents, she/he might simply present this idea to the child ("it is 
pretty awful to be away from your Mom and Dad"). If the child agrees 
with emphasis then information about this child's personal knowledge 
concerning separation has been gained.
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5. Another major concept important to the practice of school
psychology, and an important aspect of constructivism explicit, or
strongly implied, in Piaget (1962), Polanyi (1962; Polanyi & Prosch,
1975), and Kelly (1955), is best expressed by Glasersfeld (1984):
Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) 
assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the 
experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal 
directedness, in this context, has, of course, nothing to do with 
goals in an "external" reality. The goals that are involved here 
arise for no other reason than this: A cognitive organism
evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends 
to repeat certain ones and to avoid others. The products of 
conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and 
are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve 
that purpose, (p. 32)
Glasersfeld went on to point out that purposiveness, as David Hume
(1748/1963) affirmed, presupposes an assumption of regularity of
experience. One feature which Hume left out of the account of
experience, however, was the role of human action. The construing
person is the seat of purposive action. Purpose projects our
constructions of past experiences as expectations into the future. The
fundamental assessments of similarities and differences is the result of
operations performed by the cognizing person "and can never be explained
as a given fact of objective reality" (Glasersfeld, p. 34).
Bruner (1986) also argued for a constructivist view which, by
tradition, divides the world into two spheres, that of the natural world
and that of the human social world. The former is more likely to be
characterized in terms of logic and science, while the latter .is
discussed in narrative or story form. We tend to construct the natural
world in causal terms and the human world in intentional terms.
Sometimes, Bruner believed, there is overlap in these constructions.
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Animism, for example, attributes intentions to objects most people would 
discuss in terms of causality. Radical behaviorists, on the other hand, 
speak of causality and deny intentionality in human behavior. By and 
large, however, there is much consensus in our culture about how the 
world is divided. This consensus, like all others, is a function of the 
preferences of those who participate in forming the consensus and does 
not indicate an absolute "truth”; rather, it appears to be the result of 
the historical forces which have fostered the development of modern 
technocracy (Barrett, 1986).
More than one version exists of the processes by which a person 
constructs reality (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Goodman, 1978; 
Kelly, 1955; Piaget, 1950; Polanyi, 1962; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). What 
is salient in this paper is the general concept that the human being 
constructs reality, that is, forms personal knowledge about the self and 
the world. Virtually all of the people a school psychologist interacts 
with have the capacity to perceive and to construct knowledge. At 
present there are no theories which can adequately explain just how the 
person gets from the subsidiaries to the focal,, a feat which meets the 
criteria of a miracle, that is, something which is beyond the laws of 
nature (Flew, 1979). A pertinent example of such a miracle is the 
child's capacity to get meaning from the printed word, an act which we 
take for granted but cannot explain. We observe the print (the input) 
and the child's statements of understanding (the output) and these are 
the subsidiaries, the parts. It is the child who connects the parts and 
completes the whole. And our observation of the parts in this scene are 
integrated by our own act of perception or dwelling in the parts from
[-
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which we create a whole (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975), in this case, our
understanding of a child's act of reading. Polanyi and Prosch (1975)
summarized their view of the personal act of knowing as follows:
We therefore recognize and study the coherence of living things by 
integrating their motions— and any other normal changes occurring 
in their parts— into our comprehension of their functions. We 
integrate mentally what living beings integrate practically— just 
as chess players rehearse a master's game to discover what he had 
in mind. We share the purpose of a mind by dwelling in its 
actions. And so, generally, we also share the purposes or 
functions of any living matter by dwelling in its motions in our 
efforts to understand their meaning, (p. 45)
6. The concept of a person in school psychology will inevitably
mean a being with some sort of moral status (Taylor, 1985). Modern
behavioral science has attempted to portray the person as a
representation of a particular set of facts, most of which can be
reduced to quantities. What is missing from this description is that
things matter to the person as they cannot matter to animals or
machines. Taylor expressed it this way:
. . . What will appear evident is that there are matters of
significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, and have 
no analogue with animals. These are just the ones I mentioned 
earlier, matters of pride, shame, moral goodness, evil, dignity, 
the sense of worth, the various human forms of love and so on. If 
we look at goals like survival and reproduction, we can perhaps 
convince ourselves that the difference between men and animals lies 
in a strategic superiority of the former: we can pursue the same
ends much more effectively than our dumb cousins. But when we 
consider these human emotions, we can see that the ends which make 
up a human life are sui generis. And then even the ends of 
survival and reproduction will appear in a new light. What it is 
to maintain and hand on a human form of life, that is, a given 
culture, is also a peculiarly human affair, (p. 102)
While cognitive psychology has restored thinking to the model of
the person, the school psychology practitioner will restore the
emotional, moral, and spiritual qualities of the person. According to
£  '
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Taylor (1985), in the predominant behavioral and social science view of 
the person the capacity to plan is what makes a person an agent. 
Generally, human beings are superior to animals in their power to 
achieve these ends, a difference which separates humans from animals. 
Some sophisticated machines, however, are superior to humans in 
achieving goals; thus, the representational view of the person places 
human beings along a continuum assessing strategic superiority of goal 
attainment.
The contrasting view, the one which makes the most sense to the 
author, who is a practicing school psychologist, understands the person 
to have peculiarly human goals and purposes. These purposes are 
characterized by a certain sensitivity to standards. "The sense of self 
is the sense of where one stands in relation to these standards, and 
properly personal choice is one informed by these standards" (Taylor, 
1985, p. 105). Consciousness and language are essential to the 
expression of these purposes and standards, but are also imbued with 
them. "The subject according to the significance perspective is in a 
world of meanings that he [sic] imperfectly understands. His task is to 
interpret it better, in order to know who he is and what he ought to 
seek” (Taylor, p. 112).
Taylor (1985) expressed his belief that the prevalent view of the 
person which emerges from modern social and behavioral science 
paradoxically seeks to place the scientist above human significance in 
the realm of pure, austere truth, very much like the self-denial which 
has been passed down through the ages from many spiritual traditions.
The spiritual yearning of human beings to rise above the merely human
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cannot be denied (Huxley, 1945). The search for certainty, however, 
will not be successful in the alternative, or significance, view of the 
person. The moral questions of the person in the significance view are 
never settled with any finality but evolve through dialogue. Likewise, 
assumptions about a larger order of nature or of the spiritual tradition 
cannot be taken for granted. The natural science, or representative, 
view of the person assumes a significance-free natural ordering in the 
universe. Religious traditions assume a significance view which is 
larger than, but includes, that which is significant to persons. To the 
school psychologist, then, a person is one to whom many of the aspects 
of life matter. It matters to most persons whether or not they are 
replaced by machines. There is no evidence that it matters to machines 
whether or not they replace persons. Just as teachers are moral agents 
whose practices are driven by values (Goodlad, 1988), so too are school 
psychologists.
7. A model for the practice of school psychology would be 
incomplete without a basic statement about the purposes of education.
In keeping with the prior assumptions about wholeness, the construction 
of knowledge, social consensus in knowledge creation, the influence of 
personal knowledge, purpose in human life, and the significance view of 
the person, the goals of education had better emerge from a dialectical 
interaction between the student and the significant persons in the 
student's life. Usually parents, other family members, close friends, 
and teachers play, or have the potential to play, the most significant 
roles in the life of a student. Community interests are represented by 
the teacher, usually an employee of the locally elected school board.
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The student's self-interests are initially represented by the parents 
and gradually, as the child develops and can participate in the 
dialogue, more so by the student. Community and self-interests are the 
focus of the dialectic between the student and the teacher. The outcome 
of this dialectic, taken at any particular moment in time, is unlikely 
to be identical for any two students when we consider (a) the numerous 
influences on educational outcomes, some of which have been addressed by 
educational researchers, and (b) the dynamic, evolving nature of the 
dialectical process between student and teacher(s).
What is needed by the school psychologist are some personal 
philosophical goals which are superposed over the merely social and 
economic goals of education (e.g., National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983; Graham, 1989). While each person must find meaning for
her/his own life (Merton, 1955), this meaning is dynamic and emanates,
at least partly, from the social dialectic. The school psychologist,
like all humans, is faced with constructing meaning and purpose for
her/his life. Dialogues with students, parents, teachers, and others, 
cannot help but be affected by the psychologist's personal search for 
meaning. Therefore, school psychologists who subscribe to the proposed 
model will explicate their own life's guiding myths, philosophies, 
and/or purposes. Such explication need not be a formal thesis, rather 
it might take the form of rather simple statements of the overriding 
goals of her/his life.
This author, for example, believes that the purpose of his life is 
to love and to learn. Research and clinical experience with persons who 
have had a near-death experience (NDE) has found that loving and
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learning have become the paramount goals in the lives of those who have 
been brought back from clinical death (Moody, 1983). Many of the 
persons who have experienced clinical death for a brief time and been 
subsequently revived report that love and knowledge are the primary 
qualities of life which were carried over into the NDE. Whether or not 
NDEs are "real" experiences is unlikely to be resolved by science. The 
effects of such experiences on persons, however, can and are being 
carefully described by researchers (Greyson, 1985; Ring, 1980). It is, 
however, the meanings persons construct for these and other remarkable 
life events which shape their life goals and purposes. The overlap and 
commonalities among those concerned with educating children can serve as 
starting points in the neglected dialogue concerning the purposes of 
education. The materialistic and economic purposes of education, as 
mentioned earlier, have dominated the educational debate and helped to 
produce educational philosophies and practices which often distress 
teachers and students and, paradoxically, interfere with the attainment 
of even the materialistic and economic goals (Cunningham, 1982; Elias, 
1989; Kaiser & Polczynski, 1982).
Thus, the overriding purpose of education should be to facilitate 
the student's search for a personal meaning for life. Educators can 
facilitate by helping the student learn various means for moving toward 
these goals and purposes. Educators also help by participating in the 
dialectical process out of which the student evolves meaning and 
purpose. This evolving meaning in the life of the individual adds to 
the totality of consciousness, a theme explored in more detail by Jung
(1963) and his student, Edinger (1984). The school psychologist can
L
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serve by joining the dialogue when it is perceived to have become 
unproductive or problematic.
A Revisioning of the Practice of School Psychology
Here begins the design of a new purpose and way of practicing 
school psychology. Based upon the concepts of wholism, constructivism, 
the social-consensual basis of knowledge, the personal act of knowing, 
purposiveness, the significance view of the person, and personal life 
meaning as the purpose of education, a series of concepts governing the 
practice of school psychology will be presented.
1. The purposes of school psychology are to enrich, through 
dialectical encounters, the personal knowledge of students, teachers, 
parents, and others, in a school or educational setting so as to 
facilitate (a) their coping with stress and (b) their achievement of 
educational goals. "Enrichment” may best be thought of as an 
enlargement or expansion of the client's personal knowledge so as to not 
only explicate but also to facilitate the attainment of the client's 
goals or purposes. At times the school psychologist may serve multiple 
clients whose goals are in conflict. For example, the school phobic 
child does not want to come to school, while the school authorities and, 
perhaps, the child's parents want her/him to attend. Ideally, in this 
and similar situations, the school psychologist will enrich the personal 
knowledge of each client by helping each party to empathize with, or 
construe the construction processes of, the other (which is an example 
of Kelly's, 1955, sociality corollary). Ultimately, the political 
process will determine who will be the client, and who, therefore, will 
be expected to adapt to the demands of the environment. In this
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example, the child (and possibly, the parents) will be identified as the 
client and will be expected to adapt. The psychologist can help through 
the dialectical process if the client(s) allows it.
The school psychologist functions in a highly politicized, 
nonscientific setting in which common-sense psychology prevails. It has 
been argued in Chapter 3 that scientific psychology cannot justifiably 
claim any covering laws from which accurate predictions can be made and 
it was also concluded that explanations from psychologists are not 
necessarily better than those of nonpsychologists. Therefore, the 
school psychologist had better take each encounter with another person 
as an exploration of that person's theories, myths, and constructs with 
a view to helping that person achieve self-selected goals within her/his 
own system of beliefs.
The school psychologist is uniquely qualified, by interests and 
training, to offer explanations and interpretations of behavior from the 
perspective of established psychological theories. Because these 
formulations do not have the status of natural laws or natural science 
theories, the school psychologist cannot claim expertise in the same 
sense as can a physicist or chemist. Keeping the limits of 
psychological knowledge in mind, however, the psychologist can offer 
theories which are subjected to the dialectical process and which are 
traditionally viewed through the skeptical framework of the science. 
Thus, while psychological theories are generally quite limited and have 
not produced "laws of behavior," they are potentially very helpful in 
organizing information. The theories in psychology have largely been
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derived from and must compete with common sense theories of behavior 
(Fletcher, 1984).
Perhaps the most important function for the school psychologist is 
to assist in explaining human actions from psychological theory.
Because no single scientific theory will be able to provide reasonable 
explanations of all actions, the school psychologist had better be armed 
with an array of theoretical points of view. Because scientific 
theories are subjected to conceptual and empirical testing, they are to 
be preferred. Sometimes, however, no scientific theory will adequately 
explain an action and the psychologist must rely on a common sense 
theory or create a new theory. The evaluation of the explanations of an 
action takes place in the dialectical processes among those who have 
defined the action as a problem. Although the explanation process 
begins with the application of one or more theories, it is through 
dialogue and social consensus that we reach an understanding of the 
action. At the same time, we may also have expanded or altered the 
theory, or theories, in order to accommodate the action we want to 
explain. Thus, theory construction is an inevitable, progressive 
process in the practice of school psychology.
The school psychologist may also assist with the evaluation of the 
problem from the point of view of the client's own theories. By 
engaging the client in a dialogue the school psychologist may have the 
opportunity to encourage the testing of hypotheses which emanate from 
the client's personal theory. There is no way of deciding ahead of time 
whether a hypothesis will bear up to dialectical or demonstrative 
scrutiny. Therefore, the school psychologist had better take seriously
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a client's hypotheses by giving equal weight to all hypotheses before 
they are tested. To reflexively rule out a client's hypothesis because 
it is not derived from a scientifically accepted psychological theory 
risks not only error, but also risks rapport with that client. The 
psychologist may also assist by encouraging the client to engage in a 
conceptual analysis of her/his personal, often common sense, theories 
(Fletcher, 1984). Analysis of tacit concepts and theories of clients is 
a major tactic of Rational Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1963) and Personal 
Construct Psychology (Kelly, 1955).
Stress is defined by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) as " . . .  a 
particular relationship between the person and the environment that is 
appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and 
endangering his or her well being" (p. 19). Thus, stress is a multi­
faceted concept which includes one or more personal constructs and a 
syndrome of resulting emotional responses. This conception of stress is 
useful in understanding the kinds of problems for which the school 
psychologist's services are sought. It has been this author's 
experience that stress usually sets the stage for referrals. When a 
teacher, parent, child, or principal perceives that her/his capacity to 
cope with a problem is exhausted, the school psychologist is often 
consulted. If the potential client is coping adequately, then the 
school psychologist is rarely called upon. An advantage to viewing 
problems from the conceptual framework of stress is that we can focus 
upon an ongoing process and may be less likely to depend upon the weak 
and relatively useless labels and categories upon which we have depended
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in the past. This is similar to Lauer's (1969) recommendation that we 
focus upon strained relationships.
2. There are two main ways in which a school psychologist may 
enrich a client's personal knowledge. One way is by serving as a 
collaborative consultant. Another is by providing explanations of human 
actions.
Collaborative consultation is characterized by an interactive 
communication process which emphasizes the equal participation and 
status of those engaged in the transaction (Sileo, Rude, & Luckner,
1988). It is a model which calls for the consultant to serve as a 
facilitator of the problem-solving process (Berkowitz, 1973). By 
leading the client to explicate, examine, and test her/his personal 
theories, myths, and constructs, the school psychologist engages in a 
process which results in changes in the personal knowledge of the 
client— and the school psychologist. Any changes made by the client or 
the school psychologist are the result of choice, not imposition.
Choices are made as a part of the give and take in the dialogue between 
the client and the school psychologist. Other more specific ways of 
facilitating coping and enriching a client's system of constructs are to 
be found in the literature on psychotherapy. While no system of 
psychotherapy has demonstrated consistent superiority (Smith & Glass, 
1977), it is important that the school psychologist adopt or formulate a 
theoretical approach with which to assist clients in coping and 
attaining goals. If one perceives that a situation exceeds one's 
capacity to cope, stress will result. A theoretical system which can 
encompass the largest variety of human problems will help to prevent
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such stress in the school psychologist. The application of "techniques" 
without a theoretical system to organize the processes of interpreting, 
explaining, and influencing the problem is liable to inhibit the 
dialogue among those concerned about the problem.
An explanation is " . . .  a speech-act which makes use of a 
discourse which, in its literal meaning makes reference to beings which 
are not capable, often, of being observed. In many cases these beings 
are the components of causal mechanisms" (Harrd, 1988, p. 140). Harr£ 
noted that every explanatory regress makes use of causal mechanisms but 
must end with "causal powers." In physics, for example, no further 
mechanistic explanation for the behavior of quarks is available; 
therefore, at this level of explanation one must make reference to basic 
powers or dispositions. The work of the school psychologist often 
requires explanations which make reference to causal mechanisms or 
powers. These explanations must be subjected to the criteria of 
rational acceptability of the participants in the dialogue.
Each kind of knowledge (e.g., physical, psychological, social, 
spiritual), and the varying levels of each kind of knowledge, may 
require different conceptual and methodological approaches to 
understanding and explaining its objects of interest (Harr£, 1988). One 
level or type of knowledge cannot be reduced to a lower level, nor can 
it be entirely understood or explained without reference to adjacent 
levels (cf., Jacob, 1973, p. 307). In school psychology we are better 
off trying to explain a problem of interest in the terms which 
facilitate a dialogue among the interested parties. Attempts to reduce 
emotions, for example to neurophysiology, while interesting, are not
*.
u
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appropriate when the participants in the dialogue want, let us say, to 
better understand the appraisals which are underlying the emotions. 
Likewise, an explanation of an emotion from a behavioristic framework 
may be unsatisfactory to the participants because it ignores personal 
knowledge and purposes.
The kinds of questions being asked determine the level(s) of 
organized knowledge most appropriate for answering the questions. The 
construct "levels of knowledge" as applied in school psychology must be 
defined in terms of the person asking the question. To impose a 
particular version of the organization of scientific, or other, 
knowledge on a client for whom this concept is alien risks disrupted 
communication and loss of rapport.
An example regarding levels of explanation for the school 
psychologist would be the question of why a particular youngster is so 
much more physically aggressive than other youngsters of the same sex 
and age. By referring to age and sex the client has already broadened 
the question from the social and developmental psychological levels to 
that of the biological. Thus, the levels of organized knowledge most 
likely to provide acceptable answers are the biological (e.g., hormones, 
brain dysfunction), the sociological (e.g., family, group, neighborhood 
dynamics), and the developmental. An explanation is unlikely to be 
accepted by those who posed the question if it uses a level of knowledge 
organization similar to that implied in the question. Stating that a 
youngster is more aggressive because there is a greater chance of his 
engaging in hitting others, for example, is unlikely to be accepted as 
an explanation. Such answers are likely to be seen as redescriptions of
I;
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the problem. Thus, one problem with some behavioristic accounts of 
behavior is that the behavioral statements simply redescribe the 
behavior of concern, they do not explain it in an acceptable way to 
those most likely to be asking the questions, teachers and parents 
(Harr£, 1988). Nor does saying that Johnny hits other children because 
of certain contingencies of reinforcement adequately explain the 
behavior for most parents and teachers. They understand that his 
hitting follows some pattern, but usually want to know why this pattern 
exists, or if you will, why the contingencies of reinforcement are 
different for Johnny than for Billy, who does not hit other students. 
They are more likely to accept a plausible biological or sociological 
explanation than a prediction that Johnny is more likely to hit other 
students (cf., Harrd, p. 139). In the process of attempting to change 
behavior, however, behavioristic psychology may play a role. The school 
psychologist may, for example, explain Johnny’s hitting behavior as the 
result of his desire for attention. Using knowledge of the 
contingencies of reinforcement one might attempt to help Johnny achieve 
his goal in a more acceptable way by changing tjie contingencies of 
reinforcement. If the explanation is accepted by the teacher or 
parents, change will be facilitated. If the explanation is viewed as 
unreasonable it is unlikely that the school psychologist will succeed in 
encouraging changes in the reinforcement schedule.
Often questions asked of school psychologists are at the level of 
semantic generalizations. For example, a teacher might ask why a 
student is so mean. The teacher has induced from samples of observed 
behavior, or other sources, a generalization (and prediction) of
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"meanness." Such generalizations are conceptually very rich and imply 
several levels of knowledge about the child. However, the question the 
teacher is asking is at the level of personality psychology and makes 
assumptions which may not be justified. Meanness becomes an internal 
trait which takes on a life of its own and influences the thinking and 
behaving of those who subscribe to it for this particular child. While 
the behaviorists have argued for the authority of observable behavior, 
they may have inadvertently taught that it is conceptually much easier 
to communicate and form a consensus about behavior we can actually 
observe. It is unlikely that a consensus can be formed among those who 
have knowledge of the child, including the school psychologist, when an 
evaluation has been conducted, which concludes that he is, indeed, mean. 
This label has the same problems as other labels used in psychology and 
education; they tend to be arbitrary and absolutistic. When a consensus 
cannot be reached about the client's problem it is preferable to 
redescribe the problem in more basic terms and try again.
It is important to view the attempt to explain unwanted behavior as 
a part of the process of changing it. If an explanation is accepted by 
those who must deal with it, changes in ways of thinking and evaluating 
the behavior may result. It was postulated earlier that cognitions and 
evaluations influence behavior; if this is true, an explanation which 
had not previously been considered, if it is accepted, is likely to 
result in changed behaviors. For example, we are usually less severe in 
our judgments of those who committed a wrong act unintentionally than 
with those who premeditated the act. An explanation which develops a
v,
L
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non-intentional explanation of the perpetrator's behavior will probably 
result in action far different than might otherwise be expected.
3. The school psychologist advocates for a democratic approach to 
decision making. More explicitly, the school psychologist promotes 
unitary democracy (Mansbridge, 1983) in the pursuit of solving problems 
and making decisions about clients. The school psychologist must 
function, then, to build a consensus about the nature of a problem and 
the proposed actions to be taken to solve the problem. A consensus is 
defined, after Mansbridge, as " . . .  a form of decision making in 
which, after discussion, one or more members of the assembly sum up 
prevailing sentiment, and if no objections are voiced, this becomes 
agreed-upon policy" (p. 32). A consensus must be forged out of a system 
of relationships in which equality, mutual respect, and empathy prevail 
among the participants. The purpose of a unitary democracy is to create 
a common interest. In school psychology this common interest is most 
often the educational and psychological well-being of a student.
Those persons who are intimately connected to the problem under 
scrutiny have mental representations of the issues which had better 
become a part of the dialogue regarding any agreed-upon resolutions. 
Searching for a client's (which may sometimes be plural) personal 
knowledge, implied or otherwise, is an essential part of the dialectical 
process through which some kind of consensus might be reached. If the 
client has difficulty expressing a theory about the issue, then the 
school psychologist is obliged to help find ways for the client to 
express her/his theory. If the client does not possess a theory about 
the issue, then it is incumbent upon the school psychologist to aid the
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client in formulating a reasonable theory. In so doing, the school 
psychologist is likely to advocate for her/his favorite theoretical 
view. The client, however, is not obligated to accept the school 
psychologist's help in this endeavor, and the client had better take 
part in assessing the reasonableness of the theoretical explanation of 
the issue. Reasonableness is a consensual judgment of the those taking 
part in the dialogue.
While consensus is the goal in a unitary democracy there is always 
the danger that conflicts will be suppressed for the sake of unity. The 
school psychologist must be alert to the possible suppression of 
personal knowledge which may be useful in finding a solution to a 
problem. The school psychologist can frequently ask participants in a 
problem-solving dialogue if the developing consensus "makes sense" or is 
reasonable. Also, the school psychologist can ask at various stages 
with which parts of the consensus the participants feel least 
comfortable. Interactions should encourage the sense of equal status 
among participants.
The process of consensus formation in decision making, then, can be 
summarized as follows: (a) the evolving solution is explicated by
someone; (b) after discussion, dissenters' objections are sought out;
(c) objections are heard and considered by the group; (d) modifications 
to the solution are proposed so as to account for the objections; (e) 
the dissenters are asked if they can “live with" the modified proposal. 
These steps are repeated until no further objections are offered. 
Although consensus formation is not a perfect solution to decision
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making it offers many advantages not found in other processes 
(Mansbridge, 1983).
The unitary democratic transaction described above is best viewed 
as an ongoing, flowing process. Few, if any, problems become 
permanently resolved. They resurface with the same child or a different 
child and once resolved are soon replaced by other problems. The 
wholistic view exposes the practice of school psychology as a never 
ending process of interacting with others in identifying problems and 
experimenting with solutions derived through consensus.
4. Taking the wholistic view encourages the school psychologist to 
expand current conceptions of what counts as knowledge. The school 
psychologist also recognizes the unjustified restrictions upon knowledge 
construction inherent in notions such as "objectivity" and "experimental 
controls." Current conceptions of science and appropriate research 
methods are too restrictive for the school psychologist. The school 
psychologist values the traditional psychological and educational 
knowledge which has been accumulating over the decades, such as that 
typically found in textbooks and training programs for school 
psychologists, but such knowledge (usually reductionistic) is best 
viewed as only one particular construction of reality. Traditional 
school psychological knowledge, some of which was examined in the first 
three chapters, must compete without any authoritative status. That is, 
what we think we know in school psychology is open to question, is never 
sacred, and serves only until more appealing ways of knowing have been 
invented.
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While the traditional methods of knowledge construction via
scientific methodology will continue to be applicable under some
conditions, other ways of approaching problems must be found. Many of
the research problems in psychology have not been addressed because of
the difficulties in isolating and quantifying variables. The school
psychologist will value an extensive variety of research points of view
which serve many different purposes. Case histories and qualitative
studies are two particularly neglected research orientations which had
better become a part of the knowledge construction in school psychology.
5. In keeping with the view that human beings have goals,
purposes, a "telos," the school psychologist moves toward the telos of
good practice. The "good" practice of school psychology evolves from
theoretical reasoning about what the telos of school psychology is and
it is governed by the practical reasoning about right action in
particular circumstances (cf., MacIntyre, 1984). What it means to
engage in a virtuous practice was further elaborated by MacIntyre:
To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only 
with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have 
preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements 
extended the reach of the practice to its present point. It is 
thus the achievement, and a fortiori the authority, of a tradition 
which I then confront and from which I have to learn. And for this 
learning and the relationship to the past which it embodies the 
virtues of justice, courage and truthfulness are prerequisite in 
precisely the same way and for precisely the same reasons as they 
are in sustaining present relationships within practices, (p. 194)
Practitioners of school psychology must sustain the dialogues about
theories of the person, of education, of learning, of stress, and of the
telos of humankind in order to consolidate an evolving theory of the
appropriate practice of the profession. Such a theory can emerge from
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the ethical traditions, both explicit and implicit, of school
psychology, but it must be founded upon a theory of the person as a
moral agent. Any view which implies that the person is a machine or
automaton makes a code of ethics for school psychologists meaningless.
As MacIntyre (1984) has reminded us, each person becomes a
character in history, each person is the hero of a story. But stories
have a message or moral and the moral of the story of the life of a
school psychologist has a purpose. The virtues to be found in the
practice of school psychology were aptly discussed by MacIntyre as those
to be found in any practice of the good life:
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions 
which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the 
goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the 
relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the 
harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, 
and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and 
increasing knowledge of the good. . . .  We have then arrived at a 
provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life
for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and 
the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable 
us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is. 
(p. 219)
In this author's personal experience, school psychologists have 
sometimes subscribed to a theory of the person which has been 
contradicted by their own personal narrative about who they are and what 
they are about. It is time we put this nonsense aside and began 
discussing what the purpose of school psychology is in a more open, 
unembarrassed way. We may have vague notions about what justice, 
courage, and truthfulness are in the practice of school psychology, and 
we have a code of ethics which subscribes to some outdated notions about 
the nature of science and objectivity which have been addressed in this
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paper. What is needed now in school psychology is a critical
examination of some of the profession's basic assumptions and a
subsequent revisioning of notions of practice.
It is hypothesized that if such a critical examination took place
and subsequent revisions came about, the ancient virtue of humility
would ascend into prominence among school psychologists. If the
arguments put forth in this document withstand public scrutiny, then the
view of the school psychologist as technician must falter. In its place
can be resurrected a model of the school psychologist as a moral leader
who assists others in constructing meaning in their lives, a model
proposed for educational administrators by Smith and Blase (1987).
Their summary provides an appropriate conclusion for this chapter:
In summary, a concept of moral leadership is based on the 
significance view of what it means to be a person. Relationships 
among people are not played out against a background of scientific 
findings, expertise, prediction and control; rather, these 
relationships are mediated by a sense of membership in a community 
of moral discourse. To participate in this community one must 
realize the need for reasoned discussion or dialogue. The 
administrator who desires the compliment of being called a leader 
is one who recognizes, and encourages others to recognize, this 
situation, who is willing to risk himself/herself in an open 
dialogue with others, is reflexively aware of standards that go 
beyond a performance criterion, and who strives to keep our 
traditions alive through debate and discussion. This perspective, 
which is quite different from the image of the educational leader 
as expert, seems especially appropriate for public school 
leadership, (pp. 43-44)
In summary, in this chapter an attempt has been made to organize 
and justify a number of concepts from which a better practice of school 
psychology may emerge. Assumptions about (a) the wholeness of the 
universe, (b) the construction of knowledge, (c) the social consensus of 
what counts as knowledge, (d) the strong influence of personal knowing,
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(e) purposiveness in human behavior, (f) the significance view of the 
person, and (g) the search for a meaning for the student's life as the 
purpose of education, were made explicit. These assumptions provided 
the foundation for a conceptual model of the appropriate practice of 
school psychology. The major concepts of this system included the 
following: (a) the purpose of school psychology as an enrichment of the
personal knowledge of clients, (b) the view that enrichment is 
accomplished through collaborative consultation and the provision of 
explanations, (c) the advocation of unitary democracy, (d) the promotion 
of an expanded view of knowledge construction in school psychology, and 
(e) the opening of a dialogue about the virtues in the practice of 
school psychology. This model obligates the school psychologist to 
practice humility and moral leadership in the schools.




The purpose of this chapter is to give examples, through case 
histories, of ways in which the model of practice proposed in Chapter 4 
can be realized. While no specific formula can prescribe practice from 
a model or theory, it may be illustrative to describe specific practices 
in narrative form and explain how they exemplify the model. It is the 
author's intention that the reader will be able to imagine a school 
psychologist practicing her/his profession in such a way that the basic 
assumptions and principles of practice can be inferred and will be found 
to closely match those delineated in Chapter 4. The case histories 
presented in this chapter are based upon composites of actual clients in 
order to protect the identity of specific persons.
While convenience might be achieved by presenting divided aspects 
of school psychology practice, e.g., assessment, diagnosis, remediation, 
the underlying assumption of wholeness advocated in Chapter 4 would be 
violated. Therefore, the following case histories will be presented as 
stories which describe the school psychologist's involvement with a 
client. Although the subsidiary parts of practice may be pointed out, 
the focal point of each case will be the relationship between the 
client(s) and the psychologist. Diagnosis and remediation can be 
separated only artificially in a human relationship. The tasks we 
classify as diagnostic may, as will be shown, have an effect on the 
client which is often ignored in the literature of school psychology. 
However, stories told by experienced practitioners, usually in rather 
informal situations, indicate that a diagnostic evaluation is frequently
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a dialectical process which affects the student and the school 
psychologist. Almost all human relationships can be viewed as 
dialectical in nature with resulting changes in the persons who 
participate in this relationship.
Case History 1
The first case history will demonstrate just how the school 
psychological assessment process may result in unexpected, but 
productive, changes in a student. The client in this case was a 6 year 
old girl, Jane (a pseudonym), enrolled in a regular first grade class in 
a small city school. Her first grade teacher and her mother were very 
concerned about Jane's poor progress in reading, writing, and math. 
Jane's older siblings had learning problems in school, so the mother 
worried that Jane would find school work to be very frustrating. The 
family moved to the school district from another state where Jane had 
been evaluated at some kind of clinic. The mother was told that Jane 
may be developing "dyslexia." Due to her experiences with her older 
children, this parent was quite knowledgeable of the terminology and 
remedial techniques for learning disabilities. She requested an 
evaluation and remedial services for her daughter.
Because of her age, Jane was seen on five different occasions for 
relatively short periods of time in order to avoid tiring her. During 
the evaluation Jane was initially polite and quite motivated to do well 
on the evaluation tasks. In subsequent evaluation sessions Jane 
gradually became more willing to test the psychologist to find out just 
what were the behavioral limits. On several occasions, she tried taking 
test materials or beginning to work on tasks before the directions were
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completed. Often, V7hen Jane became frustrated with a task, although 
persistent, she asked the examiner to help her. Each time she was told 
that such help was not allowed, that the psychologist wanted to see how 
well she could do without help. Jane continued to ask for help, and, 
eventually, began to demand it. At one point she threatened to not be 
the psychologist's friend any more if he did not help her. The 
psychologist, however, patiently and consistently refused to help her.
As the testing progressed, the psychologist began to form some 
hypotheses about Jane. She appeared to be a youngster with little 
tolerance for frustration. Jane also seemed to lack confidence in her 
abilities to solve perceptual-motor problems. It was inferred that Jane 
construed herself as unlikely to succeed on academic tasks and that many 
of these tasks were beyond her coping capacity (that is, they were 
stressful).
Jane experienced much more success on most of the intelligence test 
items than on those in the achievement battery. Without violating test 
manual directions, she was given appropriate feedback at the end of each 
subtest on the intelligence test and the psychologist acted truly amazed 
at the few successes Jane managed on the achievement tests. He 
congratulated her on beginning to learn how to read and suggested that 
it would not be long before she would be reading bigger words and 
thicker books. He praised her on the letters and words she had learned, 
even though it was obvious to the author that she was far behind most of 
her classmates. Jane seemed pleased with her performances even when 
some of them were normatively inferior. It appeared that Jane had not
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yet learned to evaluate her performance relative to that of her peers 
and the psychologist was not about to encourage her to begin doing so.
Jane appeared to enjoy most of the evaluation time with the 
examiner, as do most youngsters in the early grades of school. On 
several occasions when Jane saw the author in the school corridors she 
asked if she was going to get to work with him. There were a number of 
additional signs that Jane looked forward to the testing sessions.
A staffing was held after all the diagnostic testing was completed 
and the school officials and the parent decided to place the child into 
a special education classroom for instruction in reading, writing, and 
math. The illustrative point of this case, however, occurred at the end 
of the staffing when the mother commented on the changes she observed in 
her daughter during the weeks when the testing was being completed. The 
mother reported that her daughter suddenly began showing much more 
interest in reading and demanded that her mother take her to the library 
almost every day. She not only showed more interest in reading but was 
also attempting to read more books of greater difficulty than ever 
before. The mother attributed the change in her daughter’s interest in 
reading to something that happened as a result of the daughter's 
interaction with the psychologist.
Of course, no cause-effect relationship can be demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of a community of scholars regarding the dialogues between 
the psychologist and the student. Thus, it is unlikely that a 
deterministic formula could ever be derived which could predict the 
outcome of the dialogues between this student and the psychologist.
What seems most pertinent in this case is that the mother observed
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desired changes in her daughter and construed these changes to be the 
result of some positive interaction between the psychologist and the 
student. The mother had no proof that her construal was correct, nor 
did she seem motivated to test her belief. In essence, the mother 
created a myth, an untested explanatory story, to account for the 
changes in her daughter's attitude toward reading. While this myth 
cannot be rationally construed to match some unconceptualized "true" 
version of what influenced this child's change in attitude, it may have 
served several valuable functions for Jane's mother (Feinstein & 
Krippner, 1988). One function may have been to organize into a coherent 
whole this mother's experiences of her daughter and the mother's 
perceptions of Jane's vulnerability in school and her need for 
understanding. It could be that the psychologist's experience with Jane 
matched the mother's ideal of how she wanted others to interact with her 
daughter. The myth may also have been a reflection of the mother's 
strong desire to find someone who could understand and help her 
daughter. The psychologist hypothesized that this search for expertise 
was an important part of the mother's belief system. Thus, an effort 
was made to help the mother also view the resource teacher, a truly 
competent educator, as potentially more helpful to Jane. The 
psychologist explained to the mother that he had learned some of his 
ways of interacting with students from observing this teacher utilize 
patience and encouragement with her students.
This case demonstrates several of the features of the proposed 
model of school psychology. First, the act of reading is not an 
isolable part of a person which can be dissected and studied apart from
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the life of the child. Second, this case also demonstrates the personal 
construction of knowledge by the child, the mother, and the 
psychologist. The mother and the psychologist utilized a belief system 
to make sense of their experiences, and the student made changes in a 
belief system which resulted in a new pattern of behavior. Third, the 
strong influence of personal construing on behavior can be seen in the 
child's increased interest in reading. No conscious efforts were made 
to remediate the child's attitude toward reading. We may infer that the 
child actively construed something which happened during the testing 
(or, in some other setting) which prompted a change. If the mother's 
interpretation was correct, the child probably reconstrued her "self" as 
a reader. Perhaps she could more clearly foresee herself reading 
difficult books, a possibility which would illustrate the purposiveness 
of behavior. This hypothesis could be tested with a number of 
individual case studies or possibly with groups of unmotivated or 
discouraged readers. The psychologist in this case, nevertheless, 
experienced a strengthening of his belief in encouraging students to 
expand their constructs of themselves as readers.
Although the details of this staffing were not presented, the 
unitary democratic process was exemplified. Jane's mother was the 
unifying force in forging a consensus that her child was handicapped in 
receiving an education and in need of special education instructional 
services. The staffing participants were in harmonious agreement about 
the child and the appropriate educational approach for her. Staffings 
do not always run so smoothly and often discussion, debate, and 
compromise are required to reach consensus, in her qualitative study of
jE
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the staffing process, for example, Law (1981) found that the parents 
were often confused by professional jargon and authority and were not 
equal participants in these meetings. Since the implementation of the 
model proposed herein, the author has perceived greater power sharing 
and less reliance upon authority in staffings. The author's school 
psychology practicum and intern students are often assigned the task of 
observing staffings specifically to identify anti-democratic processes.
Case History 2
The second case involved a 10 year old boy who was referred to the 
psychologist because of his explosive temper and frequent fighting.
This boy, Tom, was the oldest of three children, all of whom lived with 
their mother. The boy's parents had divorced two years prior to the 
referral, but he maintained regular contact with his father. Tom's 
teachers believed him to be of more than average intelligence, but his 
schoolwork was generally only average. His teachers reported that he 
was caught fighting with other students, mostly on the playground, 
several times a week.
Tom was seen on three occasions at one week intervals. During the 
first session Tom appeared nervous, tense, and quite defensive. He 
answered questions in a very abrupt fashion, revealing as little as 
possible about himself. Thus, the psychologist theorized that Tom was 
embarrassed about his troubles and did not want to discuss them openly. 
An indirect approach was taken, mutual story telling (Gardner, 1971), in 
which the child was asked to tell a story, preferably one which he had 
not heard, read about, or seen before. A story with a beginning, a 
middle, an end, and a moral or lesson was requested.
5----
L_____________
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Tom's story was about a high school football player who had become 
very angry about being penalized by the referee. The football player 
became so angry that he aggressively argued with the referee until he 
was kicked out of the game and sent to the locker room. The moral to 
Tom's story was "that you shouldn't get so mad.”
The second part of Gardner's (1971) mutual story telling technique 
requires the clinician to rapidly diagnose the child's problem and 
retell the child's story so that the protagonist "works through" some 
psycho-dynamic problem. The author, however, subscribes to a more 
direct cognitive approach to the solving of emotional and behavioral 
problems. Therefore, following Ellis' (1962) Rational Emotive Therapy 
(RET), some inferences were made about the child's anger producing 
beliefs. Namely, it was hypothesized that Tom sometimes strongly 
demanded that people behave or events happen exactly the way he thought 
they should. RET theory would predict that an effective challenge to 
Tom's irrational demands would produce the following: (a) his demands
would be changed to preferences, and (b) a significant reduction in his 
anger would occur.
The psychologist retold Tom's story as follows: Once there was a
boy who really loved to play football. Sometimes, however, when things 
did not go his way, he became so angry that he lost his temper and got 
into trouble. During one of the most important games of the season the 
young man drew an official's flag for clipping. The football player 
truly believed that he did not clip his opponent and instantly became 
upset. He argued with the referee to the point that he was kicked out 
of the game. Of course, he was sent to the locker room, still feeling
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angry and also feeling guilty that he had let his team down. While he
was in the locker room he saw the old janitor who took care of the
stadium. When asked what had happened, the football player recounted 
the events and how the referee had made him feel angry. The old janitor 
was very wise and explained to the football player that he was acting 
both very small and very big. The football player did not understand 
what the janitor meant, so the janitor explained that he was acting very 
small because he was acting like a baby who throws a temper tantrum in 
order to get its own way. He was acting very big because he was trying 
to make things happen just by demanding them, much like God demanded 
things and got them in the Bible stories. Right away the football 
player could see that he was not a baby and that he was not God, he was 
an almost grown-up person. He also realized that, unlike God, he could 
not get what he wanted just by demanding it. The wise old janitor
suggested to the football player that he practice turning his demands
into wishes and wants. Demands are for babies and God, the janitor 
explained, but wishes and wants tell what humans are usually willing to 
work hard to get. The football player took the old janitor's advice 
and, using his imagination, practiced having something go wrong on the 
football field, and followed this with wishing that it had not. He 
could picture himself staying calmer. He even began wishing instead of 
demanding off the football field and found that he did not make himself 
angry nearly so often nor so strongly as before. The moral of this 
story is that if you want to stop upsetting yourself so much with anger, 
change your demands into wishes.
5---- ■
}•
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What followed for this youngster cannot be proven, according to 
currently accepted criteria in experimental psychology, to have been the 
result of this story telling encounter. However, teachers and the boy's 
mother reported that there was a dramatic decrease in the number of 
fights and temper outbursts. Follow-up sessions with this youngster 
found him to be only slightly more open about his problems. When asked
how things were going in school, he did mention that he was "doing
better on the playground" and playing more football with the other boys 
in his class. The story telling took place in the late fall and 
subsequent follow-up conferences during the year found this youngster 
continuing to successfully manage his temper and to solve conflicts more 
constructively.
The power of stories and myth to teach morality and practical 
lessons is well documented (Bagarozzi & Anderson, 1989; Campbell, 1968,
1972; Feinstein & Krippner, 1988; Murray, 1960). Myths and stories can
be seen as expressions of knowledge which have been constructed by the 
community or by the person and they also demonstrate the purposiveness 
and meaning in human action. In this example the youngster was able to 
express something about his recurrent problem through the medium of the 
story. Likewise, the psychologist used the story to communicate an 
expanded view of the problem, one which included hypotheses about which 
of the fictitious football player's beliefs were contributing to his 
anger problem. The psychologist's story also challenged the 
hypothesized problematic beliefs and offered new ways for the student to 
think about anger arousing situations.
L_
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Two aspects of the proposed model of school psychology practice are 
prominent in this story. First, the psychologist attempted to enrich 
the student's personal knowledge through the dialectical process of 
mutual story telling. Second, an explanation of anger and an 
alternative way of reacting via the stories were provided to the 
student. Undergirding these two themes is a set of moral assumptions 
about what is right in human behavior. Tom indirectly indicated his 
moral problem concerning anger and the problems which accompany his 
temper outbursts when he formulated a moral for his story, namely that 
one should not "get so mad." Implied in this moral was the goal of 
learning to control his temper. The psychologist provided a kind of 
moral leadership in teaching Tom one way he could reach his goal.
Case History 3 
The next story demonstrates the futility of assuming the 
mechanistic model of the human being. An intelligent 16 year old girl, 
who will be called Janet, was referred to the author because of 
recurrent behavior problems in several of her classes. This youngster 
suffered from a neurological disease which caused her some embarrassment 
in school. A number of medications had been prescribed by her physician 
to reduce the symptoms of the disease, but the medications usually 
produced unwanted side effects. The girl's parents and physician 
believed that the latest medication she was taking was responsible for 
the behavior problems. Janet was very knowledgeable about her disease 
and had read extensively about the medications given to her. In an 
initial conference, Janet's mother revealed that her greatest concerns 
were about Janet's low self-esteem and embarrassment aboxit her disease.
!__ -
L ____________
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The first couple of sessions with Janet were quite stimulating and 
educational for the psychologist. Janet shared her rudimentary 
knowledge of her disease and theories about how the medications help to 
reduce her obvious symptoms. Probing also found several self evaluative 
beliefs to which Janet subscribed. When the rationality of these 
beliefs was challenged, Janet was able to quickly discern that her 
beliefs about herself were nonsense. She and the psychologist 
formulated new, more reasonable beliefs for her to practice. Janet 
responded quite well to this approach to her self-downing.
At the third session the psychologist asked Janet if she would like 
to learn more about the psychological aspects of her disease by reading 
more about it. She indicated much interest in this proposal and a 
search of the psychological literature was conducted. Interestingly, 
one of the first articles found by the psychologist was a review of the 
literature comparing medication and behavior modification treatments for 
Janet's disease. This review concluded that both approaches were 
equally successful compared to no-treatment control groups. Janet was 
able to read and understand most of this research paper as indicated by 
our subsequent discussions of the article.
Quite interestingly, however, Janet appeared to become anxious as 
she and the psychologist discussed this research. She refused to 
believe that there could be any psychological aspects to her symptoms 
and tried to support her position with an explanation about how the 
neurotransmitters at the synapses were not properly controlled and, 
therefore, only medication could help her. She v;as equally resistive to 
any attempts to reduce the severity of her symptoms with stress
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management. Various arguments were presented by the psychologist about 
possible ways in which psychological variables might affect her disease 
and a number of attempts were made to encourage her to at least try some 
of the techniques discussed in the research article. All the coaxing 
and arguing were unsuccessful in persuading this very bright teenager to 
attempt to reduce her symptoms by tried and proven behavioral methods.
The point to be made by this story is that behavioral techniques 
(e.g., Bandura, 1969) are often presented as a set of principles based 
upon laboratory research which has uncovered some very basic laws of 
human behavior. Furthermore, it is frequently inferred that when these 
techniques are appropriately applied, they will cause very predictable 
outcomes which are the result of these laws of behavior. The problem 
with this very mechanistic model of humankind is, of course, it ignores 
that human beings are agents with purposes. This case demonstrates that 
the model of humankind with which we approach our clients is not just a 
philosophical problem. Janet was not about to passively submit to the 
techniques of behavior modification, and even if she had it would have 
been the result of her choice to submit. Ironically, Janet's own 
mechanistic model of her disease may have served to defend her from the 
mechanistic techniques of behavior modification.
This case is reminiscent of many in which this author has wanted to 
help a client by applying the technology of behavioral science but was 
frustrated by the "lack of cooperation" of the client. Looking back, it 
is possible to discern patterns in this author's career in which the 
issue of mechanical versus purposive natures of humankind has had very 
practical consequences. Early on, a very deterministic/mechanistic
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orientation was taken by the author toward the problems presented to him 
in the schools. Theoretically perfect solutions to these problems were 
not difficult to prescribe. After all, the laws of behavior were seen 
to be universal, with the puzzling exception that the author was often 
unable to explain the ways in which these laws governed his own 
behavior. It was a rare occasion indeed, however, when this 
psychologist was able to apply behavioral technology. Almost always 
people, parents, teachers, or students, refused to allow the technology 
to be implemented, or some unexpected variable ruined the scientific 
application of the principles. Increasingly frustrated, this author 
sought help from the experts in behavioral technology. Many 
consultations were made with psychologists who published journal 
articles and/or presented workshops on behavior modification. None of 
them were able to offer any behavioral technology which was helpful in 
securing willing, passive, stable clients to whom the behavioral 
technology could be applied.
On one occasion the author was presented with what seemed the ideal 
opportunity to demonstrate to a child care worker the power of 
behavioral techniques. A 3 year old boy refused to help clean up messes 
he had made at the day care center and was non-compliant in other ways 
also. While the day care worker observed, the author used physical 
guidance of the youngster coupled with verbal praise to reinforce his 
behavior. The author took the boy's hand and placed it upon a block, 
moved his hand to the container, then helped the child release the block 
over the container. This was immediately followed by verbal praise from 
the author. The 3 year old boy quickly caught on to this activity,
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that is, his behavior v?as shaped and soon he was putting blocks into the 
container without assistance. He beamed whenever the author praised 
him. When the container of blocks was nearly filled the author was 
quite gratified and felt a renewed confidence in the "laws of behavior." 
Unfortunately, when the container was full and there were no more blocks 
on the floor, the boy very adeptly dumped the blocks out of the 
container back onto the floor. The youngster appeared very pleased with 
his behavior and was anxiously looking to the author for more praise and 
a resumption of the game.
This story illustrates the weakness of the mechanistic model of the 
person who exists outside the confines and controls of the behavioral 
laboratory (see Page, 1982, for an example of a laboratory study of 
adult operant behavior which found that people have intentions which are 
not accounted for in the operant model of the person V--- The -year old 
boy and the psychologist obviously had differing goals and purposes and 
this episode generated some valuable hypotheses about the child's 
constructs. The power and occasional utility of behavioral technology 
are not being denied. However, the model of humankind which includes 
the purposiveness of human behavior is much more inclusive than and can 
easily encompass the mechanistic model inherent in behavioristic 
psychology (cf., Hallberg, 1975; Miller & Martin, 1988).
Case History 4
The following story demonstrates how the negative knowledge which 
emanates from psychological and educational research (Westland, 1978) 
can combine with a school psychologist's experiences to initiate changes 
in a traditional educational practice. A fourth grade boy was referred
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to the psychologist for an evaluation by his mother. She was concerned 
because her son seemed to be developing a negative, uncaring attitude 
toward school. His grades were gradually declining each year and the 
mother was encountering difficulties in motivating her son to go to 
school and to complete his homework. The teacher had also noticed a 
gradual decline in the boy's school work and attitudes toward school 
over the few months he had been attending her class.
Keeping in mind that this case occurred in the first year of this 
author's career, a complete battery of psychological tests was 
administered to this youngster. Having been trained to put the most 
faith in objective data, testing was viewed by the author as the logical 
approach to discovering what was ailing this youngster. This boy was 
found to function with average intellectual abilities and his academic 
achievement was only slightly below the expected level (determined, of 
course, by the boy's IQ score). Observations of the youngster's 
behavior in the classroom and during testing suggested no obvious 
problems. A relatively subjective sentence completion test revealed 
nothing out of the ordinary. Frankly, the psychologist was stumped!
Out of desperation the author decided to simply visit with the 
youngster, a process this author would now refer to as a dialogue.
About midway through the first dialogue the author asked the student 
about where he had attended school for the previous grades. In the 
process of relating his school career, the boy became very clearly 
embarrassed when he revealed that he had "flunked" kindergarten. While 
the author knew, from a search of the student's cumulative file, the boy
S l- - - - - - - - - - - - - -L__
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had "repeated" kindergarten, he was alarmed to discern the strong 
negative feelings which the youngster associated with this setback.
The author immediately began a search of the literature on the 
effects of grade retention. This search was conducted in 1975 and found 
very mixed results. Most of the researchers concluded that retained 
students did not gain academically when compared to nonretained 
students. A minority of the studies found some' academic superiority for 
students who were held back one year. However, some of the studies 
found that students who were retained in grade developed more negative 
self-concepts as learners when compared to similarly achieving but 
promoted peers. Incidentally, a subsequent review by this author in 
1985, and reviews by other school psychologists (Dawson, Raforth, & 
Carey, 1990) have reached the same conclusions, namely, that retention 
does not seem to improve academic achievement and it may hurt the 
child's self-concept. Of course, these conclusions are generalizations 
which do not strictly apply to individual cases. However, there is no 
body of knowledge from which one can make accurate predictions regarding 
the effects of retention for the individual student (Smith & Shepard, 
1987). This case certainly sensitized the author to the ways in which 
grade retention can be construed by the affected child. The continuing 
use of grade retention as an alternative for students (Dawson, Raforth,
& Carey) testifies to the traditional consensus among educators about 
the effectiveness of this practice. It has been observed by this 
author, however, that the short-term effects of retention are often 
positive. When a student repeats a curriculum it is almost always 
easier the second time around. Perhaps even the following grade will be
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relatively easier. The rather unique perspective of a rural school 
psychologist who follows students from preschool to adulthood often 
gives a different picture. Many times retained students are referred 
for an evaluation to help in the original decision for retention. If 
the child is retained, however, he or she is often referred again 
several years later because of school failure.
The problem with the traditional consensus about grade retention is 
that it is short-sighted and unchallenged. It is a relatively 
inexpensive, from the educator's perspective, option for the child who 
is struggling in school and it often seems to be helpful in the first 
year or two. However, this author has adopted a view which challenges 
the educationally orthodox consensus about retention. The consensus is 
challenged at every opportunity with the result that hardly any 
referrals for students being considered for retention are received 
anymore. Of course, students continue to be retained in the author's 
school districts, but teachers and principals who believe that retention 
is a beneficial option for students simply do not consult the 
psychologist. Whenever parents or educators ask the author about 
retention they are told (a) that the research demonstrates that 
retention is not helpful for most children, (b) that some children 
develop poor self-concepts as an apparent result of retention, and (c) 
no one seems to know how to accurately predict which students will 
profit from retention.
The stance this author has taken toward retention is based on 
reviews of research and many experiences like the one described above. 
Thus, long-term follow-up of children and controlled studies of
L___________
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retention liave served to shape the author’s theories about grade 
retention. These theories do not fit the consensus of opinion among 
most educators and, thus, creates a dilemma for the psychologist. The 
model proposed in this paper recognizes that knowledge is the product of 
consensus and advocates for a unitary democracy in the decision making 
about students. The retention issue demonstrates that unitary democracy 
is not always an attainable goal. That is, disagreements about the 
effects of retention contribute to conflicts and lack of consensus in 
staffings when holding a student back for a year is proposed. Such 
conflicts do not, however, negate the value of unitary democracy. 
Instead, they point out the value of the dialectical approach to 
constructing knowledge for the sake of making decisions. The school 
psychologist has a point of view to add to the dialogue.
Of course, there are various ways of contributing to the dialogue. 
The psychologist can continue to wait for referrals in which retention 
is the issue and voice a point of view. When this approach has been 
taken by the author, no counter arguments have been offered by those 
supporting retention. The problem with this approach is that often this 
psychologist is simply not invited to participate in the dialogue.
Various other ways of entering the dialogue have been found, 
however. In some cases the author has sought out the school 
administrator and initiated a dialogue about retention. This has had a 
positive effect in one school. The principal now discourages retention. 
Importantly, this principal is very open to alternative ways of meeting 
the needs of struggling students. In another building the principal has
i
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been less receptive and, coincidentally, is less open to regular 
education alternatives to special education.
Another approach taken by this author is to frequently bring up the 
retention issue when he is asked to speak to a group of parents or 
teachers. The three major points mentioned above about retention are 
presented and the audience is invited to participate in a dialogue about 
retention. Invariably, some of the members of the audience will know of 
examples wherein retention was helpful over the long-run, while others 
give counter examples. The important point stressed by the author to 
these groups is that we are unable to predict with any certainty which 
youngsters will benefit from retention. The only other counter argument 
which has ever followed this point has been that school officials simply 
do not know what to do with these students, they do not have any other 
alternatives. The author's reply is that there are a number of ways 
regular education can be restructured to accommodate low achieving 
students (Graden, Zins, & Curtis, 1988).
There is presently an attempt in the state of Iowa to find new ways 
of providing educational services to needy students other than in 
traditional special educational programs (Overview: Implementing 
improvement in the special education service delivery system for Iowa 
students, 1989). Part of this movement is to find alternatives within 
regular education classes for students who have been served in programs 
for the mildly handicapped. As pointed out in Chapter 2, special 
education programs, although they are more expensive, have not generally 
been shown to be more beneficial than regular education programs. 
However, in order for teachers of regular classes to accommodate these
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mildly handicapped students very basic changes in educational philosophy 
and practices would seem to be in order. The answer to the problems of 
retention and the education of mildly handicapped students may be very 
similar in that both are putting pressure on the traditional, age-graded 
ways of educating students. The same challenges made of the basic 
assumptions in school psychology can be made of education in general 
(McGraw, 1984).
Case History 5
The next story brings us back to the problem of the separation of 
mind and spirit addressed in the Cain and Abel myth presented in the 
Preface. A kindergarten girl who attended a private school affiliated 
with a Christian church was referred because she was struggling with the 
academic work in kindergarten. The girl, whom we will refer to as Beth, 
was slow in achieving developmental milestones and exhibited mild 
developmental delays in large and small muscle coordination.
Intellectual testing placed her at about the tenth percentile in overall 
academic aptitude. Near the end of her kindergarten year Beth was still 
having trouble correctly writing her name. She could count and had 
mastered very rudimentary addition using concrete objects. Beth could 
read her name and those of a few of her classmates. Measures of her 
academic achievements in kindergarten were generally compatible with 
measures of her aptitudes. Beth was described as a happy-go-lucky and 
very likeable child. She related quite well to most of her classmates. 
Beth received language therapy from the Area Education Agency speech 
pathologist.
I'
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Only in the last couple of months of kindergarten had the teacher 
and Beth's mother noticed what they thought was frustration in the 
child. Beth's attention to academic tasks had worsened and she overtly 
resisted some school activities. She had begun to complain about school 
to her mother and occasionally did not want to come to school. When the 
author interviewed Beth's mother it was evident that she had suspected, 
perhaps unconsciously, that Beth was slower in many ways than her peers. 
The year before, Beth's mother had sometimes helped in Beth's preschool 
classroom and had seen that her daughter could not do as much as most of 
her peers. Also, Beth had two older siblings, and one younger. The 
mother sensed that Beth had not developed as quickly as her older 
children, and the younger child (by two years) was rapidly catching up 
with and even surpassing Beth in some skills. The mother knew that her 
third child was developmentally slow, and she was very frightened about 
what might happen to Beth in the school system.
When all the requested testing was completed a staffing was 
arranged with the parents, the teacher, the speech pathologist, the 
school psychologist, and the school principal. Everyone involved in the 
staffing knew that Beth's mother was very emotional about the issues 
which were to be discussed. All the staffing participants appeared 
tense. In this school, contrary to most others served by the author, 
the teachers typically began the staffing by focusing upon the child's 
accomplishments. In spite of this positive approach, the mother asked 
early in the staffing if her daughter was ready for first grade. The 
teacher reluctantly predicted that first grade would be very difficult 
and frustrating for Beth. Eventually, the staffing participants turned
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
158
to the psychologist for the results of the psychological testing. All 
the test scores were translated into percentiles and the psychologist 
explained that a percentile score could be viewed as a child's relative 
standing on a test when compared to one hundred typical children of the 
same age. Thus, it was explained, Beth's IQ score was at the 10th 
percentile, meaning that she would have scored better than 10 out of 100 
children her age, and 90 would have scored better than Beth. No one in 
the staffing seemed disturbed by these scores. As a matter of fact the 
teacher agreed with these estimates of Beth's relative standing.
It was not until the psychologist explained the "meaning” of the 
scores that real distress appeared on the faces of the teacher and the 
parent. Although the psychologist had already met privately with the 
parents one week prior to the staffing and related the same information, 
the mother became upset and cried again at the staffing. Not only did 
the mother cry, but also the father, the teacher, and the principal.
The "meaning” of the IQ scores, of course, had to do with the diagnostic 
label, mildly mentally disabled, and the child's eligibility for special 
education services. Under federal legislation governing special 
education (Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975; 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Section 504) a school psychologist is 
required to notify parents and school officials of any handicapping 
conditions identified as a result of assessment (L. D. Bartlett, 
personal communication, April 6, 1990). In addition to legislation, the 
school psychologists ' code of ethics (National Association of School 
Psychologists, 1984) and current practice dictate that a school 
psychologist is obligated to relate to the parents and school the
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diagnostic label and the child's eligibility for any special education 
or related services.
It occurred to the psychologist that the parents and educators were 
jointly subscribing to a set of beliefs which were contributing to the 
group's emotional distress and which were interfering with the process 
of considering educational options and selecting those which might best 
meet the child's needs. One might argue that such emotional reactions 
are a necessary part of the adjustment and grieving process. A counter 
argument, however, is that the child has not died and is in no way 
different as a result of the sharing of psychological test information 
with the parents. What had changed was the theory constructed by the 
parents and educators of this particular child. Apparently as a result 
of the labeling a joint unspoken prognosis of dire consequences was 
taking shape. In order to test this hypothesis the psychologist led the 
discussion toward a consideration of the long range educational and life 
outcomes for this child. The parents and teachers were asked whether 
Beth was a different child now than she had been two weeks ago. Of 
course, their answer was negative. Next, the psychologist pointed out 
that the mental disability label did not mean anything specific about 
Beth. It was explained that the label was used primarily to officially 
qualify youngsters for state and federal special education money and 
services. The prognostic accuracy of the label, it was explained, is 
not good; that is, the educational and occupational attainments of 
youngsters with similar labels are not specifically predictable and are 
quite variable. Further, the label simply describes what we already 
know about Beth, that school is difficult for her.
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It was also hypothesized by the psychologist that the parents and 
teachers were unconsciously judging the value of the child as negative 
because of the label. To test this hypothesis the psychologist asked 
the staffing participants what were the most important aspects of Beth's 
life. The psychologist was hoping that the religious affiliation of the 
school would influence the discussion of values toward a more spiritual 
direction and away from social and economic concerns about Beth's 
future. Unfortunately, it was the psychologist who had to point out to 
the staffing participants that Beth was, according to their religious 
beliefs, made in the image of God and that she possesses an immortal 
soul. The emotional reactions were brought to a halt by these reminders 
and, at least temporarily, the parents and educators felt much less 
distressed. The atmosphere of the remainder of the staffing became much 
more positive as the participants evidently altered their dire 
predictions of a horrible, awful life for Beth and put her educational 
problems into truly long-term perspective.
This case demonstrates the importance of opening a dialogue at all 
educational planning meetings concerning the overall purpose of a 
child's education (McGraw, 1984). As quoted by McGraw, James (1980) 
reiterated a major theme of this paper, " . . .  because the study of 
education is hardly separable from the study of the nature of man, many 
of the questions now under investigation have deep intellectual roots in 
philosophy and theology" (p. 40). She quoted Ernest Boyer (1984) 
regarding the primary purpose of education, "the social and moral 
imperative of education is to help all students see the connectedness of 
things, an insight that touches the very foundation of morality— social
L   ................
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and religious" (p. 41). It is this author's opinion that few of the 
professionals in the schools, however, are prepared to engage in such 
discussions. Again, from McGraw we hear that "the mistake has been to 
view education primarily in terms of what can be verified through 
quantitative measurement" (p. 41).
Most of the fundamental assumptions of the proposed model for 
school psychology are evident in this case. Beth's story demonstrates 
the connectedness of her educational problems to those around her and to 
other aspects of her life, and it shows the futility of trying to 
isolate one part of a child's life from other parts. We can also see 
that the "meaning" of Beth's IQ scores are the result of educational 
dialogues which have constructed the notion of mental disability, a 
concept which is not a description of nature but is a creation of 
humans. The dialogue concerning Beth's IQ scores did not stop with the 
currently accepted construct of mental disability, rather the dialogue 
was continued within the staffing and given a new meaning (namely, that 
Beth has trouble with some school learning). The construction process 
in the staffing produced a conception of Beth that served the purpose of 
the staffing— to plan an appropriate educational program for her. The 
social consensual nature of knowledge was demonstrated in the group's 
emotional reactions to their construing of the mental disability label 
as a prognosis of hopelessness. It was again present in the 
reconstruing of the label provided by the psychologist. The emotional 
reactions which followed the construing and reconstruing were examples 
of the influence of thoughts, beliefs, theories, etc., on the behavior 
of persons. A belief which reflects the significance perspective of the
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person, that humans seek meaning for their lives, is evident in the 
psychologist's attempt to shift the group dialogue to explore global 
life-purposes for this child in addition to vocational and economic 
goals. This shift matches the proposed aim of education put forth in 
the model.
The elements of the appropriate practice of school psychology are 
also alive in this story. The psychologist attempted to enrich the 
personal knowledge of the staffing participants by offering an altered 
view of Beth's educational problems. In a sense, collaborative 
consultation was evidenced in this case. The psychologist proposed a 
point of view which was shared by the staffing participants, that Beth 
possesses an immortal soul, which is not normally considered in a 
staffing, and he downplayed the authority of psychological knowledge. 
Thus, an attempt was made to equalize the status of psychological and 
theological knowledge and to encourage equal participation in the 
problem-solving process by all participants in the staffing. No 
explanations of Beth's learning problems were offered in this meeting, 
primarily because no strong explanations emerged from the evaluation 
data. Instead, the staffing participants focused upon creating a 
consensus about Beth's academic aptitudes and getting on with designing 
a program for her.
The action of a unitary democracy was evident in the group's 
acceptance of various descriptions of Beth. Had someone disagreed with 
a particular description the process would have taken a different turn. 
Disagreements are best dealt with, in this author's opinion and 
experience, by rational dialogue and compromise. For example, if the
L  . . . . . .
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parent had objected to the idea that Beth has trouble learning, she 
might have been asked for specific examples of Beth's learning. These 
examples would, then, have to be incorporated into the theory of Beth's 
learning potentials which were being constructed in the staffing 
dialogue.
By encouraging a much broader conception of Beth, the psychologist 
sought to expand what counted as knowledge in this staffing. When the 
staffing participants were reminded that Beth is more than an economic 
unit the focus was shifted from societal expectations of Beth to an 
exploration of the meaning of Beth's life. Moral leadership in this 
case consisted of inviting the group members to consider alternative 
purposes for Beth's education, purposes which would include the 
significance of Beth as a person and the significance of her life within 
a larger theological tradition.
Case History 6
Next, a story about the future practice of school psychology will 
be told. This and the following "future case history" are best seen as 
goals rather than as predictions, goals deduced from the model rather 
than predictions based upon any hypothesized exceptionless patterns. A. 
school psychologist who practices from the proposed model will ask 
certain kinds of questions of clients whenever the child's education is 
discussed. When questions of curriculum (that which is taught) are 
forthcoming, the psychologist will ask, "how will this content (skill, 
information) help the child find meaning in her/his life?" The goal of 
such a school psychologist is to keep the focus on the long-range, 
wholistic view of the child's life. When questions of technique emerge,
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this school psychologist will ask, "What do we know, as a group, about 
this child that might help us to find a strategy which will ensure that 
this child reaches her/his goals." It is understood, of course, that 
society circumscribes those goals, yet there are many ways a person may 
find meaning in her/his life. The questions about technique does not 
make sense without the question about curriculum. The goal of the child 
is inseparable from the route the child takes to achieve it.
Typically, this author consults about techniques while leaving 
curriculum relatively unquestioned. Thus, an unrealized, yet deducible, 
practice of the school psychologist who subscribes to this model is to 
take part in more dialogues about curriculum. It is conceivable that 
some of the traditional curricular goals may not be appropriate for some 
students. How long, for example, must a child endure a host of 
unsuccessful techniques for the teaching of some basic academic skill 
before teachers, parents, the student, and others begin searching for 
more achievable goals?
Again, it has been this author's experience that when the 
traditional educational curriculum is judged to be inappropriate for a 
student, the educational team typically focuses upon "vocational" or 
"self-help" goals. Examples of such goals include check writing, 
reading warranties, comparative shopping, and personal hygiene skills.
It is also usual for the education team to make curricular decisions 
with little or no solicited input from the child. Typically, 
psychometric data and the collective wisdom of the education team 
provide the basis for curricular decision making. The current model 
advocates for input from the child via interviews and observations. The
r.L_.
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younger the child the more inferences must be drawn from interviews and 
observations. In the end, educators cannot give a child a meaning for 
her/his life. But educators may help the student attain some of the 
requisite skills which may be needed on her/his journey. The following 
tells a future story about how this author would like to practice school 
psychology, a future this author will be promoting in dialogues with 
colleagues.
A third grade teacher requested help from the author concerning a 
student, Robert, who was not mastering basic reading skills. The 
teacher reported that Robert just could not hear the sounds in words 
and, thus, was unable to decode even the simplest vocabulary words. 
Robert had been receiving remedial reading help since first grade, so 
the author asked to meet with the classroom and remedial reading teacher 
together. Meanwhile, an appointment was made with the classroom teacher 
for the author to observe Robert during reading instruction.
The observation found Robert and four other students working at a 
table with the classroom teacher. The children were taking turns 
reading, or attempting to read, vocabulary words from a list on a large 
tablet situated near the teacher so that all five students could easily 
see the words. Robert's responses were not usually even close to the 
correct pronunciation, occasionally his initial sound was correct. 
Although Robert was not the only youngster having difficulty with this 
task, his performance was far below that of the other group members.
The teacher had previously informed the author that this group, the 
Darth Vaders, was the lowest reading group in all of third grade (there 
were two other third grade classes in this school).
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Later in the observation session, the teacher read a story to the 
group, a story on which they would eventually be working in reading 
group. During this time Robert was very attentive. Later, when the 
teacher asked the group questions about the story, Robert's hand was up 
each time. He was called upon several times and his answers were always 
correct. His performance on this listening comprehension task was much 
better than any of the other Darth Vaders.
A subsequent meeting with Robert's teachers revealed that they were 
aware of his good listening skills but were very concerned about his 
decoding abilities. The remedial reading teacher had worked with Robert 
for two and one-half years and had used numerous techniques to 
facilitate his learning of letter sounds. This teacher was very 
experienced, with over twenty years of teaching at the elementary level, 
and was considered to be very competent. She had tried drills of 
various kinds, some with extrinsic rewards, word families, competitive 
games requiring letter-sound associations, and many other approaches to 
teaching phonics to Robert. However, he had shown little or no gain in 
his knowledge of these associations. After further discussion, the 
psychologist requested another meeting with the teachers and Robert's 
parents.
Robert's mother, but not his father, attended a meeting with the 
teachers and the author. The mother was quite aware of Robert's reading 
problems because of frequent contact with Robert's teachers, past and 
present. She explained that Robert's father also had a severe reading 
problem which he never outgrew. The author shared his observations 
about Robert's apparently good listening skills and all agreed that he
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liked to listen to stories and seemed to learn from them. The mother 
told how Robert frequently liked to help his father, who worked as a 
mechanic, repair engines. He demonstrated some skill at being able to 
use tools to take motors apart and put them together again. Robert's 
teachers also were aware of his good visual-spatial reasoning abilities.
As a group, it was decided that the psychologist would work with 
Robert in an attempt to generate some ideas about ways of remediating 
this student's reading problems. A referral form was signed by Robert's 
mother and a follow-up meeting was scheduled for three weeks. The 
author intended to observe, interview, and evaluate Robert in that time.
The author conducted further observations of Robert in the regular 
and remedial reading rooms, none of which revealed any new information. 
Interviews with Robert found him to be pleasant, friendly, and 
cooperative. He was aware that reading was difficult for him and 
admitted that he did not like to read aloud, but that he did like 
looking at the pictures while others read. Robert was very interested 
in cars, trucks, and other mechanical things. He also liked to operate 
the classroom computer. When Robert was shown a mechanical teaching 
device, he was much more interested in how the thing worked than in the 
contents of the lessons. Robert liked to talk about his experiences 
helping his father work on cars and trucks. He appeared to have some 
rudimentary vocabulary appropriate to the auto mechanic field.
When Robert was asked in what kinds of things he was most 
interested, it was no surprise that he wanted to be a mechanic like his 
father. He also had an uncle in the U.S. Navy and thought joining the 
Navy for a while might be fun. Of a large number of activities
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suggested by the author, Robert liked computers, video games, puzzles, 
making things with tools, recess, bike riding, some math, adventure 
movies, and a few TV shows. He said he did not like reading, spelling, 
school in general, writing, cleaning liis room, playing with his little 
sister, riding in the car, sports, or swimming. Robert reported only 
one friend with whom he regularly played. His comments indicated that 
he was not a particularly popular youngster and that he often was last 
to be chosen at recess for kickball or football teams. Most other 
questions about Robert's distant future seemed silly to him and yielded 
little useful information.
Next, the author asked Robert questions about reading. While 
acknowledging that he did not like to read, the author asked Robert 
whether or not he thought his teachers and parents would ever let him 
give up on learning to read. Robert answered, "no", and understood that 
as long as he was in school teachers would be asking him to read. Thus, 
it was mutually agreed that Robert was not going to be allowed to stop 
learning to read. The author, however, admitted that no one could make 
Robert learn to read, that all his teachers and parents can do is try to 
teach him, but that he, Robert, was the one who must do the learning. 
Robert acknowledged, with a smile, that he understood that he was 
largely in control of his learning.
The author led the discussion in another direction by inquiring 
about what went on in Robert’s mind when he tried to read difficult 
material. Robert had difficulty expressing anything but his dislike for 
these situations, so the author began hypothesizing about what kinds of 
ideas might be going on in the student's head. Robert vigorously agreed
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that he often told himself that the reading was too hard, that he could 
not do it, that it would be awful to fail, and that he was a lousy 
student because he could not read well. The author challenged each of 
these beliefs by asking Robert if he could prove them all to be true. 
After some discussion Robert agreed to change his beliefs to the 
following: reading is hard, but not too hard; I can read better now
than I could last year; it is bad to fail, but it is not the end of the 
world; and I am not as good a reading student as some, but I will 
probably get better at reading if I keep trying. After saying these new 
beliefs aloud a few times, Robert agreed to read some passages for the 
author.
Robert began with some very easy, pre-primer paragraphs which he 
read with about 90% fluency and he was able to answer all comprehension 
questions easily. The level of difficulty of the passages was gradually 
increased until Robert was reading with only about 70% fluency on 
material selected from an end of first grade reading text. He was 
capable, however, of answering three out of four comprehension questions 
at this level. Observations of Robert found his level of activity and 
his distractibility to increase with the level of reading difficulty.
He acknowledged that it was harder for him to concentrate when the words 
became more difficult.
Next, Robert was asked whether he could think of any sayings 
(thoughts, beliefs) he could tell himself, when the reading became more 
difficult, that might help him concentrate better and try his very best. 
In the spirit of the prior conversation about his thoughts during 
reading, Robert suggested that he could tell himself to "pay attention,
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do your best." These sentences were written down on an index card for 
Robert to tape on his desk. He was also asked to think of any pictures 
he could draw next to the sentences that would help him remember to pay 
attention and do his best. Robert chose to draw a picture on his card 
of a boy sitting at a desk, with a smile on his face, looking at a book. 
He agreed to look at this card just before each time he was asked to 
read.
Next, a discussion was initiated with Robert concerning his 
difficulty in sounding out new words. This conversation was difficult 
for Robert, probably because this activity was his greatest source of 
frustration. However, it eventually became clear that concentrating 
upon the individual letters and remembering all the different sounds was 
very intractable for him. Sometimes he used pictures to figure out 
words, but often there were few, if any, pictures to help him. It also 
became apparent that Robert's frustrations often led to high levels of 
anxiety and to his giving up on trying to decode a passage. Although 
Robert did not directly express that he sometimes used context clues to 
decode words, it was apparent that he occasionally did so. When it was 
pointed out to Robert that he did possess some strategies for figuring 
out words he seemed to feel better about his endeavors. It was proposed 
that the author would try to persuade Robert's teachers and parents to 
focus more on helping him learn how to better use his contextual way of 
decoding words and to eliminate or greatly reduce his phonics lessons. 
Robert thought this proposal was a good idea.
It was decided by the author that it was important for the school 
principal to attend the upcoming parent-teacher meeting. This idea was
«!
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shared with Robert’s teachers and parent, all of whom agreed. The 
principal was able to attend the meeting at which the author reported 
his experiences with Robert. All present believed that the author's 
findings were consistent with what they knew of Robert, and they were 
receptive to the author's theory that Robert lacked some fundamental 
skills which were necessary for success in learning phonics. When it 
was proposed that Robert's reading curriculum be altered to focus more 
on contextual and structural approaches to word decoding, all present 
agreed that this approach was worth a try. However, when the author 
proposed that such a change in Robert's reading curriculum would mean 
that the current reading materials would not be appropriate and that any 
changes made this year would necessitate changes in future grades, the 
principal became visibly uncomfortable.
The principal was thinking about the resistance from Robert's 
future teachers who, not being familiar with his educational history, 
would probably not welcome the additional burden of preparing a separate 
set of curriculum materials for and spending additional time with this 
youngster. To further complicate the issue, the remedial reading 
teacher claimed to have several other third grade youngsters who also 
seemed to use context and structural clues better than letter-sound 
associations in word decoding. At that point the author suggested that 
the problem with Robert and these other youngsters be presented to the 
faculty, as a whole, at the next building meeting to solicit their input 
to the curriculum problem. The principal agreed to this idea and put 
the issue on the agenda for the faculty meeting two weeks away. 
Meanwhile, all conference participants agreed to replace the traditional
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phonics instruction with a contextual/structural approach for Robert 
while keeping him in his present reading group. Robert's classroom 
teacher expressed some uncertainty about what materials she could use 
with Robert, but the remedial reading teacher offered to help her plan 
lessons and find materials appropriate for Robert.
Two weeks later at the faculty meeting, the author, with help from 
the two teachers involved, presented Robert's case. Very quickly 
several of the teachers reported that they currently or in the past had 
students like Robert who did not seem to profit from traditional phonics 
instruction. A show of hands revealed that almost all the teachers 
remembered having such students in their classrooms. When the proposed 
change in curriculum for Robert was presented several of the teachers 
questioned whether it was practical to change the curriculum for only 
one student. Others countered that it was the teacher's job to fit the 
curriculum to the child. One teacher suggested that there were probably 
enough students with similar problems to justify the creation of an 
alternative reading curriculum for such students. The discussion 
continued with various proposals and counterproposals, and, ultimately 
with help from the principal, a compromise agreement was reached. The 
principal agreed to form a committee to study the problem. He asked for 
one teacher from each grade, the remedial reading teachers, and the 
school psychologist to form a committee, study the issue, and make a 
recommendation to him in two months.
The committee was formed and the author volunteered to conduct a 
search of the educational psychology and reading literature for 
information which might be helpful to the committee. Other
1
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subcommittees dealt with the search for a model program, finding 
appropriate educational materials, and the transitions these youngsters 
would have to make from grade-to-grade. Eventually, the committee 
pulled together all their information and spent several sessions working 
out an agreement which was presented to the principal as a set of 
specific recommendations.
While Robert never caught up with his peers in reading, his 
attitudes toward reading improved quickly. Eventually he was put into a 
new reading group with two other third grade students. This reading 
group became a prototype for an alternative reading curriculum in the 
schools which not only approached decoding in less traditional ways, but 
also made other modifications in the reading curriculum and in the 
traditional reading instructional methods. It was agreed that this 
alternative curriculum was to be experimental with a careful monitoring 
of several aspects of reading as well as regular assessments of 
attitudes toward reading and school. Attempts were made to make the 
reading content more personal and relevant to each child. Eventually, 
writing began to creep into the reading curriculum and the teachers 
realized that they had embarked upon a whole-language approach for these 
students. The author continued to consult with teachers of the students 
in this special group, primarily to collaborate about ways of assessing 
progress. The principal was initially reluctant about all the changes 
taking place for these students. However, the constant monitoring 
provided her with reassurance that the new approach would not continue 
if the students failed to make some progress. She eventually became 
quite enthusiastic about the project and was instrumental in diffusing
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the program within the building and, later, to other buildings in the 
district.
This case study illustrates a number of features of the proposed 
model. Aspects of constructivism, purposiveness, and the consensual 
nature of social knowledge are evident in this story. The author's 
attempts to enrich the clients (in this case the clients ranged from a 
student to a school building staff) and the democratic approach to 
decision making were exemplified. One may also see the potential for 
assessing and utilizing the personal theories of the child in 
understanding his problem and in formulating a new approach to teaching 
him reading. Implied in this model is the idea that students should be 
an integral part of the assessment and planning process in education. 
The values, purposes, and ideas of the student should compete freely 
with those of the teacher, the principal, and the school psychologist. 
Educators and school psychologists do not have relatively exceptionless 
laws of behavior from which they can accurately predict and control 
behavior. Therefore, they had better consider all relevant points of 
view in the dialectical and consensual knowledge formation process. 
Education is something we do with, not Ĵ o, a child.
The long terra impact of the changes in the reading curriculum for 
students like Robert is difficult to assess. Reading, like other parts 
of the curriculum, is not something that can be given to a student. 
Rather, what a student learns in school is the result of a dialectical 
process between student and teacher, student and materials, and student 
and student. Without covering laws which clearly specify the 
relationships between the relevant relationships educators cannot
r
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accurately predict, much less control, the outcome of these 
interactions. However, educators and school psychologists can make the 
process more collaborative and, thus, more likely to be perceived by 
everyone involved as something over which they have some control. An 
increased perception of control may improve motivation and frustration 
tolerance in some students. It is, at least, a hypothesis worth 
testing.
Case History 7
The next, and last, future case study will present a common moral 
dilemma for the school psychologist. While this situation is a frequent 
occurrence in the practice of most school psychologists, the resolution 
to the conflicting values is not widely talked about among 
practitioners. This case highlights the struggles which must be faced 
by school psychologists who work in a very tradition-governed 
institution, the school, wherein the educational practices are being 
increasingly scrutinized and criticized.
A referral was received from a group of sixth grade teachers on a 
boy about whom they had become increasingly concerned. The boy, Tim, 
had begun the school year academically behind most of his classmates and 
he had made very little progress during the first seven months of the 
year. He was reported to be very disorganized, to rarely turn in 
assigned work, to often exhibit socially inappropriate behavior, and to 
rarely pay attention in class. A review of Tim’s cumulative folder 
revealed that he had moved to the local community at the beginning of 
fourth grade. According to teachers' comments on his past report cards, 
since starting school he had difficulty paying attention, completing nis
L _____________
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work, and making friends in each grade. Although Tim had apparently 
never been evaluated by a psychologist, he had received counseling from 
the elementary guidance counselor during the last half of fourth grade 
and for all of fifth grade. There were no reports in his file regarding 
these counseling sessions. Tim's grades were generally slightly below 
average. He was the oldest of three children. His siblings were two 
sisters, ages four and two. A group intelligence test administered in 
fourth grade indicated that Tim functioned with average academic 
abilities.
An interview with the elementary guidance counselor revealed that 
the focus of her counseling with Tim was primarily on social skills.
She saw Tim individually and in a group to work on teaching him how to 
make and keep friends. She reported that Tim seemed to learn the social 
skills lessons quite well in the counseling session, but did not use 
them in class or on the playground. The counselor described Tim as 
being somewhat odd in his interactions with other children. He was 
often reluctant to approach other children, and when he did he 
frequently said unusual things or asked embarrassing questions. She 
dismissed him from counseling at the end of fifth grade, primarily 
because he was going to sixth grade at the middle school. She put his 
name on a follow-up list for the middle school counselor but had no 
information about Tim since he completed fifth grade.
The middle school counselor told the author that she had checked on 
Tim several times during the school year and was concerned about his 
progress. She had initiated several discussions among the sixth grade 
teachers about adjustments they could make and interventions they could
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try to help Tim socially and academically. The teachers began an 
assignment sheet on which Tim was responsible for writing down his 
assignments each day. However, Tim rarely could find his assignment 
sheet, so the teachers began initialing the sheet at the end of each 
class period, and the guidance counselor checked his assignment sheet at 
the end of each day. If Tim had failed to complete his assignment 
sheet, he was not allowed to leave school at the end of the day until 
the sheet was correctly filled in and initialed by each teacher. While 
there was some improvement, it became necessary for the counselor to 
contact the parents and ask them to check Tim's assignment sheet each 
afternoon and to see that he completed his homework assignments.
For about two weeks this system worked fairly well. Then, Tim 
began to turn in fewer assignments and to lose his sheet more often. 
Attempts to contact the parents were not very successful. The counselor 
felt that the parents did not want to be bothered about Tim's school 
problems anymore. Meanwhile, as Tim began to slip academically, he also 
became increasingly socially withdrawn. He was rarely seen interacting 
with other students and, when he did interact with them, it usually 
involved conflict.
A conference was set up by the author to meet with Tim's teachers 
and parents. Although telephone contact had been made and a follow-up 
letter sent, the parents failed to attend the conference. The teachers 
reiterated most of the above information. When asked by the author what 
they expected from a psychological evaluation, the teachers admitted 
that they wanted Tim put into the learning disabilities (LD) program. 
They felt that he needed one caring person to look after him each day.
[-
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They believed that he would feel more comfortable about coming to school 
if he could work regularly with Miss Smith, the LD teacher, who was 
known for helping students keep up with their assignments and prepare 
for tests. When it was pointed out by the author that, at this point, 
there was no evidence that Tim was LD, the teachers asked if he might 
not qualify as a behavior disordered (BD) student.
The dilemma which the author faced in this case is not at all 
unusual. Basically, regular education teachers witness the apparent 
success of students who are placed into special education programs for 
the mildly disabled. The success is apparent because the research 
literature cited in Chapter 2 strongly suggests that mildly handicapped 
students score just as well on standardized measures of achievement 
whether they are placed in special education instructional programs or 
not. This research also indicates that formal measures of self-concept 
do not improve, and may actually deteriorate in some students, upon 
placement in special education. While the author had cited this 
literature to the district special education teachers and encouraged 
them to conduct local studies of the effects of special education 
placement, no interest was shown among the staff in conducting such 
research. Notoriously, students with mild handicaps in Tim's school 
district usually began to receive better grades (when these grades were 
assigned by the special education teacher) and to pass their courses 
each year after being placed into special education. Often these 
students had been predicted to be school drop-outs, a prediction which 
was rarely true for those placed in special education classes. Usually, 
these students were seen, after placement in special classes, to
E ~ _
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"belong" to the special education teacher to whom they were assigned. 
This arrangement was most often satisfactory to everyone involved. The 
regular education teachers no longer felt responsible and were no longer 
embroiled in the daily conflicts of educating these students. The 
parents usually felt satisfied because their children were "passing" 
school, and the parents usually had only one teacher with whom they had 
to deal when school problems arose. Most of the students exhibited 
signs of being less distressed about coming to school; a few overtly 
expressed that they liked school better. The school principals were 
usually satisfied with the special education programs because the 
conflicts were fewer and the secondary school drop-outs were diminished. 
At least one principal, however, was disappointed to learn that once 
these students were placed in special education they were likely to 
remain in the program until high school graduation. He sincerely 
believed that the special education program would "fix" these students.
The dilemma faced by the school psychologist in this case is many 
faceted. First, the mechanistic view of humanity is behind the 
principal's expectation that the students identified as handicapped can 
somehow be "fixed" by the appropriate remedial treatment. The 
mechanistic view is also evident in the research cited in Chapter 2 on 
the effects of special education which has traditionally focused upon 
standardized achievement scores, and standardized measures of self- 
concept. From the mechanistic view the issues of special education can 
be settled by referring to physicalistic measures utilizing grams, 
centimeters, and seconds. Little or no reference is made to more 
qualitative criteria which are much more difficult, if at all possible,
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to measure on a universal scale. Even some of the quantifiable 
variables, such as school drop-out rates and measures of teacher, 
parent, and student satisfaction, are rarely seen as dependent variables 
in these studies.
Perhaps even more important are the moral questions which emerge in 
an examination of the practice of placing students into special 
education. One may begin with the most obvious question, is it good to 
segregate handicapped students from their regular education peers? 
Following this, we should ask, do school officials (including the school 
psychologist) have the right to segregate certain classes of students?
If such segregation eases the burden of the school without improving 
upon the education of the student, is it an ethical practice? Which 
school outcome variables are of most importance, and to whom are they 
most important? Questions concerning the true functions of the school 
emerge quickly when debates about the effectiveness of special education 
are allowed to take their logical course. We are soon confronted by the 
deep-seated, usually unspoken, beliefs about American public education.
Where one decides to terminate the questioning process has 
relevance to individual cases such as Tim's. If the author decided to 
adopt the shared beliefs of the sixth grade teachers, he would have 
gladly conducted an evaluation of Tim to determine his eligibility for 
special education programming. On the other hand, if he included in the 
debate the growing consensus among special education researchers, that 
programs for the mildly handicapped are not working, then he would 
resist conducting an evaluation for placement. Instead, he would 
advocate for adjustments in the regular education program for this
[
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student. However, in so doing, he would be denying this youngster 
access to a program which, by local standards, may very well be 
successful.
At another level of analysis, we may want to ask whether the 
learning of specific academic skills which are measured by standardized 
achievement tests (or curriculum-based assessments), or the learning of 
specific, observable behaviors, are the most important educational goal 
in this youngster's life at this time? If we view special education 
placement as a way of protecting this youngster from the stresses of 
regular education, what difference will such a placement make in the 
long run for this student? Will he be over-protected and, thus, denied 
opportunities to successfully solve his problems? What resources, if 
any, are available in the schools to help this student achieve a 
meaningful life? Perhaps the long-term goals of this youngster had 
better be assessed by an educational team, which would include the 
child, and recommendations made accordingly. One person alone should 
not make such important decisions. Through the give-and-take of the 
dialectical process many of the relevant value positions can be 
presented as the final decision will be value based and not mechanistic 
or limited to functional, lawful principles. Ideally, a synthesis of 
the varying points of view can be created and a consensus achieved from 
which an educational program for Tim can emerge.
Thus, this case cannot be completed at this time because the author 
is unable to predict just what value positions would emerge in such a 
case. Drawing upon recent past experience with cases which share some 
elements with Tim's, the author would predict that Tim would be
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evaluated by the Diagnostic and Educational team, including the child, 
the parents, teachers, a special education consultant, a school social 
worker, and the school psychologist. It is very likely that Tim would 
be viewed by this team as functioning with a Behavior Disorder and 
recommended for a non-traditional special program. That is, placement 
in a traditional special education program for academic or behavioral 
remediation would probably not be recommended. Instead, a program of 
interventions specially designed for Tim would be recommended. One of 
these interventions would include regular, daily contact with a caring 
adult who would develop an abiding, personal relationship with Tim. The 
research on the effects of psychotherapy, cited in Chapter 2, suggest 
that when people improve in psychotherapy it is more likely the result 
of a relationship than of any special technique. Also, this special 
person, probably an aide in one of the special education programs, would 
have access to all kinds of consultants with whom she/he could form 
relationships which might be of benefit to Tim.
An individual educational plan (IEP) for Tim would not resemble the 
typical goals and objectives seen in most acadejnically or behaviorally 
oriented programs. Rather, the caring person in charge of Tim's daily 
educational program would keep an individual educational diary (IED) in 
which daily notes would be recorded concerning aspects of Tim's behavior 
which were thought to be theoretically important. Out of weekly 
meetings of a core educational team, including the school psychologist, 
would emerge a theory of Tim gleaned from patterns found in the IED, 
additional comments of the caring person in charge, and observations of 
others. Strong efforts would be made to involve the parent in these
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weekly review and planning sessions. As long as Tim did not fit into 
the educational mainstream the IED process would probably prevail.
It should be pointed out that another of the typical moral dilemmas 
faced by the school psychologist is that there are very legitimate 
differences in her/his perspective and that of the classroom teacher.
The major difference is that while the school psychologist is usually 
concerned about a particular child, the teacher is concerned about a 
group of children. The school psychologist's recommendations often tend 
toward an individualized program, the teacher usually is concerned with 
protecting the one curriculum which has been designed for all children. 
The sctool psychologist is often out of touch with just how much effort 
is required by a teacher to manage a class of twenty-five or more 
students. The teacher is usually keenly aware of the limits of her/his 
resources. There are no easy solutions to these problems. It should be 
remembered that special education classrooms were begun in order to 
alleviate some of these continuing problems.
This future case reflects a desire for flexibility in trying to 
help students negotiate the schooling process. By taking a wholistic 
rather than a mechanistic view of the student the educational team will 
attend to more than just narrow academic and behavioral skills. When 
school psychologists in the future use terms like "meaning of life" in 
regard to a student, the concept of learning will take on a much broader 
significance. Instead of referring to the ansr/ers to questions on some 
achievement or college entrance test, they will be talking about 
facilitating the creation of consciousness in a human being.
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Implications for Training
The alternative model for the practice of school psychology 
presented herein calls for a revision of the training of school 
psychologists. Traditional course work in Psychological Foundations, 
Educational Foundations, Assessment/Interventions, Statistical Analyses 
and Research Design, and Professional School Psychology (Fagan, 1990) 
would continue to form the foundation of a school psychologist's 
education. Any new approach to the practice of the discipline must be 
founded upon and inclusive of effective past practices. However, 
ineffective practices or outmoded practices need to be deleted (e.g., 
changing from verification of eligibility for funding to developing 
change strategies). Further, we should not assume that school 
psychology practice is homogeneous. A practice in school psychology 
will be a function of the dialogue between the service provider and the 
consumers of those services. If an educational agency is expecting a 
school psychologist to provide traditional assessment and remediation 
services, then the person who is hired for such a position needs to be 
prepared to provide those services. Hopefully, the school psychologist 
in such a position will engage her/his clients in dialogues from which a 
revised practice, such as the one presented in this thesis, will evolve.
In order for the school psychologist to provide an alternative 
practice, she/he needs to be exposed to a background of experiences 
which have not often been included in school psychology programs. An 
exposure at the graduate level to the dialogues concerning the history 
and philosophy of science is essential for school psychologists who have 
identified themselves as scientific practitioners. A critical awareness
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of the basic assumptions of the science of psychology upon which 
practice is founded is necessary in order for the practitioner to 
understand the limits of the profession’s scientific knowledge base.
With the strong hold that empiricism has had as a base for 
scientific psychology, training programs will neea to identify levels of 
fact, value, and myth in the training so that the various philosophical 
roots of practice based on fact, value, purely theoretical possibility, 
or myth will be understood by the trainee. Just as it is important to 
know when to use a behavior modification technique, it will be important 
to know when to use value consensus building or to critically develop a 
situation specific theory to guide trial and error approaches.
Following the conclusions presented in Chapter 3, it is important 
for school psychologists to be familiar with narrative as a form of 
assessment and remediation. The communication of information through 
stories and myths can have an impact upon school psychologists and their 
clients (Bagarozzi & Anderson, 1989; Campbell, 1972; Feinstein & 
Krippner, 1988; Gardner, 1971; Murray, 1960), yet these traditionally 
important forms of discourse are, to this author's knowledge, rarely a 
formalized part of the school psychologist's training curriculum.
In order to practice, the school psychologist must have a knowledge 
base. This base needs to incorporate learning and development in 
cognition, morality, social behavior, and motor systems, as well as 
effective information processing strategies, memory systems, and meaning 
in life. These individually centered types of knowledge will then need 
to be reconstructed in group settings like classrooms, reading groups, 
family systems, peer systems, and school cultures. And finally, the
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knowledge must be translated into language understandable to a child, a 
parent, a teacher, or an administrator so that the knowledge becomes 
inserted into the dialectical process between co-equal participants.
Another important aspect of school psychology training is 
collaborative consultation. Gallessich (1982) has outlined a curriculum 
for consultation training, parts of which are already used for school 
psychology graduate training. One limiting aspect of Gallessich's model
is that she assumes that power is unequally distributed in a
consultative relationship. There may be circumstances in which the 
school psychologist is cast in an authoritative role in which no
opportunities are available to question the assumptions underlying this
role (e.g., when testifying in a court of law). However, in this 
revisioned model of school psychology, the practitioner attempts at 
every opportunity to equalize the power and authority in all 
relationships.
To facilitate the questioning and thinking of student school 
psychologists, they should be provided with specific courses in ethical 
practices and moral philosophy. Chances to experience the conflicts 
involved in practice can be provided first by staging mock staffings, 
with some students role-playing various staffing participants, while 
other students observe and critique the staffing process. This can then 
be extended to supervised, field based practice.
Experience in schools and other practice settings is usually an 
important part of school psychology training programs. This is an 
important aspect of preparing practitioners and should be expanded. 
Whenever possible, opportunities to participate in the schooling process
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should be provided throughout the school psychology training program, in 
addition to formal practicum and internship courses. Student 
practitioners should have the opportunity to initiate dialogues about 
these school experiences throughout the training program. Perhaps such 
discussions should be "programmed" in the curriculum by the university 
trainers of school psychologists. These experiences in the schools and 
the subsequent dialogues are important in expanding the constructs of 
neophyte practitioners, and may serve to instill habits which promote 
personal growth and professional development in experienced school 
psychologists.
The importance of experiences and the dialectical processes must be 
emphasized. The future school psychologist in the revisioned model is 
one who will begin practice with a strong respect for the complexities 
of the person and who acknowledges that reductionism when applied to 
human relationships is a potentially dangerous process which can lead to 
oversimplifications and misunderstandings of the person. What is needed 
is an awareness of when to use fact, value, myth, insight, intuition, 
and hope, as well as which philosophical, theoretical, and empirical 
systems support each.
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EPILOGUE
In the case studies presented in Chapter 5 one may see the 
potential roles and functions for the school psychologist. The term 
school psychologist can be taken literally to mean someone who applies 
psychological theories in the setting of the school. The potential 
exists for the application of a number of psychological theories, only a 
few of which were mentioned, to assist in organizing the information 
about a student. Ellis' (1962) Rational Emotive Therapy theory and 
Kelly's (1955) Theory of Personal Constructs were mentioned several 
times because they are favored by the author. Festinger's (1957) Theory 
of Cognitive Dissonance and portions of Adler's (1929) Individual 
Psychology are also sometimes used by the author in understanding 
clients. Much of C. G. Jung's (Campbell, 1971) theories of the 
collective unconscious, of archetypes, and of psychic development has 
been useful from time-to-time in helping clients formulate an 
explanation of their problems. The developmental theories of Erikson 
(1963), Kohlberg (1987), Piaget (1962), and others have been 
indispensable in understanding children and in constructing appropriate 
educational and psychological goals for them. Biological theories of 
behavioral disorders have also been helpful in explaining the problems 
of some children (Harper, 1982). Metabolic, toxic, and other 
physiological processes have been demonstrated to affect the learning 
and behavior of some children.
Anderson, Cancelli, and Krathochwill (1984) found in their survey 
an array of favorite theoretical approaches utilized by school 
psychologists. Only 9% of the respondents, however, indicated multiple
E
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theoretical approaches. It is not clear from this survey whether school 
psychologists are using different frames of reference for different 
problems or whether they tend to use the same theory to explain all 
problems. Given the weaknesses of psychological theories pointed out in 
Chapter 2 and 3, it is difficult to justify the application of any one 
theory for a majority of problem situations. Regarding the application 
of explicit theories in psychotherapy, Mindess (1988) expressed his 
belief that:
Only the most fervent proponents of an approach claim universal 
validity for it in an overt way. Covertly, however, we all cleave 
to favorite belief systems, employ typical ways of trying to help, 
and cannot rid ourselves of the notion that what seems right to us 
should apply to others too. . . .  Perhaps the crucial element in 
psychotherapy is the reformulation of the client's suffering and 
confusion into some sort of meaningful pattern that lends 
significance to his [sic] distress and points to a way beyond it, 
regardless of the form that significance and way may take. (p.
170)
In summary, from these few cases one can see that no single 
psychological theory can possibly encompass all of school psychology 
practice. A number of theories and approaches must be available to the 
school psychologist in her/his attempt to understand clients and to 
explain behavior to others, and the client's own theories may be a good 
place to begin searching for a suitable explanation. Sometimes no 
theory can be found to explain behavior and the school psychologist must 
admit failure in trying to understand another person. The practice of 
psychology frequently must venture beyond the range of scientific 
psychological theory. If the school psychologist is courageous and 
explores these frontier experiences with a student, teacher, family, or 
school system, a new, personal theory may emerge. Hopefully, the
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personal theory will be developed, publicized, and submitted to rational 
and empirical scrutiny and join the ranks of scientific psychological 
theory.
Too often, according to Koch (1981), psychologists have been
unwilling to face the uncertainties and ambiguities which are inevitable
when dealing with human beings:
It is as if uncertainty, mootness, ambiguity, cognitive finitude, 
were the most unbearable of the existential anguishes. Under these 
conditions, able and sincere inquirers become as autistic as little 
children; they seem more impelled toward the pursuit and 
maintenance of security fantasies than the winning of whatever 
significant knowledge may be within reach! (p. 259)
Koch warned of our regressive tendency to accept almost any explanation
in order to reduce the fears associated with uncertainty. He applauded
those who have the courage to look beyond the "'received1 concepts, our
technical constructions, our formal belief systems" (p. 265).
This thesis will end with the caveat that human beings are
difficult to understand and their behavior is difficult to predict.
Although the alert and interested observer may sometimes find patterns
in human behavior and these patterns may be helpful in producing
explanations of human action, there is no single set of scientific laws
or principles which has been found to provide either absolutely accurate
predictions of behavior or totally effective control of human behavior.
Instead, the search for the functional relations among variables in
human behavior has provided only partial understandings. These partial
understandings or relationships are also presented in theoretical
systems which are not without competing explanations. School
psychologists, then, can function from an empirical base only part of
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the time. They can function from a critically reviewed theoretical 
system for another part. Eventually, however, they will find themselves 
faced with problems for which reliable and valid psychological 
explanations do not exist. Rather than pretending to provide a strong 
science of behavior, school psychologists would do well to acknowledge 
their limitations.
Whether or not school psychologists can continue to be viewed as 
important to the functioning of schools will probably depend upon how 
empathic, innovative, ethical and helpful they are judged to be by their 
clients. School psychologists, as a group, certainly possess some 
important intellectual capacities (Hyman, 1988) which may facilitate 
problem solving. The school psychologist has a definite role to play in 
the schools. Although significant parts of that role may be in need of 
change, the fundamental act of trying to understand another person who 
has sought help involves the school psychologist in that person's life 
in potentially important ways. According to Kelly (1955), when one 
person tries to understand the constructs of another, the person 
attempting to understand begins to play a role in a social process with 
that other person. Thus, school psychologists are, or certainly can be, 
important in helping others cope with the inevitable stress inherent in 
the complex social processes found in the school.
Perhaps the school psychologist can be seen as the lubricant which 
keeps some of the parts of the school functioning with a minimum of 
friction. Or, perhaps the school psychologist may be thought of as the 
school shaman. Maybe the school psychologist serves as the conscience 
of the school. It could be that some see the school psychologist as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
192
non-addictive tranquilizer. In some cases the school psychologist is 
viewed as a technician who repairs that which breaks down. To some, the 
school psychologist is a gate-keeper. Sometimes the school psychologist 
is the scapegoat. Occasionally she/he is a hero. The roles and 
functions of the school psychologist are many and varied. They revolve, 
however, around a central core of helping and caring about children and 
those adults to whose care they are committed. In all roles, the school 
psychologist continues to stand on rigorous and critical thinking in 
utilizing psychological theory to build an understanding of the children 
whom she/he serves. It is the continuing dialogue which includes 
theory, research, and practice from the discipline of psychology that 
provides the school psychologist with her/his ties to the scientific 
community and her/his ethics and practice standards professionally. 
Contributing to the understanding of and assistance for a child is the 
goal of the disciplined inquiry into the child and her/his environment.
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